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ABSTRACT 
A Critical Case Study of Program Fidelity in TennCare 
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to evaluate the fidelity of the design of 
Tennessee's Medicaid managed care program in comparison to the actual program 
operation. Program fidelity is a broad measurement of how true the implemented 
program is to the intended program (Heflinger & Northrup, 2000). 
Background: In the span of only 15 years, the introduction of managed care and 
other market-based strategies from the private sector precipitated a transformation of the 
delivery of Medicaid services in the United States. These monumental changes remain 
poorly understood. The implementation of managed care in Tennessee's Medicaid 
program is an excellent public policy exemplar because of the far-reaching scope of the 
program and the ongoing development of the program. 
Method: A hallmark of case study research is that detailed information is 
collected from multiple sources (Creswell, 2003; Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991; 
Stake, 2000; Yin, 2003). Source data for this single case study design included 
interview data from key stakeholders and a variety of documents. Documents analyzed 
included: newspaper and journal articles; correspondences; the original TennCare and 
TennCare Partners waiver applications; judicial decrees; legislative documents; task 
force reports; and other case studies. Interviews were conducted with 26 informants, 
including two former Governors of Tennessee; a former HCFA Administrator; a variety of 
state government and managed care executives and advocates; and a complement of 
provider representatives including administrators, managers and caregivers. 
Themes were developed to organize the vast amount of interview data. The 
salience of themes that emerged in early interviews were challenged, clarified and 
further distilled by an iterative process of content analysis and data triangulation that 
included multiple close readings of interview transcripts and documents, clarification and 
testing of ideas with selected stakeholders and confirmation of details with document 
sources. The triangulation of retrospective recollections of events and key impressions 
captured in recorded interviews with a wide variety of time-stable documents provided a 
rich understanding of people and events that shaped the development and operation of 
TennCare. Each theme was also organized and developed through the construction of a 
chronological history of events. 
Findings: An intricate web of circumstances and people shaped the initial 
development and evolution of TennCare. Although TennCare has been successful in 
extending health care coverages, this success has been overshadowed by a myriad of 
operational problems. 
Thematic analysis illuminated both the promises and failures of TennCare. 
Three themes were prominent in the telling of the TennCare story: authority, 
management and fragmentation. Governor McWherter (1987-1995), the creator of 
TennCare, established a strong executive authority to model and implement TennCare; 
a void was created when he left office. Subsequent administrations have not adequately 
transitioned to a more balanced and inclusive authoritative structure, nor have they 
developed an adequate oversight model. Continued mismanagement of the 
administration of benefits and failure to meet established care standards set the stage 
for the imposition of federal judiciary authority. 
V 
Management of the operational phase of TennCare has largely been reactionary 
and politicized and, in many instances, inappropriately abdicated or conferred upon the 
wrong or unprepared people or entities. Turmoil and turnover in state government 
hindered stabilization of the program. The stability and evolution of the marketplace that 
McWherter expected has not been broadly realized; the state has retreated from basic 
managed care principles. 
The state failed to integrate the management the health, behavioral health and 
pharmacy carve-outs. This fragmentation resulted in diffuse accountability across 
vendors and within state government, unnecessary duplication of services, gaps in the 
delivery and management of patient care and increased patient hassle and frustration. 
More broadly, the state was found to have conflicting roles as both the manager of the 
behavioral health vendors and a direct provider of behavioral health services. 
The web of connectivity between themes changed over time, as themes presented 
as a cause, catalyst or consequence of the others at different times in TennCare's 
history. A poignant example of this connectivity is how the mismanagement of 
TennCare program after the initial implementation led to the breakdown in key alliances 
and the eventual imposition of federal judicial authority in the form of the consent 
decrees. Consent decrees resulted in reactive and disjointed management which 
significantly contributed to the gap between what was envisioned for TennCare and what 
actually resulted. 
Conclusions: The study illustrated that an intricate web of circumstances and people 
shaped the initial development and evolution of TennCare, a program designed to solve 
a state-level problem with national implications. Although TennCare has been 
successful in increasing the number of Tennesseans with health care coverage, these 
successes have been overshadowed by pervasive operational problems, a failure to fully 
implement basic building blocks of managed care, such as risk-sharing and competition, 
and effectively manage the vendors employed by the state. Conclusions related to the 
three themes show a pattern of missed opportunities and a troubling inability to transition 
from the chaos of TennCare's implementation to effective program operation. The 
illuminated themes will be informative to planners of similar state initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Introduction 
In the short span of less than 15 years, the delivery of Medicaid health services 
in the United States has been transformed. The effects of this transformation, largely 
precipitated by the introduction of managed care and other market-based strategies from 
the private sector, are not yet understood. One aim of the present study is to provide in­
depth scrutiny of one state's experiment with managed care in its Medicaid program. 
In this chapter, the use of managed care in Medicaid will be introduced and 
issues associated with the rapid implementation of this model of care for Medicaid 
beneficiaries will be outlined. Research aims and study questions, limitations and 
delimitations will also be presented. The chapter will conclude with comments on the 
significance and focus of the study. 
The reader is directed to the Appendices. A Glossary of Terms (Appendix A), A 
List of Acronyms (Appendix B), and diagrams of Behavioral Health Care Carve-Out 
Arrangements (Appendix C) and a Continuum of Types of Managed Care Plans 
(Appendix D) are included. 
Problem Statement 
Medicaid covers more than 50 million people nationally and pays for one in five 
health care dollars. From 1990 to 2002, the national Medicaid population grew by 60 
percent (Draper, Hurley & Short, 2004). At the state level, Medicaid spending is the 
second largest and fastest growing state budget item (Haslanger & Tallon, 2004). From 
2002 to 2004, 34 states resorted to cutting elements of their public health insurance 
programs because of unacceptable cost increases (Haslanger & Tallon, 2004). 
However, Tennessee had undertaken a radical experiment in 1994. Following the 
demise of President Clinton's national health reform, Tennessee was granted a waiver 
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by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to implement managed care for the 
state's Medicaid population. Tennessee's medical managed care plan, called 
TennCare, was implemented in 1994 after less than one year of planning. By 1996 the 
provision of all behavioral health care for Medicaid recipients was moved to two selected 
managed behavioral health care companies. Tennessee's move to managed care is 
noteworthy for three reasons. Tennessee implemented managed care earlier than most 
states. Tennessee added managed care as a full replacement for traditional care, rather 
than just as an option. The move to managed care took place on a very accelerated 
timetable. 
The TennCare program was beset with a myriad of start-up and operational 
problems, including funding woes and troubled relations with contracted managed care 
organizations (MCOs) and the state's providers, primarily physicians. Evaluation of the 
TennCare program is an important component of the policy-making cycle. 
Research Aims 
The aim of the case study was to evaluate the fidelity of the design of 
Tennessee's Medicaid managed care program (TennCare) to the actual delivery of the 
program through a review of pertinent literature and documents and interviews with 
various stakeholders. The study examined the complex contextual factors that influence 
the TennCare program, providing a multi-perspective view and examination of expected 
and unanticipated program results. The goal was a rich understanding and insight about 
an important public policy initiative. 
Research Question 
A single research question was used as the general guided for the study. The 
question was: In what ways has the implementation of TennCare been true to the 
original strategic aims of the program? 
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Delimitations 
Several delimitations were originally specified. Delimitations narrow the scope of 
the study (Creswell, 2003). Originally the case to be studied was specified as the 
managed behavioral health care program in TennCare, known as TennCare Partners. 
The case was also further delimited to the study of access to care for school-aged 
children and adolescents (ages 4-17) with serious emotional disorders (SED). These 
delimitations were deleted once interviews commenced for reasons outlined in Chapter 3 
on methods. The study proceeded with the case being defined as the entire TennCare 
program, including TennCare Partners. In a case study the researcher must establish 
and provide sound rationale for limiting what is relevant to the study and what will not be 
included. It is not possible to "tell the whole story." The emergent nature of issues and 
themes in a case study mandates a flexible and reflexive approach that can not be fully 
explicated in advance of data collection. 
Interviews with caregivers or providers were confined to a subset that resides or 
provides services in the East Tennessee Human Resources Agency (ETHRA) 
catchment area as originally specified. This catchment area includes the sixteen county 
area of Anderson, Blount, Campbell, Claiborne, Cocke, Grainger, Hamblen, Jefferson, 
Knox, Loudon, Monroe, Morgan, Roane, Scott, Sevier and Union. 
Limitations 
Limitations, which are specified, are projected weaknesses of the study 
(Creswell, 2003). By nature case studies are about the particular and so there are 
limitations about whether findings may be generalized. The purposive and selective 
sampling methodology can limit the generalizability of the findings. 
Since the researcher is the instrument of analysis, subjectivity or researcher bias 
is always a potential limitation. Strategies that were employed to manage researcher 
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bias include the clear identification and analysis of assumptions, as well as an ongoing 
process of challenging conclusions against these assumptions. Secondly, experienced 
researchers serving on the researcher's dissertation committee were used to analyze 
and verify content. 
The complexities associated with the delivery of health care services and 
managed care and the challenges presented by the population served by Medicaid 
posed a challenge in the management and interpretation of the data. It is recognized 
that the analysis conducted was not comprehensive. 
Study Significance and Focus 
The current trend of moving Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care programs 
has not been adequately evaluated. This situation is particularly concerning because of 
the special needs and vulnerabilities of individuals enrolled in public health programs. 
The speed, at which the change is being made, in the absence of good research and 
program evaluation, is another concern. It is not known whether research findings from 
the private sector, which are mixed, are applicable to the Medicaid population. The 
many variations of managed care that exist make evaluation difficult and conclusions 
may not be generalizable. 
Managed care is the strategy most frequently used by states to manage 
increased program costs and to accommodate increased enrollments. Of the 40 million 
beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid in 2002, 23 million or nearly 58 percent were enrolled 
in a managed care plan. This represents a ten-fold increase from 1990 to 2002 
((Draper, Hurley & Short, 2004; Haslanger & Tallon, 2004). 
Managed behavioral health care (MBHC) is also prevalent in Medicaid 
nationwide. In the early to mid 1990s, seven states, beginning with Utah in 1991 and 
followed by Arizona (1992), Massachusetts (1992), Washington (1993), North Carolina 
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(1994), Colorado (1995), and Iowa (1995) introduced managed behavioral health care in 
the state Medicaid program (Coleman et al., 2005). By 1999, 42 states had 
implemented some form of Managed behavioral health care for over 17 million 
beneficiaries (Coleman et al. , 2005). In 1999, more than one-half of all Medicaid 
beneficiaries were in enrolled in a MBHC plan. This represented a seven-fold increase 
from 1991 (Rowland, Garfield & Elias, 2003). Ten states (California, Michigan, 
Tennessee, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Washington, New York, Texas 
and Oregon) accounted for 80 percent of these enrollees. California, Tennessee and 
Michigan alone accounted for one-half of the national enrollment (Coleman et al., 2005). 
Between 1999 and 2000, six states, including Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, 
New Mexico, Montana and North Carolina terminated their Medicaid managed 
behavioral health care programs. Montana reverted to fee-for-service (FFS) because 
providers were unwilling to accept Medicaid reimbursement rates. North Carolina 
allowed its waiver to expire to facilitate development of a new statewide delivery system. 
New Mexico withdrew its program under the threat of termination of the state's entire 
Medicaid managed care plan if behavioral health care services were not carved-out 
(Coleman et al., 2005). 
The impact of the rapid implementation of managed care plans in the public 
sector has not been studied extensively. Research from the private sector, which is not 
definitive, can not be generalized to Medicaid due to plan and patient differences. 
Interestingly the managed care programs for Medicaid are generally referred to as 
experimental in the literature. 
Medicaid beneficiaries need strong policy advocates; nurse researchers should 
be more influential in the policy-making process. In evaluating public policies, nurses 
have the opportunity to improve patients' environment of care. These environmental 
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factors are important since issues of access, cost and quality, including specifically the 
complement of services delivered and their effectiveness, significantly impact patient 
outcomes. Nurses have not assumed a role in policy-making commensurate with their 
professional position and perspective. It is imperative that nurses get involved in policy 
research and other policy-making activities to improve outcomes for patients based on 
sound evidence and with a strong sense of advocacy. The need for involved nurses is 
poignantly true when you consider the special needs of patients with behavioral health 
disorders served by Medicaid. 
Using a critical orientation, which was specifically guided by the interpretive 
paradigm presented in the next chapter, the fidelity of Tennessee's managed behavioral 
health care program to selected strategic aims was addressed. Fidelity was analyzed by 
looking at the results or outcomes of the implementation of the TennCare program. 
As is true with any public policy, there are multiple stakeholders and perspectives 
relative to TennCare. This evaluation of the TennCare program was designed to include 
an examination of the complex contextual factors that influence the program and a multi­
perspective view, as well as an examination of expected and unanticipated results. The 
chosen design, a case study permits this broad examination. 
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CHAPTER 2: POLICY-MAKI NG AND EVALUTION PARADIGM 
Introduction 
An integrative paradigm for policy-making was constructed and used to orient 
study design, data collection, analysis and the development of recommendations. This 
integrated paradigm was derived and synthesized from the work of critical theorist, 
Jurgen Habermas, deliberative democracy advocate John Dryzek and proponents of 
responsive evaluation, including Jennifer Greene, Michael Patton and others. 
Understanding of the value of the integrative paradigm is enhanced by an explication of 
the researcher's perspective and purpose, as well as a discussion of the process of 
policy-making. 
Perspective and Purpose 
American society has undergone radical change since the 1960s and our society 
has become inherently more complex, pluralistic and fractured. Gone is the stable 
political, cultural and social environment many of us knew before then (Chrislip and 
Larson, 1994; Greenwald and Beery, 2002). In turn, we have seen a fragmentation of 
power, marginalization of a wide variety of groups and persons and the lack of effective 
social policy processes. We are impotent in addressing difficult social issues that have 
emerged with these major shifts. Our social policy-making processes are not 
responsive. Although the major emphasis of the integrative paradigm is developing an 
orientation for addressing health policy issues, often it is difficult and counter-productive 
to separate health from the other concerns of social policy. 
A Stunning Paradox 
In health care we are faced with a stunning paradox in the United States. We 
have the most technologically advanced delivery system and we spend a greater 
proportion of our gross national product on health care than any other industrialized 
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nation (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Studies, n.d.). At the same time we have over 
44 million Americans with no health care insurance (Institute of Medicine, n.d. , a; 
Institute of Medicine, 2004 January) and a shameful situation where ethnic and racial 
minorities receive a lower quality of care than their non-minority cohorts (Smedley, Stith 
and Nelson, 2002). Even the quality of care received by the non-minority population is 
not as high quality as many would assume (Chassin and Glavin, 1998; Institute of 
Medicine, n.d. b). Few can deny that the Institute of Medicine's report on patient safety 
(Corrigan and Donaldson, 2000), which asserted that 44,000 to 98,000 patients die 
annually as a result of medical errors in acute care hospitals, was a call to action. 
The United States lacks effective health and other social policies that reflect the 
needs and values of Americans. Recent reform efforts have only broadened the gaps 
between the various constituencies. Patients are marginalized by the very system that is 
intended to help them. Elected officials and industry leaders are unwilling or unable to 
break the impasse. Special interest groups and other power players have fragmented 
and thwarted efforts to produce significant, balanced and coordinated change. Nurses 
have generally not participated in the policy-making process in a role commensurate 
with their professional experience and expertise. 
John Gardner coined a phrase, "the war of the parts against the whole" (a 
primary source for this phrase was not found), to describe the fragmentation of power 
that is so prevalent in our country today. Empowerment, originating in and epitomized 
by the various liberations of the 1960s, and the rise in grassroots politics, eventually 
gave way to a variety of special interest groups and the politics of advocacy, which 
devolved to the polarization of the citizenry that is so prevalent today. Another issue is 
individualism. Citizens of the United States have long valued individualism. Our history 
has not fostered a broad sense of caring and social responsibility (Chrislip and Larson, 
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1 994). In many ways this individualism has thwarted needed civic action. In health 
care, our individual focus has prevented a rational, population-based focus on health. 
Increasing complexity and fragmentation have led to a situation where authority, 
responsibility and the ability to act have become so diffuse that no one person or group 
can successfully address difficult issues. Lack of confidence in leaders and institutions is 
pervasive. Chrislip (n.d.) further contends that political leaders are not leading. Instead 
they "too often divide citizens, erode civil society, and undermine trust in the democratic 
ideal" (Chrislip, n.d., para 1 ). 
Starting with a Specific Purpose 
Failures and deficits in policy-making support the need for an alternative 
understanding and commitment to the development and continual improvement of 
policies which are responsive to al l. Critical theory, particularly the work of Jurgen 
Habermas, provides an orientation characterized by a critical view of existing social 
structures and a call for revealing inequities for the purpose of producing beneficial 
change, especially for disenfranchised groups. Embracing a critical orientation for 
policy-making clearly telegraphs intentions to critique policies, raise consciousness and 
upset unequal power relationships (Patton, 2002). Deliberative democratic theory 
provides a basic framework for the evaluation of policy-making. Responsive program 
evaluation provides the means for producing needed change. 
Critical Theory 
Critical theory is a term coined by Max Horkheimer, one of the most influential 
and prominent members of the first generation of an interdisciplinary group of German 
scholars associated with the Institute for Social Research, which is now commonly 
referred to as the Frankfurt School. The scholars associated with the Frankfurt School, 
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either in Germany before the start of World War I I  or later in exile, primarily in the United 
States, were most interested in interpreting twentieth century history. 
Basic Assumptions and Beliefs 
The basic assumptions and tenets of critical theory, defined first by Horkheimer 
and his associates, are relevant to the discipline of nursing and particularly germane to 
policy-making. These assumptions and beliefs concern the nature of knowledge and 
truth, social order and the purpose of critical theory. The early critical theorists believed 
that knowledge is created, not discovered. Knowledge and truth are not universal. 
Instead, knowledge is contextual, historically situated and subjective. Truth is also 
subjective and reflective of values and ideology. The early critical theorists contended 
that societal order was reflective of power inequities that perpetuate race, class and 
gender oppression. The critical theorists focused on criticizing society's ideology and 
discovering contradictions in social arrangements. The central purpose of critical theory 
was explicitly directed at social change (Browne, 2000). 
Habermas 
Habermas is the leading second generation critical theorist from the Frankfurt 
School. Born in 1926, he lived under Nazi rule and is still an active writer. Using 
psychoanalysis as his springboard, with its purpose of developing an intersubjective 
relationship in which the therapist and patient breakdown communication barriers and 
make previously repressed motivations accessible to conscious understanding and 
control, Habermas conceived that critical social theory could do the same for society. 
This conception was based on the premise that society was also unable to recognize the 
true source of its history (Calhoun, 1996; Held, 1980). Habermas centered on 
communication as the means for liberating human and societal capacities (Held, 1980). 
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A basic understanding of the works of Habermas that are most pertinent to 
policy-making can be gained from his explication of the concepts of rationality, 
communication, knowledge, truth and the public sphere. 
Rationality and communication. In his work, Habermas centered on 
communication and collective social action as the means for liberating human capacities 
(Calhoun, 1996; Stevens, 1989). Habermas's concept of rationality, which is explicitly 
linked to communication, differentiates his theories from his predecessors (Ray, 1992; 
Scrambler, 2001 ). Instead of subscribing to the idea of instrumental rationality, or the 
process of coordinating means to given ends, Habermas promoted communicative 
rationality, which is the art of reflecting on background assumptions, and opening these 
to questioning and negotiations, something instrumental rationalists ignore (Blackburn, 
1996; Dryzek, 2002; Held, 1980; Ray, 1992; Scrambler, 2001). 
Habermas viewed rationality as being actualized in freedom and justice, and 
manifested as non-coercion and consensus. In turn, rationality has two central values, 
autonomy and responsibility (Browne, 2000). Truth is linked to the idea of rational 
consensus attained through discourse. Standards of truth or evidence are always social 
and all meaning and truth must be interpreted within the context of history (Blackburn, 
1996; Stevens, 1989). 
According to Habermas, all modes of communication rely on rational capacity 
(Ray, 1992). In creating the Theory of Rational Communicative Action, Habermas 
looked at communicative competence in the context of a search for a comprehensive 
theory of rationality (Ray, 1992). The core of the Theory of Rational Communicative 
Action is language and the concept of an ideal speech situation where rationality is 
revealed through discourse. Discourse is "speech that suspends all conversational 
motives other than that of reaching an understanding, to be achieved by withholding 
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judgments about the superiority of certain values and the existence of certain states of 
affairs" (Agger, 1991, p. 166). Fundamental to the idea of an ideal speech situation is 
the belief that all speech is oriented towards the idea of genuine, discursively achieved 
consensus which is rarely realized (Held, 1980). Habermas advanced the idea that the 
"potential for reason resides centrally in the capacity to arrive at un-coerced agreements 
concerning validity claims on the basis of reasons open to intersubjective assessment" 
(Hoy & McCarthy, 1994, p. 39). According the Habermas, the ve,y structure of speech 
serves to foster a life where truth, freedom and justice are possible (Held , 1980). 
Habermas has conceived all linguistic communication as having a background of 
consensus and an orientation to truth. He outlined four non-reducible validity claims for 
consensus. These claims include: the comprehensibility of the utterance; truth of the 
content; legitimacy or rightness of performative content; and the veracity of the speaker. 
Although ideal speech can be rarely achieved, if ever, the ideal form of discourse can be 
used as a normative standard for a critique of distorted communication. Distorted 
communication is present in eve,y communicative situation in which consensus is 
achieved under coercion (Held, 1980). 
Reflection is a central concern of Habermas. In creating the Theory of Rational 
Communicative Action, Habermas was addressing concerns that the dominance of 
positivism (which was bemoaned by the first generation exiles) led to diminished 
reflection. To transcend systems of distorted communication, individuals must engage in 
critical reflection and criticism. Critical reflection and criticism lead to emancipation, 
which entails transcending systems of distorted communication (Bronner, 2002; Browne, 
1995; Held, 1980). 
Before the Theory of Rational Communicative Action, the social paradigms of the 
system and lifeworld were separate and competitive. The system paradigm represents 
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the functional and structural view of society and the lifeworld paradigm represents 
interpretive view. In creating the Theory of Rational Communicative Theory, Habermas 
connected them with his schema of the three cognitive aspects of knowledge (Ray, 
1992). This connection is essential because conflicts arise at the interface of the system 
and the lifeworld (Bronner, 2002; Ray, 1992; Scrambler, 2001). 
Knowledge and truth. Certain beliefs about knowledge and truth are foundational 
to the work of Habermas. Like the first generation critical theorists, Habermas believes 
that knowledge is created, not discoverable or universal (Habermas, 1971). Unlike his 
predecessors, Habermas believes that the creation of interpersonal knowledge is 
grounded in language and that knowledge is socially constructed through human actions 
(Habermas, 1971). Habermas's idea of knowledge was derived through a combination 
of empirical-analytical and historical-hermeneutic knowledge; he reconciled the 
limitations he saw in the combination through a synthesis of the idea of emancipatory 
knowledge (Habermas, 1971; Holter, 1988). The three types of knowledge Habermas 
generated (also called cognitive interests) represent specific viewpoints for 
apprehending social reality (Habermas, 1971; Holter, 1988; Scrambler, 2001 ). 
Empirical-analytical knowledge (also called technical knowledge) represents knowing 
and controlling and is evident in the objective sciences. Technical knowledge includes 
the economic and administrative spheres. Technical discourse is functional and 
structural and it serves the purpose of prediction, confirmation and is useful in 
understanding purposeful rational social action. Historical-hermeneutic knowledge (also 
called practical knowledge) represents understanding and is prominent in the 
phenomenological sciences. This knowledge includes the social, cultural and personal 
spheres. The discourse of practical knowledge is interpretive. Practical knowledge 
facilitates the comprehension of social situations from the perspective and context of 
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another, which fosters mutual understanding. Emancipatory knowledge, represented by 
the critical sciences, is concerned with the power relationship between technical and 
practical knowledge and the power relationships that emanate from systematically 
distorted communication. Emancipatory knowledge fosters the process of reflection. 
The discourse of emancipatory knowledge is assertoric. The purpose of emancipatory 
knowledge is to remove distortions from understanding (Habermas, 1971; Holter, 1988; 
Ray, 1992; Scrambler, 2001; Stevens, 1989). Emancipatory knowledge involves "the 
fundamental transformation of individual and collective identities through liberation from 
previous constraints on communication and self-understanding" (Habermas, 1971, p. 
310). 
The public sphere. In Habermas's schema, the public sphere is distinguished 
from the state and economy. Most other scholars do not separate out the economy. 
The public sphere is a conception of the arena that includes free speech, free press, 
town hall meetings and the educational system. The public sphere is where civil liberties 
reside and equality, common sense and liberty are put into practice (Ray, 1992; 
Scrambler & Martin, 2001 ). While his mentors were concerned with the subjectivity of the 
subject, Habermas was concerned with the institutions of advanced industrial society 
and the possibility of what he later called democratic will formation. Habermas was 
alarmed that the public sphere, once a vital political arena, was increasingly being 
defined by the same forces of instrumental reason exhibited by the state and economy. 
The loss of the moderating influence of the public sphere was Habermas's primary 
concern. It was Habermas's view that the public sphere could influence affairs of the 
state and society (Ray, 1992; Scrambler & Martin, 2001). 
The pursuit of an ideal society. According to Habermas, knowledge of 
sociocultural phenomena requires an understanding of linguistics and context (Holter, 
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1988). Habermas envisions the ideal speech model as a model for ideal society. Power 
imbalances evident in society originate from systematically distorted communication. 
Habermas's goal is to uncover how people communicate to uncover distortions and 
constraints that impede free, equal and un-coerced participation in society (Stevens, 
1989). 
Deliberative Democracy 
John Dryzek is an example of the new breed of theorists who are proponents of 
using critical theory to construct alternative solutions for dealing with repressive and 
exploitive social relations. Dryzek, who was born in the United Kingdom and educated in 
the United States, holds a PhD in Government and Pol itics. He is currently Head of the 
Social and Political Theory Program in the Research School of Social Sciences at the 
Australian National University. Dryzek advocates that the objective is to effect change, 
not just criticize. The means that Dryzek proposes for producing change is ingrained in 
his image of deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy refers to a concept of a democratic government that 
places reasoned political discussion at its center (Cooke, 2000). The importance of 
del iberation, the defining characteristic of deliberative democratic theory, l ies in the 
transformation, not aggregation, of preferences (Dryzek, 2002; Squires, 2002). 
Del iberation is a social process where participants are open to changes in preferences 
or judgment during the course of interaction. The point of deliberative democracy is to 
manufacture or create the common good, rather than discover or aggregate it. 
Deliberative democracy is rational ; decisions made are based on reasons given during 
the course of deliberation and not by simple aggregations, prejudices or demands 
(Dryzek, 2002; Squires, 2002). 
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"Deliberation is fundamentally a cognitive process, grounded in reasons, 
evidence, and the principles of valid argument" (House & Howe, 2000, p. 8). In the 
classic philosophical sense, deliberation is a process of decision-making. Deliberation is 
the source of legitimacy in democracies. Legitimate decisions do not represent the free 
will of all. Instead legitimate decisions represent the process of deliberation. 
Deliberation is inclusive (Dryzek, 2002; Squires, 2002). Although everyone may not 
agree with a legitimate decision, each participant understands how and why a outcome 
was reached (Squires, 2002). Unanimity is not required for each individual decision to 
be legitimate. Unanimity is required for major principles and rules from which decisions 
flow (Manin, 1897). 
One way to appreciate the significance of the deliberative democratic model is to 
compare it with the model of advanced or contemporary liberal democracy. In advanced 
democracies, people give reasons to support their position and convert people to their 
side. Adherents are won over by bargaining, attacking and making alliances. 
Contemporary liberal democracy is a representative democracy, such as exists in the 
United States. There are competitive elections and, with them, substantial opportunity 
for pressure on the state (the term state is used interchangeably with government; it is 
the preferred term for many critical theorists, like Dryzek). In a contemporary liberal 
democracy, there is a tension between individual rights and the state. In the vision of a 
participatory or deliberative democracy, people give and listen to reasons in order to 
reach a consensus. Alliances and bargains are not made and voting is not the primary 
process for decision-making. Instead decisions are made through deliberation and the 
forging of a consensus. In a participatory democracy, politics are more pedagogical and 
discursive. The concern is public, rather than private, ends (Dryzek, 2002; Levinson, 
2003). 
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A comparison of policy-making in contemporary liberal democracy and in 
participatory democracy may also be illuminating. In a liberal democracy, policy 
outcomes are highly sensitive to the relative power of different interest groups. 
Outcomes are too often characterized by brokered compromises that are not particularly 
responsive to concerns (Dryzek, 2002). In contrast, participatory democracy policy­
making strives for consensus, while accepting the inevitability of conflict (Dryzek, 2002). 
The objective is the "reconstruction of private or partial interests into publicly defensible 
norms through sustained debate" (Dryzek, 1990, p. 124). 
It is important to note that both models can exist together; they are not mutually 
exclusive. Indeed John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, both liberal democrats, advocated 
in their work for more participation. Unfortunately since then, participation has waned to 
the point that ordinary citizens are often excluded or disenfranchised (Dryzek, 2002). 
Current deliberative democratic theory is a broad-based collection of ideas. 
There are two major tendencies in current discussions, one is critical and the other is 
most often characterized as liberal constitutionalism. One major distinction between the 
two is that liberal constitutionalism advocates see constitution-making as the venue for 
deliberation, while those with a critical orientation find this too constraining and believe 
that deliberation is important and essential in many other venues, particularly the public 
sphere (Dryzek, 2002). Dryzek is a proponent of a critical ly oriented deliberative 
democratic theory. There are many paral lels between critical social theory, especial ly 
the strand exemplified by Habermas, and Dryzek's conception of deliberative 
democracy. In deliberative democratic theory, legitimacy is "seen in terms of the ability 
or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of those subject to 
collective decisions; . . . claims on behalf of or against such decisions have to be justified 
to those people in terms that, on reflection, they are capable of accepting (Dryzek, 2002, 
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p. 1 ). Deliberation is a social communicative process where participants are "amenable 
to changing their judgments, preferences, and views during the course of interactions, 
which involve persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception" (Dryzek, 
2002, p. 1). 
Critical deliberative democrats and discourse theorists emphasize the importance 
of a free public sphere, separate from the state, as a place where citizens can freely 
deliberate and engage in democratic will formation (Charney, 1998). Public spheres are 
linked to the political concept of civil society. Civil society has traditionally been 
distinguished from the apparatus of the state. Civil society encompasses everything 
from non-governmental organizations to sports clubs, religious organizations and 
informal community groups. Historical examples of civil society include the polis, the 
Roman idea of res publica, the medieval free town and the New England town meeting 
(Bronner, 2002; Dryzek, 2002; Scrambler & Martin, 2001 ). Habermas described civil 
society as existing at the interface of the private and public spheres in the lifeworld. 
Discourse in the public sphere is generally distinguished as dialogical, whereas 
decision-making in the state spheres is generally monological (Squires, 2002). 
Habermas though believes that public deliberation is important for both the formally 
organized processes of political decision-making and will formation. He also advocates 
that prevailing laws and policies must be open to objections formulated through will 
formation. Oppositional civil societies and public sphere are a source of democratic 
critique and renewal (Dryzek, 2002). 
Dryzek (1990) has advocated that policy analysis that combines democratic and 
problem-solving rationality can become a force for emancipation. A mobilization of basic 
principles of deliberative democracy can produce more inclusive and rational policy-
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making processes through the use of deliberation. From this thinking, the practice of 
responsive policy evaluation has emerged. 
Responsive Policy Evaluation 
Responsive policy evaluation is a broad rubric with multiple variants. 
Robert E. Stake, an expert in case study methodology, began talking about responsive 
evaluation as early as 1975. Stake's approach emphasizes the importance of 
personalizing and humanizing evaluation processes. His suggestions include face-to­
face contact with program participants and learning firsthand about diverse stakeholders' 
perspectives and experiences (Abma & Stake, 2001 ). Jennifer Greene (1997), an 
educational psychologist, has promoted a form of responsive evaluation that focuses on 
advocacy (Greene, 1997). Michael Patton is also an advocate of responsive evaluation 
techniques. Patton (2002), in outlining guidelines for responsive evaluation, emphasized 
the, 
Identification of issues and concerns based on direct, face-to-face contact with 
people in and around the program; use of program documents to further identify 
important issues; direct personal observations of program activities before 
formally designing the evaluation to increase the evaluator's understanding of 
what is important in the program, and what can/should be evaluated; designing 
the evaluation based on issues that emerge in the preceding three steps, with the 
design to include continuing direct qualitative observations in naturalistic program 
setting; reporting information in direct personal contact through themes and 
portrayals that are easily understandable and rich with description; and matching 
information reports and reporting formats with different audiences (pp. 171-172) 
House and Howe are proponents of responsive evaluation who have made direct 
links to deliberative democracy theory. They have created a framework for judging 
evaluations based on their potential for democratic deliberation. The justification for this 
framework, which links program evaluation to the larger sociopolitical and moral 
structures is the assertion that program evaluation can not be removed from the society 
in which it is embedded (House and Howe, 2000). 
19 
The framework of deliberative democratic evaluation created by House and 
Howe includes three requirements: inclusion, dialogue and deliberation. Genuine 
democratic program evaluation requires that interests of all stakeholder groups be 
central and that the interests of any relevant party be represented. 
Research in Policy-Making 
Policy-making is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. There are many inputs to the 
policy-making process. Research is but one of a number of competing and often 
contradictory sources that inform and influence the process (Rist, 2000). Too often the 
role of research is relatively minor. 
The process of policy-making is ongoing and constantly evolving. Even choosing not 
to act or ignoring problems is part of the process and a frequent outcome. There are 
basically two levels of decision-making in policy-making. The first major level is the 
establishment of broad parameters of government actions, such as the "War on Poverty" 
or Medicare, as initially proposed. The second level is the translation of intentions into 
policy and programmatic results, usually rules and regulations associated with a certain 
broadly defined legislative bill. Oftentimes the second level of policy-making is 
protracted and the linkage between the first and second levels is obscured. A 
contemporary example is the new patient confidentiality protections which were recently 
implemented five years after the passage of the authorizing legislation. There is a gap 
between what was being implemented and what was originally envisioned. 
Research has the greatest utility within the second level (Rist, 2000). The second 
level involves the cycle of policy formulation, policy implementation and policy 
accountability (Rist, 2000). Policy accountability is the focus of this research. I have 
selected fidelity as the theme I will use to assess how access changed for enrollees in 
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Tennessee's managed care program. At the highest level, the question is whether or 
not policy objectives were met. Such a question allows for the study of both anticipated 
and unanticipated outcomes and an examination of influential forces. Changes in 
understanding and perceptions can be tracked. Social changes that resulted from policy 
implementation can also be examined. In looking at the outcomes of policy 
implementation, examination of the administrative and organizational structures that 
support the policy is important. Tracing and accounting for changes in the original goals 
and objectives of the policy are also critical (Rist, 2000) . 
Policies are dynamic and reflective of the socio-political milieu in which they exist. 
As such, funding levels and other indicators of support, leadership and staff stability and 
effectiveness and target population changes must be considered. Importantly, the 
degree of change that has occurred in the problem addressed by the policy must be 
assessed (Rist, 2000) . 
Osborne (1997) presented a schema for considering health policy. He stated that 
most analyses of health policy adopt a reactive view of the relationship between health 
and policy, meaning policy is viewed as a reaction to objective problems of health need 
and provision and conversely, health is viewed as the product of policy. He further 
explicated three reactive responses: a meliorist, critical, or anti-medical approaches. A 
meliorist approach looks at health policy in terms of the progressive adequacy of health 
knowledge and delivery. As increased knowledge ameliorates health problems and 
challenges, new ones emerge. A critical approach views policies as the outcomes of 
negotiations between different interest groups. An anti-medical approach claims that 
health policy creates its own concerns and that health problems are always contextual .  
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Program Evaluation 
Program evaluation is a research technique that is used to clarify the intent of 
programs and improve program efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness (Wholey, 
1979). Program evaluation is an important part of the policy-making cycle. Program 
evaluation involves the assessment of one or more program domains, including program 
need, design, implementation and service delivery, impact or outcomes and efficiency 
(Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 1999). 
Programs are defined as an "organized set of resources and activities directed 
toward a common set of goals" (Wholey, 1979, p. 1) and "an organized, planned and 
usually ongoing effort designed to ameliorate a social problem or improve social 
conditions" (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 1999, p. 2). Program evaluation is "the 
measurement of program performance, the making of comparisons based on these 
measurements, and the use of resulting information in policy-making and program 
management" (Wholey, 1979, p. 1 ). Using a more focused social science orientation 
and expanding the definition to include contextual factors, Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey 
(1999) define program evaluation as "the use of social research procedures to 
systematically investigate the effectiveness of social intervention programs that is 
adapted to the political and organizational environments and designed to inform social 
actions in ways to improve social conditions" (p. 2). Program performance includes the 
"resources that go into the program, the program activities undertaken, and the 
outcomes and impacts of those program activities-including both progress towards 
program objectives and side effects on those served and on the environment in which 
the program operates" (Wholey, 1979, p. 1). 
There is an important and demonstrated distinction between the formulation and 
adoption of a policy or program and the program implementation. Implementations are 
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influenced by administrative agencies, governmental and non-governmental, and 
program interpretation by the courts and regulating bodies. These distinctions are 
representative of the differences between policy enactors, usually legislators, and policy 
executors, the various administrators that implement and interpret policy (Mazmanian & 
Sabatier, 1 983). 
Formulation and implementation of policy are not always dichotomous. In 
adaptive or interactive implementations, adjustments are made by the various 
stakeholders between goals and objectives and strategies. Another approach, while not 
allowing for alterations in basic program goals or strategies, does recognize the need to 
modify goals and programs in recognition of various constraints and changing 
circumstances (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1 983). The dynamics of policy-making, which 
emphasizes continually changing contexts, demands and priorities, are best 
conceptualized in a model that includes policy formulation, implementation and 
reformulation in a continually evolving, fluid cycle. 
The Integrative Paradigm 
Deliberative democracy theory arose from critical social theory, which rather than 
being a theory is more of a philosophical orientation. Deliberative democracy is less 
conceptual than critical theory and as such is more specific and prescriptive. 
Responsive policy evaluation is even more specific. Tenets of critical social theory, 
deliberative democracy and responsive policy evaluation were used to create an 
integrative paradigm which was used to guide this study. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the integrative paradigm that was 
created to guide this case study. 
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Critical Social Theory 
Collective social action --+ liberation of human capacities 
! 
Del iberative Democracy 
Reasoned political discussions --+ transformation of preferences to create common good 
! 
Responsive Pol icy Evaluation 
Inclusion, dialogue and deliberation --+ rational policy-making 
! 
Program evaluation 
Clarification of program intent --+ improved program efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness 
Figure 1 :  Integrative Paradigm for Pol icy-Making and Evaluation : Key Components 
Conclusions 
You can not separate health policy from the interconnected web of social policy. 
A holistic view of health recognizes the importance of social issues, such as violence, 
poverty and ethnic diversity. Health issues are broad-based societal issues, no one 
sector has the perspective, expertise or resources to achieve significant progress (most 
efforts to-date have been woefully inadequate). Just as it is important to look at the 
connectivity of social problems, it is important to look at the multiplicity of players that are 
needed to address problems. Also it is a priority to be responsive to citizens who have 
been disenfranchised by the current health care delivery system. Effective leadership in 
health care has generally been missing. This is especially true for nurses. The fact that 
nurses have been slow to engage in the development and evaluation of health policy 
should not prevent them from entering the debate as honest brokers and advocates of a 
more inclusive and broad-based process. The paradigm presented in this paper creates 
a segue for nurses to participate in policy-making activities, including research and 
activism. 
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Critical theory provided the general orientation for this study. This suggests that 
the proposed policy evaluation was oriented towards critiquing inequities in the design 
and delivery of health services and programs. It also suggests that the goal of policy 
evaluation is to produce change that will benefit the spectrum of stakeholders that 
programs impact. Just as Habermas has proposed that the ideal speech situation can 
be used as a model for the ideal social situation, it is suggested that the principles of 
deliberative democracy can be a model for policy-making. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
In the span of only 15 years, the introduction of managed care and other market­
based strategies from the private sector precipitated a transformation of the delivery of 
Medicaid services in the United States. These monumental changes remain poorly 
understood. To facilitate an understanding of this transformation, the history of various 
forces that contributed to the rapid growth of managed behavioral health care in the 
public sector will be reviewed. Understanding these forces and how they interacted 
requires an understanding of the definition and history of Medicaid and the prevailing 
political and social forces that influenced change over time, as well as an understanding 
of the concept of managed care. 
The implementation of managed care in Tennessee's Medicaid program is an 
excellent public policy exemplar because of the far-reaching scope of the program and 
the ongoing development of the program. Opportunities still exist to influence the 
evaluations and improvement of the program. Additionally, an emphasis on a state 
health reform initiative is important because state reform has filled the void left by the 
failure of national health reform. 
Tracing the History of Medicaid 
Medicaid is one of the Great Society programs implemented in the mid-1960s 
during the administration of President Johnson. The program that was implemented and 
the one that exists today are vastly different. The original intent of the Medicaid program 
was to make federal matching funds available to the states to provide medical coverages 
for women, children and people over the age of 65 who were concurrently receiving 
welfare assistance (Rowland, Garfield & Elias, 2003). 
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Since the inception of Medicaid, there have been four major reform movements 
that have significantly changed the delivery of care to clients with behavioral health 
disorders. These are the community mental health movement of the 1960s, the 
deinstitutionalization that predominated in the 1970s, the widespread establishment of 
community support programs that characterized the 1980s and the rehabilitation and 
recovery movement that started in the 1990s and continues today. Concurrently, in the 
1990s, some of the public purchasers of Medicaid services began to transform their 
purchasing practices. This transformation was made possible through the use of waiver 
authority granted through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) which paved 
the way for the states to use commercial, risk-bearing managed care organizations 
(MCOs) (Croze, 2000). 
The introduction of Medicaid, with the addition of alternative funding and the push 
for changes in the delivery of care, induced changes in the SMHAs. By the late 19070s 
the states had begun to contract with community mental health centers (CMHCs) and 
other non-profit service agencies. The role of the SMHAS changed from a constrained 
provider of primarily institutional services to a manager of a wide array of provided and 
contracted services and a variety of revenue sources, including the states, the federal 
government, grants and third party payments. The advent of managed care added new 
complexities to the role of the SMHAs. 
Today, with more than 47 million low income beneficiaries, Medicaid is the 
nation's largest health insurance program (Rowland et al. , 2003). Between just 1986 
and 1999, Medicaid spending increased four-fold (Ridgely, Giard, & Shern, 1999). Within 
the enrolled population, approximately one-third of the beneficiaries have a disability, 
another one-third are children who meet age and income requirements and one-third are 
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pregnant women and caretakers of children eligible for Medicaid, as well as other low 
income people (Rowland et al. , 2003). 
There are two major classes of Medicaid beneficiaries. The largest group 
includes those who qualify because they are recipients of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). The health care needs of this cohort are most similar to 
private sector plan enrollees (Holahan, Zuckerman, Evans & Rangarajan, 1998). Most 
of the mentally ill population qualifies because of a disability for which they are receiving 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Of the current SSI recipients, ages 18 to 64, 34% 
have a mental disorder. Four percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries qualified because of a 
mental illness. Since the late 1980s, SSI recipients with mental illness have been the 
fastest growing segment of the Medicaid population (Frank, Goldman & Hogan, 2003). 
The SSI population with the medically needy and Medicare recipients that are dually 
eligible for Medicaid are the most costly of the Medicaid beneficiaries (Holahan et al., 
1998). 
Medicaid mental health benefits are generally more comprehensive than other 
plans. Drug therapy, the mainstay of the current treatment of mental illness, is a 
covered expense under Medicaid (Rowland et al. , 2003). The significance of this feature 
from both a cost and care perspective is highlighted by the twelve-fold increase in 
spending for psychotropic drugs in non-HMO plans between 1991 and the third quarter 
of 2000 (Frank et al., 2003). In addition, Medicaid does not have restrictions on certain 
levels of care, such as residential treatment or plan limits, which are both common in 
private plans. Medicaid also pays for services such as transportation assistance, 
supportive services in the home, respite care and case management (Rowland, et al., 
2003); these are generally not covered in private plans. 
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Medicaid is essentially an open-ended entitlement program that is funded jointly 
by the federal and state governments. The states are attracted to Medicaid because the 
federal government pays 50 to 70% of expenditures, depending on the state. There is 
no cap on the federal government matches. Whatever the states spend on eligible 
beneficiaries, the federal government matches (Rowland et al., 2003). Because of this, 
states have been able to expand services for fewer state dol lars and obtain financial 
assistance for services, such as institutional care, which previously were paid for solely 
with state funds (Frank et al. , 2003). The expansion of services has precipitated 
changes in patterns of care, such as deinstitutionalization, and a concomitant increase in 
community-based care and the use of outpatient drugs. 
Just as was true in the private sector, the growth of managed care in the public 
sector was the result of a complex convergence of forces. Medicaid did not originally 
pay for specialty mental health services. Mental health treatment costs were initially 
covered only under the general categories of physician and hospital care. With the 
move to deinstitutionalization in the 1970s during the Carter administration, the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) recommended the optional addition of mental 
health services. Even today, most mental health benefits in Medicaid are provided by 
state choice, not by a program mandate (Hogan, 1999). 
After the failure of President Clinton's proposed Health Security Act, the states 
became a new incubator for health reform, following the long-standing reform efforts 
spearheaded in the private sector by large employers. Other factors that contributed to 
reform in the states were the federal budget controversy of Clinton's first term and the 
escalation of the federal budget. Both prompted the Clinton administration to remove 
obstacles to the states managing Medicaid costs by accelerating the approval of waivers 
from the established Medicaid requirements. Waivers are used to broaden the covered 
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population and services. Waivers have also been used to reduce benefit levels and 
increase cost-sharing (Rowland et al., 2003). The growth of managed behavioral health 
care in the private sector led to the saturation of the market and declining profits for the 
managed behavioral health care organizations which, in turn, led to aggressive 
marketing and lobbying by these organizations. In addition, early successes in states, 
such as Massachusetts led to the surge in the growth of managed behavioral health care 
in Medicaid (Hogan, 1999). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 also facilitated the growth 
in managed care by allowing the states to require mandatory enrollment in managed 
care and permitting states to contract with health plans that served populations 
composed entirely or predominantly of Medicaid enrollees (Hanson & Huskamp, 2001 ). 
Along with these national trends, forces within the states were also fueling the 
growth. The implementation of managed behavioral health care in Washington and 
California supported existing mental health reform efforts. The addition of managed 
behavioral health care in the Medicaid programs of Tennessee, Oregon and Arizona was 
a part of a larger Medicaid reform effort and a move to managed care for other services. 
In Massachusetts and Utah, managed care was introduced for behavioral health care 
specifically to slow spending. Iowa and Nebraska added managed care to be able to 
expand services (Craze, 2000). 
Looking at Managed Care 
There is no doubtthat managed care has changed the health care delivery 
system in the United States. Managed care has successfully controlled costs or leveled 
the rate of increases. However, the use of managed care has also caused a significant 
public backlash (Hogan, 1999). Despite its far-reaching influence, managed care is not 
a well-defined or researched phenomenon. 
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Ask ten people to define managed care and you will likely get ten different 
responses. In the past, the term managed care was reserved for the prepaid, capitated 
financial arrangements that characterized HMOs. As managed care has become more 
pervasive, this distinction is no longer valid. Managed care is a concept that is no longer 
tied to a single financial model. The essence of managed care is far more complex than 
putting providers at risk. Managed care is more about information systems and 
managed care tools such as utilization management (Rand Research Highlights, 2000). 
This shift was made possible by the highly competitive national market that emerged in 
the 1980s. Also the internal care and cost management processes in place at the health 
plans are now common across product lines, regardless of funding mechanisms. The 
organizational processes that were originally put in place in capitated plans are now 
recognized as effective strategies for enhancing customer retention, corporate reputation 
and identity and for facilitating success in a competitive marketplace (Goldman, 
McCulloch & Strum, 1998). 
"The managed care revolution has been both uneven and incomplete" (Hogan, 
1999, p.SP71). What we know as managed care is largely managed costs. Discounting 
provider fees and utilization control are relatively developed and tested. The same can 
not be said for care management and coordination (Durham, 1995; Hogan, 1999), which 
are inherent in a sophisticated definition of managed care. 
Hogan (1999) claims that variations among geographic regions and payers are 
impeding a more complete development of managed care. In some cases, the 
variations in managed care are reflective of the market variations (Goldman et al., 1998). 
Managed care for Medicaid enrollees is often defined by the providers who are willing to 
serve the population. Often the pool of providers that are willing or able to assume risk 
in a state contract is very limited (Robinson & Clay, 2000). I t  is also noteworthy that 
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Medicaid is often the main revenue source for the providers that do care for Medicaid 
patients. Revenues from Medicaid represent 18% of state mental hospitals revenues, 
24% of the revenues for psychiatric services within general hospitals and 24% of 
community-based providers revenue (Frank et al., 2003). Additionally, Medicaid was 
designed to accommodate state-by-state variation. Managed care has added to the 
proliferation of this variation (Goldman et al. ,  1998). 
Variations are also attributable to program elements. Key elements that shape 
the type of managed care in Medicaid behavioral health care programs include which 
groups are eligible; whether enrollment is voluntary or mandatory; if the program is state­
wide or regional; what percentage the Medicaid enrollees represent of the overall plan's 
enrollees; whether the program includes mental health care, care for substance abuse or 
both; and what other state mental health services are included (Goldman et al. , 1998). 
Little is known about the relationship of these various elements to performance. 
Interestingly the managed behavioral health care programs present for Medicaid are 
generally referred to as experimental in the literature. 
In the public sector, managed care is an even more ill-defined concept. 
Understanding of the concept comes mostly through case examples, an approach with 
limited usefulness because each managed care initiative is shaped by local forces and is 
constantly changing. Each managed care program in the public sector is defined by 
local structures, history, geography and politics (Hoge, Jacobs, Thakur & Griffith, 1999). 
The debate about managed care in the United States can be quite polarized. 
Some see managed care as market-driven, efficient and accountable. Others are 
concerned with the negative effects on access and quality. A central point to each of 
these opinions is economics. Because managed care is often utilized as a cost control 
strategy and the benefits of care management are usually not featured, many are leery. 
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Despite this current reality, general managed care and managed behavioral health care 
have been shown to have a positive effect on various performance indicators. With 
managed behavioral health care, an overal l  increase in the use of mental health 
services, reduced costs and improved patient outcomes have been shown (Coleman et 
al . , 2005; Mowbray, Grazier & Holter, 2002). Cost savings are greatest in the first year 
(Goldman et al. , 1998; Ma & McGuire, 1998). Other studies have not shown that cost 
savings are sustained. Costs may actually increase because of added administrative 
costs associated with managed care plans (Haslanger & Tal lon , 2004). Util ization 
patterns change with the implementation of managed behavioral health care. The 
biggest and most consistent change is a reduction in inpatient admissions and length of 
stay (Goldman et al. , 1998; Ma & McGuire, 1998). General findings about the uti l ization 
of health care services have been l imited because of the practice of enrol l ing non­
disabled children and their parents in Medicaid managed care plans when these 
categories represent a minority of total Medicaid enrollees (Haslanger & Tallon, 2004). 
Concerns about the effects of managed care on the del ivery of mental health 
services are important when we consider the vulnerabil ities of those individuals with 
mental i l lnesses are considered, especially severely and persistently mentally i l l  
individuals. A stigma associated with mental i l l ness is sti l l  pervasive in our society 
despite progress since the creation of Medicaid . Unfortunately there are sti l l  too many 
people who see mental i l lness as a character flaw, rather than a serious health problem 
(Hanson & Huskamp, 1998; Thomas & Leavitt, 2002). 
Opinions about the use of managed care for Medicaid mental health services are 
mixed. Former providers fear unfair competition, the assumption of risk, a disregard for 
tradition , bureaucracy, greed and the diversion of care costs to administrative burden.  
They are concerned about the move from a catchment model to a model of competition. 
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Historically community providers were granted franchises for slices of public sector 
territory. They believe competition could destabilize a very fragile population, focuses on 
the wrong factors and gives for-profit entities entry to a market where they do not belong. 
Proponents of competition counter that competition challenges the status quo, may raise 
the bar on standards and expectations and allows the purchaser to evaluate the price 
and quality of service of several products. Public stakeholders have protested the added 
administrative costs associated with the MCOs and the profit motivation of most of these 
organizations (Craze, 2000). 
Managed care often adds new services and products; these include utilization, 
case and quality management; various patient protections such as grievances and 
appeals processes; performance and outcome measures; and information management 
capabilities. The concern about the cost of these added capabilities can be mitigated if 
quality and effectiveness of service and care is improved. Iowa is a good case example 
of this point. With the approval of the managed mental health initiative, the legislature 
reduced the budget by 10%. Fifteen percent of the payments to the MCO were for 
administrative and care management, effectively reducing the amount of care dollars in 
the new arrangement by 25%. Even with these cost reductions, there was an expanded 
array of services and improvement in specific quality indicators (Craze, 2000) . Just as 
managed care is erroneously identified with capitation, the transformation of Medicaid 
behavioral health care has been incorrectly identified as the privatization of the system. 
This label is inaccurate since providers have been an integral component of the 
behavioral health care delivery system for many years. Craze (2000) has taken the 
position that the profitization of the Medicaid system is the essence of the current 
transformation. Even this term is problematic. There have been public 
purchaser/private contractual arrangements that have demonstrated that it is the diligent 
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management of the medical loss ratio (the amount spent on direct care services), not the 
MCO's tax status that is the true measure (Croze, 2000). 
According to a 1998 profile, 46 of the states had or were in the process of 
implementing managed behavioral health care; 10 of these had virtually no fee for 
service financing. Twenty-five of the states used risk-based contracts; of these 17 used 
carved-out programs. Two states had terminated managed behavioral health care 
programs (Croze, 2000). 
Changing Roles of the States and MCOs 
The introduction of managed care has required realignment in the roles of state 
agencies, behavioral health care providers and the health plans or MCOs. The 
experiences the SMHAs and other state agencies had working with very limited 
resources, dedicated public delivery systems and rigid bureaucracies are not readily 
transferable to working within the competitive managed care environment, using 
traditionally private MCOs and providers. Traditionally state governments either directly 
provided or contracted out mental health services to non-profit or quasi-governmental 
mental health centers while directly administering institutional programs, such as state 
mental hospitals. Now they have assumed a radically different role as they enter into 
multi-million dollar contracts with private companies who often assume financial risk 
(Robinson & Clay, 2000) . I n  a very short period of time, state agencies have been 
transformed from managers of institutional services and negotiators with community 
agencies to contract managers of costly, complex and often capitated health plans in a 
very competitive and rapidly evolving market. From a policy perspective, the growth of 
Medicaid and the involvement of the federal government in care that historically has 
been shaped at the state and local level is also a major shift (Aday et al . ,  1999). 
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State purchasing agents are very different developmentally and otherwise than 
their private sector counterparts. Traditionally state agencies have been most focused 
on process metrics. The private sector has migrated to a focus on outcome measures, 
or a balance of process and outcome measures (Robinson & Clay, 2000). States make 
contracting decisions within a political context (Bailit & Burgess, 1999) that is not 
comparable to what is seen in the private sector. 
The MCOs have also faced a steep learning curve. MCOs, with a legacy of 
working in the very different private marketplace, need new knowledge and capabilities 
as they adjust to new requirements and a significantly different patient population. 
MCOs have been forced to become familiar with a new type of purchaser and patient 
population. There is a marked difference between the privately insured clientele that the 
managed behavioral health care companies have experience with and the severely and 
persistently mentally ill patients with complex comorbidities that Medicaid covers. Public 
mental health authorities have spent several decades building support systems and 
developing the expertise needed to provide appropriate community-based care. There 
is a major difference in what the managed behavioral health care organizations have 
done and what the public mental health system has accomplished (Mechanic, 1999). 
Commercially experienced behavioral health care organizations have 
underestimated the magnitude of system changes inherent in a move to managed care. 
There have been several instances of underpricing & lack of necessary resources to 
facilitate the change. Because of their purchasing clout, it is not uncommon for state 
purchasers to negotiate rates well below private market rates. This underpricing, in turn, 
precipitated a declining supply of providers and concerns about quality (Frank et al. , 
2003). The behavioral healthcare organizations have also had to contend with 
unrealistic expectations. Managed care is not a panacea for chronic problems. There 
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have been failures. Both North Carolina and Montana have abandoned previously 
implemented managed behavioral health care programs for their Medicaid beneficiaries 
(Croze, 2000). Tennessee's Medicaid carve-out for behavioral health care was fraught 
with start-up problems (Chang et al. , 1998). Just as purchasers are gaining savvy in 
these new arrangements, so are the MCOs. The once aggressive companies have 
become more judicious. Some MCOs have modified their thinking about the desirability 
of public sector business and they have become more discriminatory in their bids. When 
the state of Arkansas released a request for proposals for their children's behavioral 
health care program, only one vendor responded (Croze, 2000). Likewise, there has 
been a move away from capitation. 
There were early Medicaid managed behavioral health care successes, at least 
in terms of reduced costs. Colorado saved $6.5 million in the first year of their program. 
Massachusetts saved $47 million, which was a 22% reduction (Coleman et al. , 2005; 
Croze, 2000; Ma & McGuire, 1998). Since that time costs have been difficult to sustain. 
Early savings, derived from use of a gatekeeper and provider discounts, are more easily 
realized than savings associated with improved quality, coordination of care and 
reductions in practice variation (Coleman et al. ,  2005). In other instances costs have 
been reduced, but only because of reduced access to services and cost-shifting to other 
public agencies. The price for these savings has also been high member dissatisfaction 
(Heflinger & Northrup, 2000). 
Corporate buyers of health care precipitated a major change in the buying 
process when they began to purchase health care services using the same strategies 
that had long been employed for the acquisition of other goods and services. Their 
transition to a more systematic, disciplined and competitive buying process caused a 
major shift from a revenue-generating/ provider dominated system to a cost-control/ 
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payer dominated system (Lindenmuth & Burger, 1998). As states begin to utilize the 
competitive purchasing model refined in the corporate world, there will be a steep 
learning curve and the possibility of significant variations in what the states will 
experience given the wide range of their needs and resources. 
Before managed care, the providers of public mental health services worked 
collaboratively with state mental health authorities. Many of the providers utilized 
existed solely to serve the Medicaid and other state beneficiaries. There was little 
competition for contracts (Bailit & Burgess, 1999). 
Organizational Capabilities and Leaming 
Health plans can take many organizational forms (see Appendix A). On one end 
of the continuum are staff model Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs}, which are 
fully accountable for all aspects of delivering and managing care. A close derivative of 
the staff model HMO is group model HMOs where the health plan and the independent 
provider groups are integrated to various degrees. At the other end of the spectrum are 
"virtual" health plans who basically serve as an intermediary between purchaser and 
providers. In these types of arrangements, the level of care management varies 
considerably. Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and Point of Service (POS) plans 
are examples of virtual health plans. 
Carve-outs are a commonly used method for the provision of behavioral health 
care services. A carve-out is a managed care approach in which a separate system of 
care is contracted for a distinct set of services and/or a defined population (Feldman, 
1998; Robinson & Clay, 2000). Often a defining characteristic of carve-outs is 
independence. Carve-outs are "freestanding organizations that are not subunits of, nor 
financially dependent upon, a general health care organization" (Feldman, 1998, p. 
SP59). Carve-outs can take three primary forms (Appendix 8). In some instances, the 
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purchaser contracts directly with a specialty organization. In other instances, the health 
plan, with which the purchaser has a contractual relationship, sub-contracts with the 
specialty organization (Frank et al., 2003; Hodgkin, Horgan, Garnick, Merrick & Goldin, 
2000). In some cases, the health plan creates a specialty department within the 
organization which, by definition, is not independent or a true carve-out. "There are still 
diverging opinions and ongoing debate about the relative merits of carve-out versus 
carve-in (integrated) behavioral health care" (Findlay, 1999, p. 119). Carve-outs assume 
varying degrees of risk and use a variety of strategies to mange the cost and utilization 
of services. For Medicaid managed behavioral health care, states have contracted with 
mainstream carve-outs or carve-outs created primarily to service Medicaid contracts. 
Fragmentation or poor coordination between primary and behavioral health care 
services is a concern about carve-outs (Tietelbaum, Rosenbaum, Burgess & DeCourcy, 
1998). 
Fundamentally, health plans manage costs and quality. These can be 
conflicting objectives. In addition, three of the major stakeholders--purchasers, the 
health plans and patients--have different priorities. Typically health plans want to 
provide appropriate, evidence-based care and avoid inappropriate care, but they must 
do this in a highly competitive and financially constrained environment. Patients often 
place quality above costs and generally do not understand, and may not accept, 
evidence-based care recommendations. Requests for specific medications or 
treatments are not uncommon. Purchasers are generally cost-oriented, yet many of 
their requirements cause increased administrative burden and costs. Within this 
environment, plans implement care management and administrative processes to 
achieve the varying objectives. These processes do not inherently manage costs and 
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quality; it is how these processes are implemented and managed that create the value 
difference (Wholey et al., 2003). 
Health plans generally manage in three ways. Management strategies include 
selective contracting; the utilization of programs that support the care delivered by 
various providers; and the implementation of protocols and management processes that 
affect the provision and use of health care services. Importantly, health plans also 
manage information (Wholey et al. , 2003). 
Adding to this complexity is the fact that it is ultimately the management and 
delivery of care that defines the plan's effectiveness, not just the plan model. A high­
functioning POS plan may perform better than some group model HMOs. A plan's 
performance is also circumstantial. A plan that may perform wel l  with one population 
may not perform with another. Hogan (1999) states that "public sector managed 
behavioral health care is not monolithic; when done well it produces positive results, 
when done poorly, it does not" (p.33). Also, it is not uncommon for health plans to 
contract out specific administrative and care management functions, such as claims 
processing or case management and disease management. 
Public agencies have often struggled to acquire the tools needed to effectively 
manage the delivery of care. Risk-based contracts increase the needs for information 
and administrative systems (Craze, 2000). Information management is the currency of 
the managed care industry. Information management drives care management and 
supports performance-based contracting. Few states have the financial resources or the 
motivation to create and maintain the information technology needed to support 
managed care. 
Performance generally improves with experience. Organizational learning 
defines evolving industries, such as managed behavioral health care which came into 
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existence less than 20 years ago (Argote & Epple, 1 990; Strum, 1 999). Strum showed 
that, when controll ing for other factors, the initial cost savings achieved by private 
employers with the move to managed behavioral health care were sustained through 
organizational learning. 
Where Are We Today? 
In 2002, the states' tax revenue declined by six percent. This annual decline was 
the first since World War II . Overall ,  the states faced a $37 bil l ion deficit in fiscal year 
2002. This deficit was expected to grow to $70 bil l ion by 2004. This trend has 
reinforced the states' strategy to replace programs paid for with state-only dol lars with 
those supported by matching funds (Rowland et al . ,  2003). 
"State fiscal conditions rebounded notably in fiscal 2005" (National Governors 
Association, 2005 December, p. ix) .  During this time revenue increased strongly. 
Estimates for 2006 are more modest. Growth in revenue is expected to slow and the 
pressure to increase expenditures that previously were cut is high (National Governors 
Association). As 2005 closed, United States House and Senate negotiators were 
beginning to wrestle with how to restrain federal spending for Medicaid, as cal led for in 
President Bush's 2006 budget (New York Times, 2005, December 1 2). Any cust wi l l  
have a significant impact on state budgets. 
Even though federal dollars are used to offset the cost of state programs, 
Medicaid wi l l  continue to be a target for state budget reductions. Medicaid is often the 
second most costly l ine item in a state budget, behind education. For fiscal year 2003, 
45 states instituted cost-containment mechanisms for prescription drugs in their 
Medicaid programs, 37 froze or reduced payments to providers and MCOs and 25% 
reduced benefits and eligibil ity. Unfortunately, the reductions disproportionately affected 
people with mental i l lnesses. People with mental i l lnesses, who represent 1 1  % of the 
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total Medicaid population, account for one-third of the high cost beneficiaries. People 
with mental illness often have complex health needs that often require very costly drugs 
(Rowland et al., 2003). 
Competition, which is nourished by choice and supports purchaser efforts to 
negotiate strong performance-based contracts, has been impacted by the consolidation 
of the managed behavioral health care industry that has predominated in recent years. 
There is now a tremendous concentration among the mostly for-profit companies. In 
1998 the top two managed behavioral health care companies had a combined market 
share of 48.9% and the top five had a 68.6% share (Findlay, 1999). 
Public Mental Health Services 
Since colonial times, there have been multiple efforts directed at the provision of public 
mental health services. The implementation and evolution of Medicaid has precipitated 
the most significant changes since the emergence of public mental health care. 
Historically changes have centered on the delivery system for care, the financing of care 
and lately on the introduction of managed care, which influences delivery systems and 
the financing of care. 
Most recently and prior to the inception of Medicaid, the states provided the 
majority of mental health services through entities called state mental health authorities, 
or SMHAS. SMHAs, primarily accountable for managing care for patients with serious 
mental disorders, traditionally operated on a very limited budget of state funds. The 
most common model for the delivery of services was the direct provision of services, 
with a predominance of hospital-based care (Essock & Goldman, 1995). 
Looking at TennCare 
TennCare is the managed Medicaid program in Tennessee. TennCare was 
developed primarily because of fiscal concerns in the state. Between fiscal year (FY) 
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1987 and FY 1993, Medicaid expenditures nearly tripled. In addition, a strategy used by 
Tennessee to finance hospital payments for indigent care was curtailed by the federal 
government. In turn, Tennessee levied a 6.75% gross receipts tax on hospital and 
professional services. When the Tennessee Hospital Association and others threatened 
legal action, the state concluded that Medicaid would have to be radically changed and 
alternative revenue services found (Conover & Davies, 2000; Rocha & Kabalka, 1999). 
In early 1993, Governor Ned McWherter presented a draft plan for Medicaid 
reform to the General Assembly. After limited debate and no public hearings, a detailed 
plan was developed and submitted to HCFA on June 16, 1993. HCFA approved the 
waiver November 18, 1993, and TennCare was implemented January 1, 1994 
(Matthews, 2000). 
TennCare was designed to expand coverages to low-income people and rely on 
private MCOs to manage the health care benefits of the newly eligible beneficiaries and 
those traditionally covered by Medicaid. The developers of Medicaid intended to finance 
the expansion of the state's Medicaid program by saving money through managed care 
efficiencies, by converting federal and state payments to hospitals for indigent care to 
payments for insurance coverage and by adding new state revenues (Conover & Davies, 
2000). 
Initially there was a partial carve-out of behavioral health care services to five 
state-run regional mental health hospitals and 26 community mental health centers for 
the seriously and persistently mentally ill (SPMI) adults and seriously emotionally 
disturbed (SED) children. All other behavioral health care benefits were initially provided 
by the established MCOs (Conover & Davies, 2000; Saunders & Heflinger, 2003). 
In November 1994, HCFA approved a waiver that integrated care for SPMI adults 
and SED children into the MCOs with the requirement that the MCOs contract with 
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approved MBHC companies. The implementation of this program was delayed until July 
1, 1996, to accommodate a change in governors. Effective this date, all behavioral 
health care services for all TennCare enrollees were provided through full carve-out 
programs with two statewide MBHC companies (Conover & Davies, 2000). 
Serious Emotional Disorders 
Among the TennCare enrollees, there is a cohort of children and adolescents 
with serious emotional disorders or SED. SED is a term used in education to describe 
students with any type of behavioral, emotional or mental health disorder. Disorders can 
range from mental health problems, such as depression, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) or obsessive-compulsive disorders, to developmental disorders, such 
as autism (University of Illinois, Chicago, n.d.). A SED diagnosis requires a level of 
clinical symptoms consistent with the assignment of a diagnosis and impairment in 
psychosocial functioning (Heflinger, 2002). 
It is estimated that there are 3.5 million children and adolescents with SED in the 
United States (University of Illinois, Chicago, n.d.). Dr. Craig Anne Heflinger and her 
associates at Vanderbilt University have studied children and adolescents with SED. 
One study conducted by Heflinger (2002) projected that 26 percent of all TennCare 
school-aged children meet SED criteria; another 21 percent have clinical symptoms or 
functional impairment, meaning almost one-half (47 percent) have significant behavioral 
health problems. 
A 2002 literature review (Saunders & Heflinger, 2003) showed that children 
enrolled in public managed behavioral health care programs, primarily in Massachusetts, 
North Carolina and Colorado, had improved overall access; reduced use of inpatient 
services and increased use of case management services, but the programs had 
questionable effects on children's use of outpatient services. 
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In a separate multi-state analysis of secondary data (Heflinger, Simpkins, Scholle 
& Kelleher, 2004), researchers analyzed parent/caregiver satisfaction with their child's 
Medicaid plan and behavioral care providers. The sample was taken from three states: 
Tennessee, which has managed care as the only option; Mississippi, which has 
traditional fee-for-service care only; and Pennsylvania, which has both managed care 
and traditional. The sample included children enrolled in Medicaid, ages 4-17, with a 
diagnosis of SEO. In a contradiction to prior studies, the researchers found that 
parents/caregivers of children enrolled in a managed care plan were less satisfied than 
those enrolled in a traditional plan. The difference among the plan types was reflective 
of satisfaction with the MCO characteristics, not the provider characteristics. 
Conclusions 
The TennCare program, a major public policy program designed to leverage 
certain strategic advantages of managed care practices from the private sector, offers a 
unique opportunity to study the phenomenon of Medicaid managed care. There are 
conflicting conclusions from the research in the private sector about the efficacy of 
managed care. Data from the public sector is still emerging. There are contradictions in 
findings. Often studies have been limited in their approach or scope. 
Heflinger and her associates (and others) have studied children and adolescents 
with SEO extensively. They have been active in  the evaluation of TennCare. Despite 
the work done by Heflinger and others, there are still gaps in our understanding of 
TennCare and the efficacy of care received by school-aged children with SEO, as well 
as the impact of managed behavioral health care in the public sector. 
This case study differs from other examinations of TennCare, particularly those 
of Heflinger and her associates, because case study research goes beyond analysis of 
cost and utilization indicators and other one-dimensional views. A case study approach 
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facilitates an understanding of the context in which the managed behavioral health care 
program of TennCare was developed, implemented and exists. Because the case study 
is about a particular public policy initiative, the study will .highlight the situational aspects 
of the impact of the program. Seeking the perspectives and experiences of multiple 
stakeholders acknowledges the absence of a singular or one-dimensional understanding 
and affirms the importance of inclusion and deliberation in the process of policy-making. 
This approach supports a richer understanding. A case study, which is holistic and 
naturalistic, is conceptually aligned with a nursing conception of health. The concluding 
section of the case report will highlight opportunities to advocate on behalf of people 
served by TennCare's managed behavioral health care program. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
A single case study design was employed to evaluate the fidelity of Tennessee's 
Medicaid managed behavioral health care program to selected original strategic aims. 
In this chapter, the methodological approaches and specific strategies for the study will 
be described. 
"Fidelity implies strict and continuing faithfulness to an obligation, trust or duty" 
(Merriam-Webster's, 2000). Program fidelity is a broad measurement of how true the 
implemented program is to the intended program (Heflinger & Northrup, 2000). 
According to Lowenstien & Grites (1993), "fidelity commands us to live up to 
commitments that we have made, both explicitly and implicitly" (p. 54). 
Case study research entails an in-depth, multi-faceted exploration of a single 
social phenomenon. Phenomena that have been studied using this approach include 
programs such as TennCare, events, activities, processes and one or more individuals. 
According to Yin (2003), "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (p. 13). A hallmark of 
case studies is that detailed information is collected from multiple data sources 
(Creswell, 2003; Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991; Stake, 2000; Yin, 1997 & 2003). 
Additionally case studies are characterized by data richness that results from the 
examination of a phenomenon in its real life context, the field collection of data ( although 
this is not absolute) and more variables of interest than data points (Yin, 1997). 
Case study evaluation strategies have been used to investigate important practical and 
policy questions in health care (Keen & Packwood, 1995) by inherently dealing with a 
wide variety of evidence that other strategies do not (Yin, 2003). The contextual nature 
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of programmatic decisions, their linkages and evolution is best understood through this 
examination of multiple data sources and perspectives. Thus, participants representing 
the variety of stakeholders, what Yin (2003) call "key respondents" (p. 90), were selected 
for interviewing as a purposive sample (Creswell, 2003; Polit & Beck, 2004). 
Fundamental to the case study is the idea that people have complex social and 
public relationships. Case studies offer a unique opportunity to examine the 
relationships and patterns that define social situations. Case studies permit the 
grounding of observations and concepts in a naturalistic way. Case studies are holistic 
in that they provide information from a number of sources over time, which adds the 
dimensions of time and history (Feagin, Orim & Sjoberg, 1991 ). Case studies are 
valuable in that they "deal with reality beyond appearances, with contradictions and the 
dialectical nature of social life, as well as with a whole that is much more than the sum of 
Its parts (Sjoberg, Williams, Vaughn & Sjoberg, 1991, p. 39). "Well-crafted case studies 
can tell the stories behind the numbers, capture unintended impacts and ripple effects 
and illuminate dimensions of desired outcomes that are difficult to quantify (Patton, 
2002, p. 152). 
A case study is not a methodological choice. Instead a case study is a 
choice of what is to be studied. Case study refers to both a process and the product of 
the process. 
Approach 
What is a Case? 
Cases are units of analysis (Patton, 2002). A case is also a bounded system. "A 
case has working parts; it is purposive; it often has a self' (Stake, 2000, p. 436). In 
addition, a case is an integrated system with patterned behavior in which coherence and 
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sequence are prominent (Stake, 2000). A case is simply "one among others" (Stake, 
2000, p. 436) and with case study research we concentrate on that one. 
"A case is a complex entity operating within a number of contexts-physical, 
economic, ethical, aesthetic and so on" (Stake, 2000, pp. 339-340). To understand the 
case of TennCare, detailed descriptions and analyses of the nature of the program; the 
program's historical background; the setting of the program; important contexts, such as 
economic, political and legal influences; and the major stakeholders will need to be 
constructed. These contextual influences and complex interactions necessitate a holistic 
understanding of the program, what Stake calls the "coincidence of events" (p. 440), and 
the recognition that some are purposive, some situational and most inter-related. 
The proposed case is the TennCare program. TennCare is a public policy 
exemplar worthy of study because the program is still evolving and there is an 
opportunity to influence the improvement of the program through an evaluation of the 
program implementation. The reality that the states are incubators of health reform, 
rather than the federal government, is what makes this case so compelling. 
Framing the Case 
Most case studies are about the particular, not about the general. The 
descriptive case study conducted is a type of case study called an instrument case study 
(Stake, 2000). According to Stake, an instrument case study is conducted to provide 
insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization. Although the focus was TennCare, 
the case study may be informative more generally about managed care in the public 
sector. With an instrument case study, it may be possible to forge some generalizations 
about the phenomenon being studied. As such, the case of TennCare has been 
examined to not only understand the specific program, but also to provide insight into the 
broader issue of managed care in Medicaid. 
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TennCare is an important public policy initiative. This case study should inform 
the debate about the use of managed care strategies for vulnerable populations. The 
generation of public policy, referred to as policy-making, is multidimensional and multi­
faceted. Policy-making is a highly contextual process, which ebbs and flows, with 
multiple stakeholders. The paradigm that most have of policy-making is one of event 
decision-making. This paradigm is erroneous. The more accurate paradigm is one of 
process decision-making (Rist, 2000). 
Research is just one of a number of forces that influence and inform the process 
of policy-making. All too often, research has minimal influence. One way to increase 
the utility and importance of policy research is to abandon the event decision-making 
paradigm and recognize that research can best be leveraged to enlighten policy over 
time, rather than engineer at its inception. Case study research can help policy-makers 
and other stakeholders achieve contextual understanding that is essential when looking 
at intricate social policy and its effects (Rist, 2000). 
Scope of the Case Study 
The original intent was to limit the case to the study of access to care for school­
aged children and adolescents (ages 14-17 years) with serious emotional disorders 
(SED) enrolled in TennCare. The study focused shifted to the more general issue of 
managed care in the TennCare program when it became apparent that the majority of 
people interviewed did not focus on this particular population as a priority in their 
interviews nor were they conversant about the specifics of care delivery for this specific 
cohort within TennCare. This adjustment in focus is consistent with qualitative research 
philosophy that informants will emphasize what is most important to them and that the 
researcher should follow the direction taken by study participants. Data and analysis 
about the delivery of mental health services in general, and to children and adolescents 
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with behavioral health problems specifically, are included as an integral part of this case 
study, however the focus of this study is now more inclusive than first conceived. 
Interviews with individuals in management and supervisory positions in provider 
organizations were limited to those that provide services in the East Tennessee Human 
Resources Agency (ETHRA) catchment area. This catchment area includes the sixteen 
county area of Anderson, Blount, Campbell, Claiborne, Cocke, Grainger, Hamblen, 
Jefferson, Knox, Loudon, Monroe, Morgan, Roane, Scott, Sevier and Union. 
One of the challenges of case study research is the lure of wanting to tell the 
whole story. This is not possible. "The whole story excels anyone's knowing, anyone's 
telling" (Stake, 2000, p. 441 ). The case study was further delimited by the establishment 
and use of general opening questions for each category of informants and by pursuing 
topics and issues that pertained to the three themes that emerged in early interviews 
and predominated with later informants and by pursuing additional details, reflections 
and perspectives about these themes. Throughout the data collection and analyis 
(which overlapped), correspondence between the events still unfolding in TennCare, 
various observations and findings gleaned from informants and the review of documents 
was sought. Emergent issues and these were pursued without regard to pre-conceived 
expectations or understandings. 
Program Evaluations 
Evaluation of outcomes is an important goal in the analysis of the effectiveness 
of a public policy program such as TennCare. Primary to any evaluation of outcomes is 
the determination of whether the program is operating according to design (Patton, 
2002). Program evaluation procedures informed the proposed case study. The aim of 
program evaluation is to inform and improve services, programs, policies and public 
discourse (Greene, 2000). Although basic tenets of the process of program evaluation 
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were used to inform the researcher, this case study is not a true program evaluation. 
However, a case study that evaluates the implementation of a public policy program, 
such as TennCare, has the elements of a good story, telling "what happened, when, to 
whom and with what consequences" (Patton , 2002, p. 10). 
With public policy program evaluation, deviations from intentions are common 
and natural. Programs are implemented incrementally (this was true for TennCare). 
Furthermore, programs are influenced by local conditions such as the availability of 
MCOs and the willingness of providers to become involved, and by organizational 
dynamics (including the changes in governors, other elected and appointed state 
officials, and Federal officials, that occurred since the inception of TennCare, as well as 
MCO vicissitudes). In Tennessee the continuing financial crisis has had a significant 
impact on how the program was implemented and now managed. 
Methodological Specifics 
Data Sources 
Consistent with case study research, multiple data sources were utilized. 
Generally, in case study research, there are six sources of evidence: documents, 
archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations and physical 
artifacts (Yin, 2003). This case study of TennCare included the review and analysis of 
documents and interview transcripts. Documents that were reviewed included: 
newspaper articles; correspondences, including e-mails; journal articles; the original 
TennCare waiver application; the TennCare Partners waiver application; judicial 
decrees; legislative documents; state, consultant, independent and task force reports; 
other case studies. Informants that were interviewed included: two former Governors of 
Tennessee; a former HCFA Administrator; a variety of state government executives, 
advocates and managed care executives; and administrators, managers and caregivers 
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from two community mental health centers, one integrated community health center and 
one Federally-qualified community clinic. 
Interview Specifics 
Interviews were conducted during a five month period in 2005. Twenty-six 
individuals were interviewed in twenty-one separate interviews. A pilot interview was 
also conducted. A profile of study informants and interview specifics appears in the 
fol lowing section. 
Open-ended interview techniques were used to assess the perspective of the 
person being interviewed (Patton, 2002). A presumption of this approach and key to the 
study was that the perspectives of the complement of interviewees are "meaningful, 
knowable, and able to be made explicit" (Patton, 2002, p. 341). Interviews were used to 
capture a variety of perspectives and experiences. Interviews were arranged in advance 
and all participants knew the general focus of the interview. Rather than following a rigid 
interview protocol, the researcher maintained flexibility to be able to pursue whatever 
direction seemed appropriate. Many questions flowed from the immediate context; 
others resulted from the ongoing document review. As such, a predetermined set of 
questions was not possible. This approach al lowed the researcher to be highly 
responsive to individual differences and perspectives. It is exactly these rich and 
contextual differences that the researcher was seeking and obtained. Interviewees were 
free, of course, to decline answering questions if they chose. Few did. Interviews with 
all identified informants and the majority of anonymous ones were one hour or more in 
length; some of the interviews were significantly longer than one hour. 
Profile of Study Respondents and Interview Details 
Informants were divided into two broad classes. The first group consisted of 
public officials and senior level managers of BHO and provider organizations who did not 
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have accountability for direct patient care. The second group consisted of mid-level 
managers and supervisors in provider organizations and other informants that asked that 
their identity be protected. Sixteen of the interviewees are identified; the identity of ten 
of the interviewees is protected. 
Table 1 provides a description of all identified study informants. In addition a 
more detailed description of selected key informants follows. 
Ned Ray McWherter-4tfh Governor of Tennessee. Governor McWherter is a 
political legend to many in the state of Tennessee and throughout the south. He was 
first elected to the Tennessee House of Representatives in 1968. Prior to being elected 
the 46th Governor of Tennessee in 1897, McWherter served as a popular Speaker of the 
House under four Governors, Buford Ellington, Winfield Dunn, Ray Blanton and Lamar 
Alexander. McWherter was elected Speaker of the House after only two terms in the 
State Legislature and he served longer in the position than anyone else in Tennessee 
history. As Speaker of the House, McWherter worked primarily with Republicans; two of 
the four Governors McWherter served under were Republicans; only Ray Blanton was a 
Democrat (Tennessee Encyclopedia of History & Culture, n.d. ; University of Tennessee­
Memphis, n.d.; Wikipedia, n.d. b). 
Governor McWherter is remembered as a progressive and honest leader 
(Wikipedia, n.d. b). As Governor, McWherter appointed the first African American 
committee chairman in the south. Other noteworthy accomplishments include assisting 
women legislators gain leadership roles in state government and the passage of the sate 
"Sunshine Law". McWherter also worked closely with his predecessor as Governor, 
Lamar Alexander in reforming and enhancing the prison and education systems in the 
state (Tennessee Encyclopedia of History & Culture, n.d.; Wikipedia, n.d. b). During his 
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Table 1 :  Profi le of Identified Study Informants 
Interviewee 




Dr. Warren Neel 
Dr. Bruce Vladeck 
Profile 
Former Tennessee Governors 
Democratic Governor of Tennessee who served from 
1 987-1 995. 
Republican Governor of Tennessee from 1 995-2003. 
Former Tennessee Commissioners 
Commissioner of Finance and Administration during the 
entire McWherter administration. Currently Director of 
Finance for Metro Nashville. 
Director of Medicaid Bureau during the McWherter 
administration and then TennCare Director under three 
governors. Retired from state government in July 2005. 
Tennessee Commissioner of Finance and Administration 
during the Sundquist administration from 2000-2003. 
Currently Executive Director of the University of 
Tennessee's Corporate Governance Center. 
Former Federal Commissioners 
Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) of the U .S. Department of Health and Human 
Services from 1 993-1 997, directing the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. Currently a Principal in the Health 
Sciences Advisory Services practice of Ernst & Young 
LLP, and East Coast Director of its Academic Medical 
Center service line. 
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Table 1 :  Continued 





• Profi le 
Representatives from the Advocate Community 
> ·. :: . 
Co-founder of the Tennessee Justice Center (T JC); has 
served as the organization's Executive Director since the 
organization's inception. T JC is a non-profit public 
interest law firm which serves poor citizens of the state of 
Tennessee. A key figure in the development of TennCare 
and actively involved in the program since. 
Executive Director of the Tennessee Health Care 
Campaign, a state-wide advocacy organization committed 
to affordable, accessible and quality health care for all 
Tennesseans. Involved since before the inception of 
TennCare and currently as an advocate and coordinator 
of grassroots efforts. 
Executive Director of Tennessee Voices for Children 
(TVC) since 1 995. TVC is an organization formally 
organized in 1990 as a statewide coalition of individuals, 
agencies and organizations working together to promote 
children's mental health service. Remains active with 
efforts to promote the care of children throughout the 
state. 
Executive Director of Tennessee Association of Mental 
Health Organizations (TAMHO), a state-wide trade 
association representing primarily community mental 
health centers (CMHCs). 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Interviewee . 
Kelly Lang-Ramirez 
Dr. Rene Lerer 






Associate Executive Director of TAMHO at the time of 
interview; has since left the organization . 
BHO Representatives 
President and Chief Operating Officer of Magellan Health 
Services 
Chief Operating Officer of their Public Sector Division of 
Magellan Health Services; President of Tennessee 
Behavioral Health and Premier 
Director of the Service Center and General Manager of 
Magellan Health Services for the TennCare Partners 
Program at the time of the interview; has since left the 
organization . 
Executives of Provider Organizations 
Chief Operating Officer of Ridgeview, a community 
mental health center with facilities in five counties in east 
Tennessee 
Administrator and Vice President for Peninsula Hospital; 
Peninsula Hospital provides mental health and 
alcohol/drug crisis stabilization services for adults, 
adolescents and children 
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tenure, McWherter created a legacy of balanced budgets, new roads, a streamlined 
state government and increased funding for public education (Tennessee Encyclopedia 
of History & Culture, n.d.). 
McWherter was a popular Governor who was re-elected to a second term with 
almost two-thirds of the vote. In his bid for a second term, McWherter was supported, 
tacitly and fairly openly, by many prominent Tennessee Republicans. There is general 
consensus that had it been permitted and McWherter desired it (he did not), McWherter 
could have easily won a third term (Wikipedia, n.d.). 
Governor McWherter's belief in the need for health care was born of his own 
experience growing up poor as a sharecropper's son. Despite being a millionaire by the 
time he was elected Governor, McWherter never forgot his roots. When I met with 
McWherter he related a story that I later learned was somewhat legendary. He said, 
[President] Clinton used to say, "Keep your hand on your pocketbook. Here 
comes the poor guy." I was born on a round oak table in my mother and daddy's 
kitchen. That's the way people were born back then in the country . . .  I think 
[when] people need health care services . . .  we need to make them available and 
when you're really in trouble, you need the latest technology that money can 
buy . . .  I believe a poor person's entitled to the same as a rich person (transcript of 
a recorded interview, 2005, February 2, lines 941-950). 
Governor McWherter is not a partisan man. Rather than being divisive, he is 
focused on finding common ground among diverse parties. This is the foundation of his 
success as a legislator, later as Governor and finally as senior statesman of the 
Democratic Party. Bill Clinton has aid, "He is a very good man, and he relate[s] well to 
everyone. These so-called red and blue divisions we have today are more about culture 
and clan than real issues" (Hillman, 2004, December 26b). A young politician who 
benefited from his tutelage said of McWherter, "I was amazed at how he could bring 
people who didn't want to talk to each other into his office and he would work things out 
and achieve a consensus. That was the best education, to sit in a corner of his office 
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and watch him interacting with people" (Matt Kisber as quoted in Hillman, 2004, 
December 26b). Lois DeBerry, a prominent African-American and second-ranking 
member of the Tennessee House of Representatives said of McWherter, 
He erased lines of race, party affiliation . . .  Ned was just the real test of a politician. 
He really removed partisanship from the legislature. He believes in working for 
the common good, and it doesn't matter if you're Republican or Democrat. That's 
the kind of attitude he has. When you can walk with kings and queens, and you 
keep in touch with the ordinary person-he is that kind of man. 
You know, you can get along with anybody when you have fairness, values and 
integrity, and he does (Hillman, 2004, December 26b). 
Governor McWherter is a big man with a large presence. He fills a room and you 
are drawn to him. He is kind, warm, gracious and gregarious. He is very approachable 
with little pretense. The simplicity of Governor McWherter's presentation of his ideas 
and speech belie the complexity and tenacity of his vision. Bill Clinton has said, "He'll 
act like 'country come in,' but he's smart as the devil" (Hillman, 2004, December 26b). 
I was impressed with his abiding faith in the goodness of people and his 
optimistic outlook. McWherter clearly sees the possibilities in situations, instead of the 
obstacles. Former President Jimmy Carter said of McWherter, 
We're similar in our style, which is based on the bedrock of where we came from. 
We both come from small towns, and we grew up where your word is your bond. 
You do what you think is right and follow your conscience. He advised me to 
follow my core values and faith in Washington. Sometimes that's costly politically, 
but that is the right thing to do. We have both lived our lives in that way. Ned is 
such a wonderful person, so smart and so fair. The caring he has for the people 
has always led him to do the right thing for Tennessee (Hillman, 2004, December 
2004b). 
In listening to the Governor, you are impressed with his personal involvement. 
He is very "hands on" and revels in the personal relationships and stories which 
characterize his career and accomplishments. 
I met Governor McWherter at his condominium in Belle Meade not from the state 
capitol in Nashville. I was met at the door and led up to a traditional and elegant parlor 
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by an aide to the Governor who then left the premise. The Governor joined me in the 
parlor and promptly asked if it was okay to meet in the kitchen "where it is more 
comfortable'. For over one and one-half hours we sat at the kitchen table as the 
Governor told me about himself, his personal and political beliefs and how TennCare 
was created. 
Don Sundquist-47'h Governor of Tennessee. Don Sundquist has the current 
distinction of being the Governor for the longest tenure since the inception of TennCare. 
Despite expressing opposition to the program during his bid for Governor, he became 
convinced of the value of the program. Sundquist, a political conservative, ran for 
Governor of Tennessee (against Phil Bredesen, the current Governor, who he 
surprisingly beat by a wide margin) in 1994 after serving six terms as a U. S. 
Representative from the Sixth Congressional District. Sundquist succeeded McWherter 
who was barred from seeking a third term (Wikipedia, n.d., a). 
Sundquist is most known for the immensely unpopular stance he took in support 
of a state income tax in a state very adverse to the plan. Although the issue of a state 
income tax dominated Sundquist's second term (to which he was easily elected over 
John Jay Hooker) and he was able to garner some support from the Republican 
business community and from many Democrats who relished the idea of being able to 
implement a tax while being able to blame the Republicans, the idea failed and was 
instrumental in the political fall from grace that Sundquist experienced (Wikipedia, n.d., 
a). The contentious debate about a state income tax detracted from other priorities 
during Sundquist's administration, notably TennCare. 
Governor Sundquist has a keen interest in health care and reform at the national 
and state level. He is currently serving as the head of a national panel appointed by 
President George W. Bush to improve Medicaid. 
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I met with Governor Sundquist on two occasions at Bank East in downtown 
Knoxvi lle. Sundquist is a member of the bank's Board of Directors. On both occasions, 
Governor was accompanied by Dr. Warren Neel who served as the Commissioner of 
Finance and Administration for a period of time (2000-2003) during Sundquist's 
administration. 
I did not expect Don Sundquist to care so deeply about the value of providing 
health care to the neediest Tennesseans. I was impressed with his candor and his 
thoughtfulness about what needs to be done about health care. I sensed he was 
frustrated by barriers he encountered in the management of the TennCare program. 
found Sundquist to be contemplative about how we can solve the issues of health care 
access and costs in our country. What impressed me each time I interviewed Governor 
Sundquist and in subsequent discussions was that although his motivation for wanting 
affordable and accessible health care was different from Governor McWherter's (when 
Governor Sundquist talks about health care, it is less personal and more linked to the 
financial impact that issues of cost and access have on the state and national economy), 
he is no less committed to the idea than anyone else I interviewed. Next to Dr. Vladeck, 
Governor Sundquist talked most about the interface between national and state reform 
efforts. 
In summary, Don Sundquist i l lustrated for me how complex issues of health care 
access and costs are. Sundquist also showed me that traditional paradigms about 
Republican and Democratic differences are dysfunctional and detract from the common 
ground that can be forged when reasonable people are brought together for common 
purpose despite their motivations. 
Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. -Executive Director of the Tennessee Justice Center. 
Gordon Bonnyman seems l ike an unlikely advocate. He was raised in a wealthy 
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Knoxville family and received his baccalaureate degree from Princeton (he later received 
a Law degree from the University of Tennessee). But a strong sense of social justice, 
rooted in a strong faith, propelled him to advocacy and representation of low income 
clients in a variety of civil matters, including housing and consumer law, prison reform, 
public benefits, rights of disabled individuals, nursing home reform, juvenile procedures 
and civil rights. Before the inception of the Tennessee Justice Center, Mr. Bonnyman 
was a Legal Services attorney for 23 years. Since he co-founded the Tennessee Justice 
Center in January 1996, where he has served as the Center's only Executive Director, 
he has focused on health care access for poor and uninsured persons (Tarr, 2001, June 
25; Tennessee Justice Center, n.d.). 
Gordon Bonnyman was part of Governor McWherter's inner circle in the creation 
of TennCare. Over time, rather than being part of the inner circle, Mr. Bonnyman 
became the main figure in legal and other challenges to the operation of the TennCare 
program in the Sundquist and Bredesen administrations and in the reform efforts more 
recently initiated by Governor Bredesen. Mr. Bonnyman's transition from ally to 
adversary is a key factor in the telling of the TennCare story. 
Consistent with my experience with others I approached with a request for an 
interview, Mr. Bonnyman was immediately open to the idea. Like others, he seemed 
eager to share his thoughts on TennCare. Although he was the first that I was able to 
contact for an interview, actually conducting the interview was toughest of all. Mr. 
Bonnyman was always gracious, but gaining access was difficult because of the last 
minute (and eventually failed) negotiations between Governor Bredesen and Bonnyman 
at the end of 2004 and later in early 2005 because of the preparations necessary to 
challenge the eventual plans of Governor Bredesen. Initially Mr. Bonnyman was 
reluctant to commit to a specific meeting time. He did call on two occasions for an 
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impromptu phone interview which was logistically not possible either time. On a separate 
time, we arranged a phone interview in advance, but Mr. Bonnyman was not available at 
the appointed time. When Mr. Bonnyman called at a later time, I happened to be on a 
break between a series of scheduled interviews in Nashville. Although Mr. Bonnyman 
initially resisted my suggestion that I come immediately to his office, he eventually 
yielded to my insistence. 
Mr. Bonnyman's office was undoubtedly the most humble of all I visited. It was 
small and with stacks of papers and books everywhere. The office could easily have 
been one of a mid-level manager in a rural public health department or some similar 
official. All of this was quickly invisible once the interview began and proceeded at 
breakneck speed. 
Mr. Bonnyman is keenly intelligent, eloquent, persuasive, passionate, 
exceedingly polite and unassuming. He is able to deftly and quietly capture you with a 
weaving of words and ideas. Although you have to strain to hear what Mr. Bonnyman is 
saying at times since he is so soft-spoken, you are quickly caught-up in a strong wave of 
ideas and passions. When Mr. Bonnyman talks, it is so much about the people he is 
dedicated to serving and so little about himself. 
I was also impressed with Mr. Bonnyman's strong and personal feelings for the 
people that he sees as barriers to his missions. Mr. Bonnyman is a passionate partisan. 
He makes no effort or pretense about considering contextual influences or alternative 
views. Mr. Bonnyman presents himself as a single-minded reformist. 
My hour with Gordon Bonnyman passed quicker than any other interview. Mr. 
Bonnyman has been very gracious in responding to requests for additional information 
and clarification since I met with him. He is meticulous, exacting and exceedingly 
gracious. 
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Dr. Bruce Vladeck-Former Administrator of the Health Care Financing 
Administration. I was referred to Dr. Bruce Vladeck by Dr. Donna Shalala (who is the 
current President of the University of Miami and the former Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services during the Clinton administration) when I requested an 
interview with her. She suggested that Dr. Vladeck would be a better informant. My 
initial disappointment was borne of ignorance. I was not aware how valuable it would be 
to meet with Dr. Vladeck and how impressive he would be. I was not aware of Dr. 
Valdeck's role or his activism in the delivery of health care benefits in the public sector. 
Dr. Vladeck majored in government at Harvard University. He received a Ph. D. 
in political science from the University of Michigan where he was mentored by Dr. John 
Kingdon who formulated the Policy Streams Model that is widely used by those 
interested in agenda setting in public policy. Dr. Vladeck was the Administrator for the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the predecessor to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from the spring of 1993 through 1997 where he 
had oversight of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. In this role he had direct 
involvement with TennCare. Dr. Valdeck is a respected policy scholar with frequent 
publications and a history of collaboration with other scholars. 
I met with Dr. Vladeck at his office in New York City where he is currently 
employed as a Principal in the Health Sciences Advisory Services practice of Ernst & 
Young LLP, and the East Coast Director of its Academic Medical Center service line. 
Interestingly I was subjected to more security screening and procedures in my visit with 
Dr. Vladeck than I was with any other interviewee. I attribute this to Dr. Vladeck's office 
location and the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Center. 
Dr. Vladeck was very personable and kind. I was privileged to be part of an 
interview that was more of an intimate intellectual discourse than any other. Dr. Vladeck 
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was able to deftly share his experience and perspective on TennCare while centering 
the discussion on important political and philosophical questions. Years of government 
experience have made Dr. Valdeck very pragmatic, but his pragmatism is rooted in a 
very studied and compelling philosophical and political worldview. 
David Manning-McWherter 's Commissioner of Finance and Administration. 
David Manning was the Finance and Administration Commissioner during the entire 
McWherter administration. He was an example of a McWherter's interest in and 
success with identifying young talent, cultivating that talent and providing invaluable 
support. Manning is also an example of the loyalty and effectiveness that resulted from 
this practice. 
David Manning reminded me of many corporate controllers I have worked with 
previously. He is extremely confident and very competent. You also get the impression 
that Mr. Manning is very cunning. He has a keen wit and a sly sense of humor. When I 
met with him, he was very forthcoming with facts and ideas, but he revealed little of 
himself. He was welcoming without the genuine warmth of a man like Governor 
McWherter or Dr. Vladeck. 
David Manning was very factual when I met with him. He was precise and 
definitive in his recollections and assessment of events and issues. 
What impressed me about Manning was his single-mindedness of purpose and his 
ability to evaluate options and deflect criticisms by his adherence to well thought-out 
principles that ground his visions. I was impressed that he was the glue that held 
together the idea of TennCare in the beginning. In his interview, he was dogmatic about 
the ideas that defined TennCare (e.g. , the virtues of managed care and market-based 
competition) and unabashed in his criticism of the failings in program management since 
Governor McWherter left office. 
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The interview with Mr. Manning was conducted across his very large desk in his 
spacious office in Nashville. From Mr. Manning's office you can look up to Manny 
Martin's office. Despite the proximity, the two former partners seemed worlds apart. 
Manning lamented how ineffectively Martins was being used and was critical of 
Governor Bredesen's handling of TennCare. Manning's criticism seemed to emanate 
from his conviction that the TennCare concept was still viable, and one way to actualize 
its promise was to better deploy Manny Martins. 
Manny Martins-Director of the Medicaid Bureau and TennCare Director. You 
might pass Manny Martins on the street without a second look, but you will never forget 
him once you have had the privilege of talking with him like I did. When I think of Mr. 
Martins, I am first reminded of his compassion. He is the epitome of the tireless, 
committed public servant who is genuinely concerned about those he serves. I am also 
immediately reminded of how grounded Martins is. He is very accomplished by virtue of 
his many experiences (in state government, private sector business and higher 
education administration), yet he is constantly searching for the evidence to enlighten his 
experiences. 
Mr. Martins is not flashy, but he is rock solid. He is the kind of person that 
engenders trust and confidence. He is not a partisan, as evidence by his service under 
three Governors. Mr. Martins has the unique distinction of serving as the first TennCare 
Director in the McWherter, twice in the Sundquist administration and once again during 
the Bredesen administration. 
I met with Mr. Martins in his 2ih floor office in the Tennessee Tower in Nashville. 
The Tennessee Tower is a state office building that is a prominent point in the Nashville 
skyline. From his vantage point, Martins has a panoramic view of Nashville. I equated 
this expansive view with Mr. Martins expansive view of TennCare and his perspective as 
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an accomplished state administrator contemplating his legacy and transitioning towards 
his departure from state government. 
Tony Garr-Executive Director of the Tennessee Health Care Campaign. My 
interview with Tony Garr, the first after my pilot interview, was conducted in Knoxvil le 
fol lowing a meeting he led with representatives from the social services community. In 
this meeting I observed Mr. Garr's grassroots advocacy. The attention that the 
organization Mr. Garr heads, the Tennessee Health Care Campaign, brought to the 
issue of health care access for marginalized people was instrumental in the inception of 
TennCare and has been a complement to the work of other advocates ever since. 
Mr. Garr has been very helpful since I first contacted him. He is very resourceful 
and efficient in garnering and using resources. Garr deflected any personal attention, 
always putting his clients first and he was very deferential to his colleagues, most 
notably Gordon Bonnyman. 
Table 2 provides a profile of anonymous study informants. 
Informed Consent and Other Participant Protections 
Methods and procedures used with anonymous informants differed from those 
used for all other informants. The confidentiality of anonymous respondents has been 
strictly protected (see Appendix E for a sample consent form used with providers). Only 
the researcher, transcriptionist and the dissertation committee chairman know the 
names of the anonymous respondents. The transcriptionist signed a confidentiality 
agreement (see Appendix F for a sample agreement). 
Because of the public visibility of all non-provider respondents, they were asked 
to not be anonymous (see Appendix G for a sample of the consent from used with non­
provider respondents). However, each respondent was given the option of not being 
publicly identified. One of the respondents in this class selected this option. 
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Table 2: Profi le of Anonymous Study Informants 
Category · . Profile 
.. • . . 
Member of the Tenn Care Partners Roundtable A federally-funded Medicaid researcher 
Managers and Supervisors of community-based Director of Children and Youth Services employed by an 
organizations East Tennessee community mental health center 
Top-level administrator of residential and outpatient 
services for a full-range behavioral health care provider 
Admissions Director employed by an east Tennessee full-
range behavioral health care provider 
Direct care providers or mid-level managers of care A Master's-prepared social worker employed as a case 
delivery manager 
Intake Coordinator of an east Tennessee full-range 
behavioral health care provider 
Customer Services Specialist from an east Tennessee 
full-range behavioral health care provider 
A pediatrician practicing in a full-range community health 
care clinic as the primary provider of an integrated multi-
disciplinary team delivering primary care services to a 
primarily Medicaid population 
A Master's-prepared social worker practicing in a full-
range community health care clinic as a provider of an 
integrated multi-disciplinary team delivering primary care 
services to a primarily Medicaid population 
A Family Nurse Practitioner employed in a federally-
qualified primary care clinic 
68 
Verbal and written explanations (see Appendix H) were provided to each 
potential interviewee prior to obtaining informed consent, and a copy of the explanation 
and consent forms were given to applicable participants along with researcher contact 
information. Signed consents were obtained prior to beginning the first interview. In 
addition, letters of approval from the applicable department or agency head, as wel l  as 
IRB approval, were secured prior to approaching any individual employed in the 
respective department or agency. The original signed consent forms and agency letters 
of approval were delivered to the dissertation committee chair for secure storage. In 
addition, copies of the agency approval letters were delivered to the University of 
Tennessee Office Of Research, as requested. 
All interviews were audio-taped using a digital voice recorder. Digital voice files 
were uploaded to the researcher's personal computer. All digital audio files of interviews 
are stored on a password-protected personal computer in the researcher's locked home 
office. These audio files wil l  be destroyed at the direction of the dissertation chairman 
once all requirements for a successful defense have been met. Printed typed transcripts 
are stored in the researcher's locked home office. The transcripts of confidential 
sources do not contain personal or other information that could be used to identify these 
individuals; only pseudonyms are used. Copies of the digital audio files were burned to 
compact d isks (CDs) for transcription. All CDs have been returned to the researcher. 
The CDs are stored in the researcher's locked home office. They wi l l  be destroyed at 
the same time that the audio files are destroyed. 
Transcripts and Field Notes 
All informants were mailed a copy of their transcript and given the opportunity to 
review their transcript for any additions or changes. A self-addressed, stamped 
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envelope was included in the mailing for return of corrected transcripts. Informants were 
notified that transcripts would be considered accurate if the transcript was not returned 
with any modifications, additions or deletions within 10 days of the postmark date. A 
sample of the cover letter that was included is shown in Appendix J. 
Ten of the transcripts were returned with edits. The edits that these 
respondents made were not substantial with the exception of one respondent who 
deleted comments that could be sensitive if misconstrued. 
The researcher dictated field notes at the end of each interview. These notes 
were transcribed with the interviews and are included with the printed copies (field notes 
were not included with the transcript copies sent to each respondent). Field notes 
included observations made during the interviews, and any information obtained from 
study participants before or after the tape recorder is turned off were recorded as field 
notes. Additional field notes also included researcher impressions, feelings, thoughts or 
experiences. Field notes were also used to begin the explication of emerging ideas. 
Data Analysis 
Data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously in a fluid, interactive and 
dynamic process. Interview questions were continuously refined and focused as 
patterns and themes emerged. By its nature, case study research involves following the 
threads of such patterns and may require additional resources in order to adequately 
build the database (Yin, 2003). 
Themes were used to organize the vast amount of interview data. The salience 
of themes that emerged in early interviews were challenged, clarified and further distilled 
by an iterative process of content analysis that included multiple close readings of 
interview transcripts and documents. The goal of content analysis was to identify 
prominent and recurring themes and patterns among the various data sources (Patton, 
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2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Waltz, Strickland & Lenz, 1 99 1 ). Themes were further 
developed through the clarification and testing of ideas with stakeholders and 
confirmation of details with document sources. Each theme was also organized through 
the construction of a chronological history of events. 
Analytical quality was enhanced by data triangulation. The retrospective 
recollections of events and key impressions captured in recorded interviews were 
triangulated with a wide variety of time-stable documents. Triangulation is "the process 
of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation" that "serves to clarify meaning by identifying different ways 
the phenomenon is seen" (Stake, 2000, p. 443). 
The purpose of triangulation is to test for consistency. It is not expected that 
different data sources wil l  yield the same results (Patton, 2002). Each data source and 
analysis yields a new perspective. With a complex phenomenon like a public health 
policy, differences are expected and were examined closely to derive new meanings and 
perspectives. 
Analysis also involved primary reflection by the researcher and interaction with 
members of the researcher's dissertation committee skil led in the techniques of 
qualitative research and details about the TennCare program. 
Conclusions 
A case study researcher needs to be mindful about threats to validity and 
reliability. There are special challenges in case study research because the researcher 
is the primary instrument of analysis and because the researcher needs to be flexible, 
and open and responsive to emergent issues. Careful thought, planning and 
collaboration are necessary for maximizing the potential of case study research while 
maintaining focus and rigor. 
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CHAPTER 5: TENNCARE VISION AND DEVELOPMENT 
"I believe that people in need are · entitled to accessible, available, and affordable 
health care. That 's my three As" (transcript of a recorded interview with N. McWherter, 
2005, February 02, lines 399-400). 
"We believed that it was important to move the . . .  [Tennessee] Medicaid 
Program . . .  to a managed care system and put competitive pressure on the health care 
system that at the time didn't exist . . .  what we attempted to do was . . .  to cover not only the 
eligible Medicaid population but to cover the uninsured/uninsurable population" 
(transcript of a recorded interview with M. Martins, 1 15-136). 
Introduction 
A convergence of factors paved the way for the development of the TennCare 
concept, a concept consistent with a long-held vision of Ned Ray McWherter to provide 
accessible and affordable health care for all Tennesseans. McWherter and his team of 
David Manning and Manny Martins capitalized on these factors to fulfill these lofty 
objectives . . .  and to avoid a fiscal collapse in the state. 
Factors that were influential in the development of TennCare related to people, 
purpose and context. Among the most influential factors were an impending crisis in 
Medicaid funding precipitated in part because of unfunded federal mandates, the demise 
the funding strategies employed by the state of Tennessee in response to the growing 
financial crisis, recommendations developed by the Tennessee Medicaid Task Force 
appointed by McWherter and the state's experience and eventual success with 
introducing managed care to state employees. 
A host of other factors facilitated the acceptance of TennCare. These included: 
the election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States, an unlikely alliance forged 
by the McWherter administration, the dominance of Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Tennessee and a very calculated strategy to exclude detractors of McWherter's ideas 
and move at a very rapid pace. 
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TennCare Development 
The Conception of a Radical New Idea 
Several experiences, collaborations and agreements (explicit and tacit) were 
employed by Governor McWherter, Manny Martins and David Manning to support the 
acceptance and development of the concept of TennCare. The success McWherter had 
in addressing issues with Tennessee prisons was instrumental in paving the way for 
TennCare. In addition, the experience the McWherter administration had with the State 
Employee Health Insurance Plan and their collaboration with Blue Cross provided the 
experience, organizational structure and needed contingencies to launch TennCare. 
Prior to the development of the concept of TennCare, Governor McWherter appointed a 
Blue Ribbon Task Force, headed by current U.S. Senator and Majority Leader, Dr. 
William Frist, to secure support for the need for a radical restructuring of the state's 
Medicaid program. In addition, the past experiences the McWherter administration had 
working with the Tennessee Legislature had created a pattern of cooperation that was 
leveraged in the creation of TennCare. Finally the McWherter administration, in a 
departure from the status quo, solicited the support and involvement of the advocacy 
community while severely limiting the influence of the traditionally dominant provider 
community. 
Governor McWherter served two terms as Governor from 1987-1995 (see Table 
3 for a summary of the terms and political affiliations of recent Tennessee Governors 
and U.S. Presidents). It was during the waning days of his administration, after 
addressing his other key objectives of better education, roads, jobs and prisons that he 
turned his attention to access to health care for the state's most needy (Friar, 1999). In 
early 1993 he presented his draft plan for Medicaid reform to the Tennessee General 
Assembly. In six weeks he had secured their endorsement and submitted a detailed 
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Table 3 :  Tennessee Governors and U.S. Presidents :  Affil iations and Terms 
U.S. President Tennessee Governor 
Ronald Reagan (R)-1 981- 1 989 Lamar Alexander (R)-1 979-1 987 
George H. Bush (R)-1989-1 993 Ned Ray Mcwherter (D )-1 987- 1 995 
Bill Clinton (D)-1 993-2001 Don Sundquist (R)-1 995-2003 
George W. Bush (R)-2001 -present Phil Bredesen (D)-2003-present 
waiver application and plan to HCFA (McWherter, 1993). That approval was received 
five months later and the program was implemented 46 days after that, a total of just 
over six weeks! Several events and key decisions facilitated the radical and rapid 
deployment of TennCare. A discussion of these follows. 
A Crisis in Medicaid Funding 
A crisis in Medicaid funding that had actually begun in the prior administration of 
Governor Lamar Alexander ( 1979-1987) and then escalated in the McWherter 
administration, was the impetus for the creation of TennCare. Between 1984 and 1991, 
the federal government issued regulations that first allowed and then required states to 
expand Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women and children. When Governor McWherter 
assumed office the state budget for covering the 500,000 Medicaid enrollees was $1 
billion. By 1993 costs had tripled to $3 billion and enrollment had doubled (Manning, 
1995). According to David Manning these incre.ases were due to, 
An aggressive series of what became known as unfunded mandates [emphasis 
added] on states, where [the administration of President George H. Bush] was 
fairly aggressively expanding coverage, a lot of it focused on children and pre­
Medicare [enrollees] . . . . but they weren't providing any relief for the states and 
they weren't making it optional. (transcript of recorded interview, D. Manning, 
2005, March 11, lines 59-65) 
Tennessee's response, developed by Governor McWherter, Manning and 
Medicaid Director Martins, paved the way for the eventual restructuring of Medicaid in 
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Tennessee through the creation of TennCare. By leveraging the availability of federal 
matching funds and permissive regulations that allowed them to broker a provider tax 
supported by the Tennessee Hospital Association, their plan was able to avoid new 
state-initiated taxes and cuts in the Medicaid program. This was essential, given the 
McWherter administration's negative experience with proposing additional state taxes. 
The state of Tennessee initially funded the escalating costs by using "voluntary" 
provider donations and later by provider taxes and fees. According to Manning, 
We took that opportunity to solicit those donations, and we received them and 
other significant amounts and were able to expand coverage particularly for 
pregnant women, as well as children, at a rate which was considerably faster 
than would otherwise have been possible. Somewhere toward the end of the 
"80s, maybe the very early "90s, Congress and the first Bush administration 
looked up and said, "This is working too well, and we need to do something to 
discourage this because the States are . . .  being too effective at doing this." So 
they attempted to regulate more directly what you could do. That got a little bit of 
push back from the States. By the early "90s, there was a change made in that 
regulation, but it was a change made by Congressional act that really didn't 
restrict it; it opened the door much broader to what you could do to generate 
Federal revenue for Medicaid programs. So we did. We were able to expand to 
sustain the growth of the program and the opportunities that had been created for 
expanding coverage. About that time, though, the Bush administration really 
engaged and said they would have to write a change by regulation those things 
and stop that practice from occurring. We worked closely with the National 
Governors" Association and was able to block the Bush administration's efforts in 
that area and then worked a compromise for the National Governors" Association 
to essentially enable Tennessee to continue doing at the same levels much of 
what it had been doing in the past. All of those machinations that occurred at the 
State and Federal level did wind up causing us to change what had been a 
"voluntary donation" program into a provider tax program. That provider tax 
program was about to run out because it had some set provision in it toward the 
end of 1993, and in order to address the funding problem that would create, 
something significantly different had to be done. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 11, lines 70-97) 
The experience of dealing with the voluntary donations and the provider tax laid 
the foundation for the success of the team of McWherter, Manning and Martins in 
creating TennCare. 
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Blue Ribbon Task Force 
The focus of the Blue Ribbon Task Force, appointed by Governor McWherter 
and headed by Dr. William Frist, was to discuss the problems the state faced with 
increasing Medicaid costs and "help to educate the general public and the General 
Assembly about what the state would encounter if we were to try to cut our way out of 
the problem", according to David Manning (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 
11, lines 178-182). The Task Force concluded that the state had three options. These 
were to increase taxes, a very unpopular idea; reduce Medicaid services, an idea 
Governor McWherter opposed; or significantly reform the delivery and financing of the 
state's Medicaid program, an idea that had some traction nationally and appealed to 
McWherter and his team. The task force paved the way for justifying the need for the 
radical reforms that were proposed when the plans for TennCare were unveiled. The 
task force helped "the public understand the consequences of the rather dramatic cuts 
that would occur if in fact the changes were not made" (transcript of recorded interview, 
D. Manning, 2005, March 11, lines 137-138). 
The State Employees Health Insurance Plan 
In addition to rising Medicaid costs, Governor McWherter was challenged with 
the same in the State Employees Health Insurance Plan. To solve the problem, 
David Manning turned to Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Tennessee in 1988 to develop a 
managed care plan. The state was able to wield influence with Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
because they were one of Blue Cross-Blue Shield's largest customers. Working closely 
and exclusively with Blue Cross-Blue Shield, the state was able to roll-out a statewide 
network of providers for the alternative delivery of health care services for state 
employees. The Tennessee Provider Network, known as TPN, was implemented in 
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1 988 as a capitated plan. TPN eventual ly became the backbone of the TennCare 
delivery system. 
According to David Manning, there was a "great deal of controversy" about the 
state employees managed care plan when it was introduced, and it took "Blue Cross 
about two years to sel l it to a mil lion Tennesseans" (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 1 1 , lines 1 68, 1 64-1 65). The experience laid the foundation of the strategy 
that would eventually define TennCare and gave the McWherter administration the 
confidence to propose and eventual ly implement a radical change in their Medicaid 
program. Manning recalled that, "We . . .  understood that you could change the structure 
of your programs, provide a level of consistent care, in cases improve care, and reduce 
costs if you are wil ling to use the marketplace to make that happen. That backdrop, that 
experience, even though it had been controversial, led us to believe that you could do 
the same things with Medicaid" (lines 1 68-173). 
Many providers and state employees resisted the start of the TPN . However, 
over time, employee concerns diminished and by the early 1 990s the TPN was serving 
over one mil lion Tennesseans through private health plans (Manning, 1 995) . According 
to Manning, "the development of TPN clearly demonstrated that any effort that really 
creates a change in the health care system wil l be politically controversial, but the fact 
that we survived the strife and achieved cost control and qual ity of care made a lasting 
impression" (p. 24). 
A Unique Alignment of People and Purpose 
Governor McWherter, David Manning and Manny Martins had unique and 
complementary experiences and expertise matched with a common vision. McWherter 
was a savvy, popular and wel l-connected political leader in the waning days of tenure as 
governor who was willing to expend political capital on his long-term vision of helping 
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disadvantaged people. Manning was a bold financial innovator with great political 
acumen and negotiating insight. Martins, a solid and pragmatic administrator, 
understood the Medicaid program. 
According to Manny Martins, 
The Governor wanted to provide comprehensive health insurance to people ... He 
truly wanted to do that. The Commissioner of Finance at the time, David 
Manning, . . . [is] a very sharp individual, very smart, and [he] understood the 
dynamics of financing and health care. He had his heart in the same place as 
the Governor's. I happened to be the Medicaid Director at the time. I happened 
to have my heart in [TennCare] also ... All of us were in the position to make 
TennCare happen. All of us philosophically, management-wise, every other way, 
saw [TennCare] as something we really wanted to get done. I had staff in here at 
the time that was very, very good as well. ... It just jelled. I mean, it really jelled. 
So I think the fact that David [Manning] was where he was, the Governor was 
where he was, I was where I was, really, really helped. I think all of us had a 
certain amount of credibility with the Legislature. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 11, line 672-688) 
Tony Garr adds Gordon Bonnyman to the inner circle of essential creators of 
TennCare, saying, 
It wouldn't have happened without Governor McWherter. It would not have 
happened without David Manning, and it wouldn't have happened without Manny 
Martins. And I think I could say it wouldn't have happened without Gordon 
Bonnyman. So there were four key players: Gordon, Manny, David, and the 
Governor .... I think the two key players were really David Manning and Gordon 
Bonnyman. David Manning came to the point where he said, "I can't beat 
Gordon, and so I've got to figure out a way to work with Gordon." And Manny 
Martins and David Manning came up with this sketch [of] what it might look like. I 
think, I may be wrong, but I think probably after David Manning talked to the 
Governor about it, probably the very next person he talked to was probably 
Gordon Bonnyman. Or if it wasn't Gordon Bonnyman, it was probably Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield. I think they recognized early on that Gordon played an 
important role. I think also that administration realized that this is really a political 
animal in that unless there was some political considerations given to this, unless 
they realized it was a political animal, it was never going to pass. And so, David 
Manning was very good politically. And it's my understanding that Manny 
Martins made it clear to David Manning, "I'll be glad to run this thing. I'll be glad 
to run this thing. I can make the nuts and bolts work together. But I'm not going 
to stand in front of the legislative committees explaining this or trying to do this, 
so you're going to have to do that." I think there was an unspoken agreement 
that David Manning would do all the talking, and he was the one that did. He 
was the one that appeared before all the legislative committees. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 105-116) 
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Dr. Bruce Vladeck supported Garr's idea of the vital role of Gordon Bonnyman 
saying, "one of the pivotal supporters of TennCare in the summer and early fal l  of 1993 
was Gordon Bonnyman, who wrote us a number of letters and cal led me a couple of 
times" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 4, lines 185-187). Dr. Vladeck also 
related that a year or so later "when Gordon [Bonnyman] was complaining about some 
part of the program and giving us a very hard time, and he can be very obnoxious when 
the mood strikes, and I saw him at a conference, he said, "How can you let this 
happen?". I said, "Gordon, this whole program would not be there if you hadn't been 
one of its major supporters" (lines 193-197). 
Relying on the Bench Strength of Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
Both the organizational capabilities of Blue Cross-Blue Shield and its success 
with the State Employees Health Insurance Plan were essential to being able to 
accomplish the TennCare roll-out in the timeframe developed. Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
was the "organization that had the capacity to do the whole thing, if they had to do the 
whole thing" (transcript of recorded interview, D. Manning, 2005, March 11, lines 202-
203). Although the administration "didn't really want one organization to do the whole 
thing" (lines 203-204), they were confident Blue Cross could, if necessary. 
Changing the Seating at the Table 
Providers, including physicians, hospital representatives and others, have been 
traditional powerbrokers in any debate about the delivery of health care services. 
Frequently consumers of health are excluded from meaningful participation. With 
TennCare, the McWherter administration changed these dynamics. Governor 
McWherter made a deliberate decision about who would be included in the development 
of TennCare; he made the unorthodox decision to include the consumer advocates and 
exclude the providers. 
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An important battle with providers had been won with McWherter administration's 
roll-out of the TPN with Blue Cross-Blue Shield for state employees. As they prepared 
to address the Medicaid crisis, McWherter, Martins and Manning formulated a new 
strategy. Rather than drawing powerful provider groups and representatives into the fold 
for discussions about the reform of the state's Medicaid program, they turned to the 
advocates, most notably Gordon Bonnyman and Tony Garr, who represented the people 
the program served. The McWherter team thought it was essential to. "have the 
advocacy community with us" (transcript of recorded interview, D. Manning, ·2005, March 
11, lines 204-205). Manning recounted how the administration "spent a great deal of 
time, early in 1993, and perhaps a little in late 1992, conferring with Blue.Cross and 
conferring with Gordon [Bonnyman] on behalf of the enrollee groups and [we] developed 
a good working relationship (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 211-
215). " Initially skeptical to the initiative, advocacy groups eventually supported what they 
labeled as a "labor/management" deal with state administrators because of the goodwill 
generated with the state's earlier use of provider taxes and DSH payments to expand 
the Medicaid program and their recognition that more poor families could be given health 
insurance under managed care" (Friar, 1999, p. 6). 
Manning further related that, "we were able to move forward with a cooperative 
approach that presented a united front to what was known as HCFA in those days" 
(transcript of recorded interview, D. Manning, 2005, March 11, lines 216-218). The 
TennCare application for a Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver submitted by Governor 
McWherter to Secretary Donna Shalala of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (McWherter, 1993), who Dr. Vladeck reported to, included numerous letters of 
support, including one from Gordon Bonnyman who was then with Legal Services of 
Middle Tennessee, as well as one from Glen C. Watson Jr. , a Senior Vice President with 
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Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Tennessee. In addition to Blue Cross-Blue Shield and the 
advocates, the state also garnered the support and assistance of the Tennessee 
Primary Care Association, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the state's chapter of 
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) , nurse practitioner and physician 
assistant associations, the perinatal association and the psychological association (Gold, 
Frazer, Schoen, 1995). 
By bringing Bonnyman and the advocates into the fold, McWherter's team not 
only removed a barrier to being granted the requisite federal waiver. They also secured 
some cover from the inevitable fall-out associated with TennCare's accelerated timeline 
and the magnitude of change imposed. A part of the group that worked on the 
development of TennCare, Gordon Bonnyman made apparently tacit agreements 
regarding inevitable problems. According to Tony Garr, a close colleague of Gordon 
Bonnyman, 
David Manning knew that starting a whole new program was going to create a 
whole new set of problems that he hadn't dealt with before. I think he was smart 
enough to basically bring Gordon on board early on saying that, "There's going to 
be problems. You know, we're not going to do everything right. We don't have 
the data systems to handle this as good as we'd like to. We'll do the best job we 
can, and we want you all to be partners with us and not fight me in court because 
somebody gets terminated inappropriately." ! . . .  don't think anything was ever 
written down. There was certainly an understanding between those two that 
Gordon wasn't going to haul him to court because things went wrong. (transcript 
of recorded interview, 2005, January 19, lines 190-200) 
In exchange for tolerance during the transition, Bonnyman was able to realize the 
goal of the advocates of securing more coverage for more people. Mr. Bonnyman also 
had the opportunity to prospectively craft solutions rather than respond to issues once 
they were manifested. This opportunity, granted by Governor McWherter and his closest 
allies, created a new power dynamic that they saw as part of the reform of TennCare. 
Bonnyman offered tolerance for coverage. Because of this, McWherter and his team 
81 
were willing to withstand the resultant firestorm to make their vision of a new health care 
delivery system a reality. 
A Strategy of Exclusion 
In contrast to the close alliance the state forged with Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 
representatives of the advocacy community and the selected groups cited, there was 
very limited public interaction with other key stakeholders in the creation of TennCare. 
The decision to not seek a consensus among a broad spectrum of stakeholders was 
deliberate. Among those excluded were state officials outside the circle of Manning and 
Martins (Gold, Frazer, Schoen, 1995). The state departments of Commerce and 
Insurance and the Health were purposely were not involved to a great extent in formative 
discussions about TennCare (Gold, 1997). The McWherter administration thought that 
time constraints necessitated and justified not involving other stakeholders. According to 
Manning (1995), "We recognized that consensus was not likely on any proposal that 
would effectively address the problem and that there would be opportunity to debate 
TennCare both in the state legislature and as part of the federal waiver process" (p. 23). 
The debate in the state legislature was basically a token one though. When 
questioned about the exclusion of certain stakeholder groups, Manny Martins related 
that, 
We had open meetings for the Legislature, the advocacy groups. We felt like the 
groups that we really needed to have on board with us were the advocates, the 
Legislature, as well as some of the big insurance companies like Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield. We couldn't pull it off without them. We held meetings with other groups. 
We held meetings with TMA. We held meetings with every provider organization. 
It was apparent that they were opposed to managed care. It wasn't necessarily 
they were opposed to health care. They were opposed to managed care. I t  
seemed to us that we had to implement this thing rapidly. And I used to say, "We 
did this at warp speed" because we really did that. [There] would have a long 
drawn out debate process and it would never have gotten us to the point we got 
to. Whether that's good or bad is another issue. But we had the right groups on 
board. We had the Legislature. We had the advocates . . . .  Did we involve TMA 
enough? Did we involve the medical groups enough? Did we involve public 
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enough? I don't know. I don't know. I don't know where you draw that line. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 750-767) 
The Tennessee Hospital Association (THA) was not involved with the inner circle 
on the planning for TennCare, yet they did not actively oppose the state's efforts since 
they were initially encouraged by the elimination of the 6. 75 percent provider tax 
(Becker, 1995). Tony Garr related that the THA, "stayed on the sideline. They did not 
oppose it; they did not support it. But of course, one of the major reasons why they did 
not oppose is it because part of the deal was eliminating the hospital tax" (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, January 19, lines 84-87). 
Major opposition to TennCare came from the Tennessee Medical Association 
(TMA.). The TMA aggressively campaigned for HCFA to reject the Medicaid waiver 
application submitted by Governor McWherter. Although TMA's strategy was to not 
oppose managed care and instead focus on the speed of the implementation, many 
physicians were adamantly opposed to managed care in general, as well as the level of 
capitation payments and the requirement that participation in the TPN network for state 
employees was conditional on participation in the state's managed Medicaid program 
(Gold, 1997; Manning, 1995). During TennCare's first year of operation, the Tennessee 
Medical Association filed suit against the state charging "an unconstitutional delegation 
of authority to the executive branch" (Mirvis, Chang, Hall, Zaar & Applegate, 1995, p. 
386). The specific contentions of the TMA included inadequate involvement, increased 
enrollment without adequate funding (i.e., inadequate capitation), perceived secrecy 
about TennCare and MCO financials, increased provider liability and the transfer of risk 
to physicians. The physicians also argued that TennCare was not a managed care plan, 
as presented, but rather a heavily discounted fee-for-service plan. The suit was 
subsequently withdrawn, but opposition lingered. The National Association of 
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Community Health Centers also filed suit to block the implementation of TennCare. 
Their opposition centered on the short time allowed for implementation and to develop 
needed infrastructure (Mirvis et al., 1995). 
The provider opposition was exactly what the McWherter administration 
expected. Whether this opposition justified the exclusion of providers from any 
meaningful role in the development and launching of TennCare remains a contentious 
issue. 
Holding the State Legislature at a Distance 
Manny Martins cited past experience in dealing with the Tennessee Legislature 
on Medicaid as key to winning their support along with specific strategies that were 
employed when the push was on for the approval of TennCare and permission was 
sought to request a waiver form the federal government. Martins recalled, 
Over a period of time, we were able to be pretty innovative in our funding of 
Medicaid. We were the first State in the nation to really do disproportionate 
share money coming into the State. The Legislature, I think, probably looked at 
that and saw that and said, "My goodness, you know. We're at the forefront of 
being able to get these dollars coming in to this State, and it's helping the State 
manage its Medicaid program. I t's taking pressure off of the Legislature to have 
to deal with financial issues." We'd be before committees on, you know, on a 
weekly basis. And my approach had always been, "You just tell it like it is." 
You know, I 'm not going to get before a Legislative Committee and distort or tell 
an untruth or lie. I 'm going to get up there and say, "Here's what's going on." 
Well, I think over a period of time, we built some credibility along those lines. 
And I think David Manning did, and I think Governor McWherter did. So when we 
went to the Legislature, they began to believe what we were telling them because 
our record had always been one of being honest. And so when we developed 
TennCare and explained it and went through it and the Governor was great 
because he would have people . . .  he would have the Legislature . . .  he'd bring 
them in. We had meetings where we would brief the Legislature 24 hours a day. 
We set up a room in the Legislative Plaza, and we said, "Any Legislator that 
wants to know about TennCare, we will be here. Come." We sat there; we 
manned that room; we had staff in that room. We did the same the thing, by the 
way, with advocates. We said, "If you have any questions, concerns, anything, 
you come talk and we'll be here." So I think that approach kind of, you know, 
allowed people to understand and know what was going on with the process. 
We were able to implement TennCare, as I recall I think I made the suggestion 
by simply changing one or two words in the TennCare law . . .  in the Medicaid law 
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that basically allowed the State to pursue an 1115a waiver. That, I think, was a 
break-through in itself because one of the failures of national health insurance 
was, and one of the failures many times in these laws are that they go into so 
much detail and everybody and their brother wants . . .  you know, by the time your 
lobby groups get through with it, you have such a watered-down piece of 
Legislation that you know, you don't know what you've done. So this enabled us 
to really go forward. The Legislature passed it. But the Governor was 
instrumental in that. We had credibility with the Legislature, and we essentially 
opened it up to anybody that wanted to look at it. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 11, lines 705-739) 
Table 4 provides a summary of events in the development of TennCare. 
TennCare Enrollment 
In creating TennCare, the state of Tennessee went further than any other state in 
reforming the delivery and financing of health care. Although the changes that were 
introduced in 1994 went beyond what any other state had done, by introducing managed 
care as a full replacement and providing access to more uninsured and uninsurable 
individuals, the full scope of the changes Governor McWherter, David Manning and 
Manny Martins envisioned remains an elusive goal. Managed care has not matured and 
a competitive marketplace has not emerged. In 2005 Governor Bredesen, prompted by 
a projected state budget crisis, set in motion a plan to reform TennCare by reducing 
enrollment and benefits. At the same time, the prospects of national health reform care 
are stalled. 
Table 5 shows eligibility categories for TennCare. Table 6 details enrollment 
changes over the course of TennCare's. Figures 2 and 3 provide an overview of 
enrollment numbers since TennCare's inception. 
Conclusions 
The development of TennCare was bold and very necessary. Decisions that 
were made in the development of TennCare had significant and lasting impact on the 
implementation and operation of TennCare. 
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Table 4: TennCare Development and Implementation Timeline 1 992-1 994 
Date . 
November 1 986 
November 1 992 
Early 1 993 
Earl A ril 1 993 
June 1 6, 1 993 
Ned Ray McWherter elected as Governor of Tennessee; he ran on a platform that 
included romises for better education, roads, 'obs, risons and health care. 
Tennessee Medicaid Task Force appointed by Governor Ned Ray McWherter; first 
meeting held in December 1 992 (Ferrar & Humphrey, 1 992, December 1 1 ;  Rawlins, 1 993, 
Jul 6 .  
Task Force presented three options to State Legislature: increase taxes, reduce Medicaid 
services or reimbursement to Medicaid providers or significantly reform the delivery and 
financin of the state's Medicaid ro ram 
Application for a Section 1 1 1 5 Medicaid submitted to H CFA for review ( Chang & 
Steinber , Ma 2005 . 
November 1 8, 1 993 Waiver approved as a five-year demonstration; providers notified by the state of January 
1 ,  1 994 start date Chan & Steinber , Ma 2005; Tennessee. ov, n .d . c . 
Janua 1 ,  1 994 
November 1 995 Don Sund uist elected as Governor to succeed Ned Ra McWherter 
Table 5: TennCare El igibi l ity Categories 
· · Category Description 
Medicaid-eligible categories 
1 Medicaid-eligible individuals 
2 Medically needy spend-down-optional Medicaid cateQorv 
Expansion categories (also cal led waiver categories) 
3 Uninsured individuals who lacked access to health care insurance 
4 Uninsurable individuals-those people denied commercial health insurance because of a medical 
condition 
5 Waiver dual eliQibles-individuals eliQible for TennCare Standard and Medicare 
(Long, W., 2005, March 29; Tennessee.gov, n .d . c) 
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Table 6 :  TennCare Enrollment Timeline 
Date Event . .  
: 
·-: 
January 1 ,  1 994 TennCare implemented; TennCare covers categories 1 -5 
December 31 , 1 994 Enrollment for category 3 closed; enrollment remains open for all other categories 
(Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Tennessee.gov, n .d .  c) 
April 1 ,  1 997 Enrollment re-opened to uninsured (category 3) children under age 1 8  (Chang & 
Steinberg, 2005; Tennessee.gov, n.d . c) 
May 21 , 1 997 Enrollment opened to dislocated workers (1) (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; 
Tennessee.gov, n .d . c) 
January 1 ,  1 998 Age limit for uninsured (category 3) children extended to 1 9th birthday (Chang & 
Steinberg, 2005; Tennessee.gov, n .d . c) . 
February 1 2, 2002 Sundquist administration filed major modification plan with CMS (Tennessee.gov, 
n .d . c). 
July 1 ,  2002 New and modified TennCare waiver (2) approved for implementation; included 
changes in eligibil ity requirements and creation of TennCare Standard. These 
changes were slated for implementation January 1 ,  2003. 
TennCare expanded to include females with breast and cervical cancer, a new 
optional Medicaid category (3) (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Tennessee.gov, n.d . c). 
December 2002 District Judge Will iam Haynes hands down a decision that prevents the state from 
implementing TennCare changes approved July 1 ,  2002 and required the 
reinstatement of every person disenrolled since the approval of the new waiver ). 
(Chang & Steinberg, 2005). 
March 28, 2002 Governor Bredesen announced that benefit reductions would be effective April 1 ,  
2003. This was plan was rescinded because of continu ing negotiations on a 
Settlement Agreement (Tennessee.gov, n.d. c.). 
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Table 6 :  Continued 
Date Event 
· .  
August 26, 2003 The state and plaintiffs enter into a joint motion that withdrew proposed benefit 
cuts and cost-sharing increases, maintained EPSDT coverage for non-Medicaid 
children eligible for TennCare, modified terms of the Grier Consent Decree and 
allowed a grace period for persons who had lost TennCare coverage under new 
criteria (Tennessee.gov, n .d. c) . 
t1 1 Dislocated workers defined as persons losing employment through a bona fide plant closing; there were no income 
limits for this category and access to COBRA benefits was not a disqualifying criterion (Tennessee.gov, n .d . c). 
t2l TennCare was divided into three separate programs: one for Medicaid-eligibles (TennCare Medicaid), one for 
demonstration eligible individuals (TennCare Standard) and one for low income persons needing assistance in 
purchasing available insurance (TennCare Assist). Each of these programs was slated to have a separate benefit 
structure, e.g. , the benefits available for TennCare Standard and all adult beneficiaries were to be less than those 
available in TennCare Medicaid; copayments were also required introduced (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; 
Tennessee.gov, n .d. c). 
(31 This new Medicaid eligibility category provided coverage for uninsured women under age 65 who were determined 
to be in need of treatment for breast or cervical cancer by a Centers for Disease Control (CDC) site (Chang & 
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Figure 2: Total TennCare Enrol lment by Year 
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Figure 3:  TennCare Enrol lment by El igibi l ity Category 
Source: Chang & Steinberg, May 2005; McKinsey, 2003, December 1 1 .  
The building blocks of TennCare are high-performing, competitive MCOs and 
BHOs, effective performance management and financial risk-sharing. As will be seen in 
the ensuing chapters, these building blocks were not assembled and the edifice remains 
a shaky construction. 
89 
CHAPTER 6: INTRODUCTION TO F INDINGS AND THE THEME OF 
AUTHORITY 
Introduction to Findings 
TennCare is one of the most significant and expansive health reform efforts of 
the past thirty-five years. Just as the nation watched the creation and initial ten years of 
operation, the nation is now watching events, local and national, surrounding attempts to 
reform (or dismantle, depending on your perspective) TennCare. Interestingly it is 
against this background of intense scrutiny, change and the positioning and polarization 
of stakeholders that this dissertation has been conducted. Although this dissertation is 
not specifically focusing on current and recent events, these events are a manifestation 
of the history studied. 
An intricate web of circumstances and people shaped the initial development and 
evolution of TennCare. The unique alignment of people and purpose that made the 
program a reality is an excellent public policy exemplar. The examination of the 
program's history illuminates many lessons. Although TennCare has been successful in 
achieving selected strategic aims, these successes have been overshadowed by a 
myriad of operational problems and a failure of the program to evolve and achieve 
expected results. 
Emergent Themes 
An iterative process that relied on the triangulation of multiple data sources was 
used to develop this case study of the TennCare program and examine the principle of 
fidelity. A view of TennCare was constructed that is not a traditional history or analysis, 
but rather an emergent perspective of the key themes that illuminated the organizing 
concept of fidelity. Three themes were prominent in the telling of the TennCare story. 
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These themes have been explored by balancing and evaluating the perspectives offered 
by the key stakeholders interviewed and relating these to other sources of data. A 
discussion of these themes illuminates the promises and failures of TennCare. 
The themes that integrate the key findings of this study are diffuse authority, 
management failures and fragmentation of efforts. A discussion of authority is included 
in this chapter. The discussion of management and fragmentation follow in chapters 
seven and eight respectively. Each of the themes had an influence on or was influenced 
by the other themes. It is important to appreciate the web of connectivity between the 
themes. 
Introduction to Authority 
Issues of authority are integral to the story of TennCare. Authority is a concept 
with multi-layered meanings and connotations. In public policy, the term authority is 
used to indicate individuals or agencies that have jurisdiction or control. Longest (2002) 
has referred to health policy as "the set of authoritative [ emphasis added] decisions 
made within government that pertain to health and the pursuit of health" (p. xx) . In this 
framework, authoritative decisions can be made anywhere, at any level within the three 
branches of government within the legitimate domain of the decision-making individual 
or body (Longest, 2002). 
Authority also connotes expertise, control, influence, force and power (Merriam­
Webster's, 2000). Authority is derived not just from office, position or station, but also 
from opinion, respect, esteem or character (Quotes & Dictionary, n.d.;  Brainy Dictionary, 
n.d.). Authority also denotes dominion (Brainy Dictionary, n.d.). Informal authority can 
be conferred to advocates, researchers and others who have established credibility and 
success in influencing policy processes. 
91 
Authority in TennCare has been the subject of debate, intrigue and controversy. 
In understanding TennCare, it is important to examine how lines of authority have been 
drawn or assumed, the perceptions of various stakeholders, and how authority has been 
used or not used. It is also important to see how the theme of authority has been 
impacted by the other two themes, management and fragmentation. Various ways 
authority has been manifested in TennCare, including executive, judicial, legislative and 
other types, will be discussed. 
Federal Legislative and Budgetary Authority 
The federal government has two primary mechanisms for funding programs. 
Funding can be provided via block grants or through payments for entitlement programs. 
"Block grants are programs for which the federal government gives states or local 
governments a fixed amount of funds for administering or providing certain services" 
(Lambrew, 2005, p. 41). Entitlement programs, in contrast, "create a government 
obligation to finance a benefit or service for a prescribed set of people, with no 
aggregate limit on funding" (Lambrew, 2005, p. 41 ). The nomenclature used to 
differentiate federal spending associated with block grants and entitlement programs is 
very telling. Spending for block grant programs is classified as discretionary whereas 
the funding of entitlement programs is mandatory. Authorizing legislation for 
discretionary spending, which accounts for approximately one-third of all federal 
spending, specifies the basis for operating programs and a specific level of funding 
(either as a fixed amount or as sums as necessary) during the annual budget process. 
In contrast, entitlement programs are authorized by permanent laws. Through 
entitlement programs, including Medicaid, Social Security, veterans' benefits and Food 
Stamps, individuals receive benefits because they meet eligibility requirements for the 
program. To change the level of spending for mandatory programs, Congress and the 
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President must change eligibility requirements (Longest, 2002; White, 2002). 
Participation in Medicaid is not mandatory. States have the option to participate in 
Medicaid or not. However, participation is contingent upon adherence to federal 
statutes, regulations and policies regarding eligibility (White, 2002). The federal 
statutes, regulations and policies which govern Medicaid give each state the authority to 
"1) establish it own eligibility; 2) determine the type, amount, duration and scope of 
services; 3) set the rate of payment for services; and 4) administer its own program" 
(Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.). 
Throughout Medicaid's history there have been two major efforts to transform 
Medicaid into a block grant program. The first effort occurred during the Reagan 
administration (1981-1989). Similar efforts, eventually defeated by a concerted personal 
campaign of President Bill Clinton, were revived by Republicans in 1996 as part of the 
budget showdown between the President and federal lawmakers led by Representative 
Newt Gingrich. In his strategy to win the budget battle, Clinton laid the groundwork for 
incremental expansion of the Medicaid program and the transformation away from an 
entitlement for the poor to a broad-based program reaching into the middle class. 
Interestingly, the National Governors' Association favored the Republicans' block grant 
proposal, in part because of the flexibility afforded by block grants and because of the 
relative good times of adequate state revenues and the early successes of Medicaid 
managed care seen during the time of the debate (Grogan & Patashnik, 2003). 
According to Dr. Bruce Vladeck, HCFA Commissioner at the time, "the sticking point 
came to be whether, from a legal point of view, Medicaid beneficiaries would still be 
entitled to seek enforcement of the law in federal courts" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 4, lines 536-537). Manny Martins commenting on another 
concern with block grants said, "anytime you go to a block grant, you cap. You cap the 
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amount of money that comes to you from the federal government" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 11, lines 639-640). Once again, the current administration of 
George W. Bush, looking for ways to cut back federal spending for Medicaid, is 
contemplating trying to move to block grants and decreasing the amounts of money 
states receive for Medicaid. 
Keen Vision and Power: The Executive Authority of Governor McWherter 
In creating TennCare, Governor McWherter envisioned a strong role for the 
state's Governor. In describing his instructions to aides drafting the original legislation 
needed for the Governor to seek a waiver from the federal government, Governor 
McWherter said, 
I want you to write me a small short statute, and . . .  I want it on one piece of paper 
and I don't want it to be more than that. . . .  I want you to give the Executive Branch 
and the Chief Executive Officer of the state of Tennessee (you don't have to call 
names, but positions) the authority [emphasis added] to enter into an agreement 
for a health care alternative to Medicaid. And it says something like that. . .  that 
word is in there, authority, . . .  gives [Governor] Bredesen, and it gave [Governor] 
Sundquist and it gave McWherter . . .  the authority. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, February 2, lines 202-213) 
Although the enabling legislation was actually four pages in length, it contained 
"broadly permissive language [that] authorized the Tennessee Executive Branch to 
design and define [TennCare] through administrative regulations. These regulations, 
which are the legal authority for the TennCare waiver, were established using a 
streamlined rulemaking process" (Gold, Frazer, & Schoen, 1995, pp. 4-5). Dr. Bruce 
Vladeck concurred that Governor McWherter had secured "authority from the Legislature 
that was very broad to design a new program without great specification and detail 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 4, lines 45-48). 
The action of the Tennessee General Assembly that permitted the creation of 
TennCare occurred in the context of limited debate and no public hearings. In part this 
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was because the confidence the Democratic legislature had in their strong leader, and in 
part this was because the legislature did not want to be accountable for TennCare or any 
associated political fal lout. Limited public discourse has been an issue at other key 
junctures in the history of TennCare and continues to be an issue. 
The authority bestowed on McWherter by virtue of his office was significantly 
complemented by personal and political clout and involvement. Governor McWherter 
came to office as the longest serving Speaker of the House in Tennessee history with an 
excellent reputation for effectiveness based on his style of seeking consensus and 
inclusiveness. 
Governor McWherter's executive authority was challenged during TennCare's 
first year of operation by the Tennessee Medical Association (TMA). The TMA, which 
argued that the TennCare program was not a managed care program, but instead a 
heavily discounted fee-for-service program, ral l ied against "an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority to the executive branch" (NEED Citation). The suit was 
eventually with drawn 
The Influence of Presidential Authority 
President Clinton's involvement in the creation of TennCare was l inked to his role 
as president, his experiences as a former governor and his close, personal relationship 
with Governor McWherter. 
According to Dr. Bruce Vladeck, 
President Clinton came to us as a former governor who had been very frustrated 
about Medicaid and very frustrated with whet he perceived as bureaucratic 
rigidity at HCFA. We had very clear marching orders to make encouragement of 
state flexibil ity and state waivers a priority and to be as responsive and 
supportive to the states as we could. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
March 4, lines 71-75) 
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David Manning, the Finance Commissioner during the McWherter administration, 
related that "before we took the waiver to Secretary Shalala, we took it to the President" 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 395-396). Manning also related 
that, "McWherter and the President had a nice visit" (line 398), an indication of their 
close personal relationship. The President, his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and 
Governor McWherter met on the Truman Balcony at the White House. Manning 
recalled, "when [the Governor] came out, we went down to the Secretary's office and 
delivered the waiver" (lines 410-411). 
Federal Judicial Authority 
Federal judges have a role in the administration of Medicaid programs, including 
TennCare, because the programs are jointly sponsored by the federal government and 
the states. Even more specifically, consent decrees pertaining to Medicaid are 
permissible because Medicaid is an entitlement program, rather than a block grant 
program. Because federal laws specify eligibility requirements for entitlement programs, 
individuals have the right to seek enforcement of the provisions of the law in the federal 
courts. 
Under Medicaid, the federal government has defined certain categories of 
individuals who are entitled as a matter of federal law to receive certain benefits. 
If the state, which has administrative responsibility under that law, fails to provide 
them with the benefits, they have the right to seek redress in federal court 
because it is fundamentally a federal responsibility. (B. Vladeck, transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 4, lines 543-552) 
It is this specification that permitted the filing of the civil class action suits pertaining to 
TennCare. No such protection exists with block grants. 
Consent Decrees 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Governor Don Sundquist signed the first of four legal 
agreements called consent decrees in response to the civil class action suits filed on 
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behalf of TennCare recipients by the Tennessee Justice Center and one filed first in 
1979 (Briefing, n.d.). Merriam-Webster's (2000) defines a consent decree as "a judicial 
decree that that sanctions a voluntary agreement between parties in dispute". More 
specifically, "a consent decree is an agreement in the form of a judicial order between 
two parties that ends a lawsuit by decree rather than by trial" (Brooks, 2005). Consent 
decrees have been described by Professor Tim Westmoreland of Georgetown University 
as "a settlement in court rather than a settlement out of court" (transcript of recorded 
interview on National Public Radio's All Things Considered, 2005, June 21). Consent 
decrees have been used to resolve class action suits against public officials and 
agencies for years. Consent decrees have been issued over time to cover a wide range 
of topics, including health care, education and prison conditions (Roxe, 2005). Consent 
decrees "subject the state administration of federal programs . . .  to ongoing judicial 
oversight and management" (civilrights.org, n.d.). Most commonly, consent decrees are 
judicial orders that result "from agreements brokered between public officials and 
plaintiffs engaged in civil court actions" (Alexander, 2005, para 3). "Consent decrees 
spell-out exactly how a state or local government should solve a problem that led to the 
lawsuit, often over a number of years" (J. Rovner, transcript of recorded interview on 
National Public Radio"s All Things Considered, 2005, June 21 ). 
Consent decrees offer important protections. According to Susan Brooks, a 
clinical professor of law at Vanderbilt University, "Consent decrees save money and 
protect rights" (2005). Money is saved by avoiding litigation costs and having both 
parties negotiate the terms of the agreement, rather than having the agreement 
imposed. Charlotte Bryson, the Executive Director of Tennessee Voices for Children, 
noted that, "consent means just that. . .  parties agree on what the best outcomes are" 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, line 527-528). The protection of 
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rights through a system of checks and balances is the centerpiece of justice in our 
country (Brooks, 2005). 
TennCare Consent Decrees 
Consent decrees are an important storyline for TennCare. In many ways, views 
of consent decrees are emblematic of the polarization of stakeholders that has 
characterized discussions about TennCare. The consent decrees notably address the 
state/federal government interface, the level of TennCare benefits, quality of care and 
service issues, as well as who is eligible for the TennCare program. The consent 
decrees are particularly important because they represent the breakdown of important 
tacit agreements that supported the development of TennCare and because they are a 
result of pervasive management problems (discussed in the next chapter) and the lack 
of strong effective leadership. 
The advocates and others with similar perspective think that consent decrees are 
necessary to protect rights and that the rights of beneficiaries were violated in the 
administration of the TennCare and TennCare Partners program. Some informants 
spoke of the consent decrees as unrealistic and complained about the untoward effects 
of the terms of the consent decrees negotiated. Governor Bredesen and members of his 
administration contend that the consent decrees thwart efforts to manage program costs, 
and they worked vigorously and successfully to eliminate or modify the TennCare 
decrees. Supporting Governor Bredesen in his efforts to limit the reach of the consent 
decrees, Senator Lamar Alexander and Representative Jim Cooper introduced federal 
legislation in early 2005 to limit consent decrees issued in federal courts. 
The reader is directed to Tables 7 and 8 which describe the four TennCare 
consent decrees and show a timeline pertinent to the consent decrees. 
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Table 7: TennCare Law Su its and Consent Decrees Descriptions 
• .  Consent Decree · • ·  · 
Grier v. Goetz 
Description 
. : / . : 
Order modified an existing 1 979 Consent Decree known as Daniels. The Daniels 
case was a challenge to the denial of medical services under Medicaid ( Grier v. 
Goetz, 1 996, Tennessee.gov, n .d . ,  c; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). "The 
Grier consent decree provide[d] appeals for TennCare patients when the state or 
its managed care contractor (HMO) denied coverage for a needed medical 
service" (Tennessee Justice Center, 2005, June 1 3). A key component of this 
consent decree required TennCare to obtain express physician approval to 
override prescriptions not on an approved drug list (Alexander, 2005, April 04; 
Briefing, n .d . ;  Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la Cruz, 2003 August 27; Humphrey, 
2003 August 27; Locker, 2003 August 27) . In itially th is decree essentially resulted 
in an open formulary, hampering the state's ability to manage prescription drug 
costs. The Grier consent decree also spelled-out appeals procedures. In 2005 
the Grier consent decree was substantially modified. 
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Table 7 :  Continued 
Consent Decree . Description 
John B. v. Menke This class action suit was brought on behalf of all TennCare enrollees under the 
age of 18; suit alleged that the state of Tennessee failed to meet obligations under 
the federal EPSDT mandate which governs the provision of medical services to 
Medicaid-eligible children (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Grier v. Goetz, 1 996, 
Tennessee.gov, n.d. ,  c; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). In this decree, the state 
was given five years to close the gap between the state's actual performance and 
the federal standards regarding screening and preventive care for children. Little 
or no progress was made subsequent to this. In 2001 the court found the state in 
violation of each of the major components of the 1 998 consent decree and a 
Special Master was appointed because the state was not in compliance with the 
order. In 2002 the state requested that expansion population children not be 
included in the decree (Alexander, 2005, April 04; Briefing, n.d. ; Caughorn, 2003, 
August 27; de la Cruz, 2003 August 27; Humphrey, 2003 August 27; Locker, 2003 
August 27; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005, June 13). 
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Table 7 :  Continued 
Consent Decree · 
·' 
Rosen v. Commissioner of 
Finance and Administration 
Newberry v. Menke 
. Description . · .. < 
" , :-
This case was a challenge to the state's eligibility process for TennCare 
beneficiaries in the expansion population (Alexander, 2005, April 04; Briefing, n .d. ; 
Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la Cruz, 2003 August 27; Humphrey, 2003 August 
27; Locker, 2003 August 27). Plaintiffs for the case included uninsured and 
uninsurable TennCare enrollees who alleged that the state of Tennessee failed to 
provide an adequate system for assuring due process regarding premium 
assessment, premium disputes, denial of TennCare eligibility and termination of 
TennCare eligibility (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Rosen v. TN Commissioner of 
Finance and Administration, 1 998; Tennessee.gov, n.d. , c; Tennessee Justice 
Center, 2005). Particularly noteworthy about this decree was the stipulation that 
Judge Haynes must approve any reduction in enrollment (Alexander) 2005, April 
04). In 2005, Judge Haynes did authorize the disenrollment of TennCare 
beneficiaries from the expansion population. 
The Newberry case challenged inappropriate denial of home health services for 
people with disabilities enrolled in TennCare (Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la 
Cruz, 2003 August 27; Humphrey, 2003 August 27; Locker, 2003 August 27). The 
settlement, later known as Newberry v. Goetz, required the state to pursue a 
budget-neutral home-based program for elderly TennCare beneficiaries and for the 
TennCare MCOs to pay more for home health care for poor, disabled and elderly 
TennCare recipients (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Newberry v. Menke, 1 998; 
Tennessee.gov, n .d. , c; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). 
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Table 8: TennCare Consent Decree Timel ine 
Date · Event · 
August 1 996 An Agreed Order, known as Grier, entered. (Grier v. Goetz, 1 996, Tennessee.gov, n .d . ,  c; 
Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). 
February, 1998 John B. v. Menke filed in U.S. District Court (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; John B. v. Menke, 
1 998; Tennessee.gov, n .d. , c; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). 
March 1 998 The John B. Consent Decree signed (John B. v. Menke, 1 998& Tennessee.gov, n .d . ,  c) . 
July, 1 998 The Rosen v. Commissioner of Finance and Administration lawsuit filed in federal court 
(Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Rosen v. TN Commissioner of Finance and Administration, 1 998; 
Tennessee.gov, n .d. ,  c; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). 
December 1 998 The Newberry v. Menke lawsuit was filed in federal court on December 7, 1 998 (Chang & 
Steinberg, 2005; Newberry v. Menke, 1 998; Tennessee.gov, n .d . ,  c; Tennessee Justice Center, 
2005). 
September 1 999 The state of Tennessee entered in a Consent Decree with plaintiffs for the Rosen v. 
Commissioner of Finance and Administration (Chang & Steinberg, 2005; Rosen v. TN 
Commissioner of Finance and Administration, 1 998; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005). 
October 1 999 Revised Consent Decree governing appeals in TennCare is filed in federal court as a follow-up 
to the Grier case; the revisions concern appeals ( Grier v. Goetz, 1 999; Tennessee.gov, n .d. ,  c) . 
July 2000 Revised Consent decree governing TennCare appeals modified (Tennessee.gov, n.d. , c). 
September 2000 Request for stay of implementation of the term of the Grier settlement denied (Tennessee.gov, 
n.d . ,  c). 
January 2001 The Tennessee Justice Center filed a complaint in federal court regarding breaches of the John 
B. settlement (Tennessee.gov, n .d . ,  c). 
December 2001 The Court found the state of Tennessee to not be in compliance with the terms of the original 
John B. Consent Decree; a Special Master was appointed to oversee the state's compliance 
(Tennessee.gov, n .d . ,  c). 
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Table 8 :  Continued 
Date 
. .  
: Event 
August 2003 Governor Bredesen and Gordon Bonnyman negotiated changes to the four TennCare Consent 
Decrees. The state and plaintiffs agreed to a grace period for all persons who lost coverage 
under new TennCare eligibil ity provisions proposed July 1 ,  2002: state agrees to withdraw 
proposed benefit reductions and cost-sharing increases, continue EPSDT coverage for chi ldren 
enrolled in TennCare regardless of Medicaid eligibility; plaintiffs agreed to reduce requirements 
for receiving prescription drugs from 14 days to 3 days without prior authorization 
(Tennessee.gov, n .d. , c). 
October 2003 Settlement Agreement reached with plaintiffs in four TennCare lawsuits (Tennessee.gov, n .d . , 
c). 
Three of the consent decrees relative to TennCare originated from lawsuits filed 
in 1998 by the Tennessee Justice Center, headed by activist attorney Gordon 
Bonnyman. Each of the lawsuits was filed in an attempt to halt efforts initiated by the 
state to curtail benefits of the TennCare program or reduce the number of beneficiaries 
(Locker, 2003, August 27). The first of these, the Rosen case, was a challenge to the 
state"s eligibility process for the Medicaid expansion population. This consent decree 
was signed by U.S. District Judge William Haynes in 1998 with several orders after that 
modifying the decree, most substantially in 2002 (Alexander, 2005; Briefing, n.d. ; 
Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la Cruz, 2003; Humphrey, 2003, August 27; Locker, 
2003, August 27). Particularly noteworthy about this decree is the stipulation that Judge 
Haynes must approve any reduction in enrollment (Alexander, 2005). 
The Newberry case challenged alleged inappropriate denial of home health 
services for people with disabilities enrolled in TennCare (Caughorn, 2003, August 27; 
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de la Cruz, 2003; Humphrey, 2003, August 27; , August 27, 2003). The John B. filing 
concerned medical screening and treatment services for children under age 21. This 
consent decree was signed in 1998 by U.S. District Judge John Nixon after 18 months of 
negotiations. In this decree, the state was given five years to close the gap between the 
state's actual performance and the federal standards regarding screening and 
preventive care for children. Little or no progress was made subsequent to this. In 2001 
the court found the state in violation of each of the major components of the 1998 
consent decree and a Special Master was appointed because the state was not in 
compliance with the order. In 2002 the state requested that expansion population 
children not be included in the decree because they were not covered by the entitlement 
provisions of Medicaid (Alexander, 2005; Briefing, n.d. ; Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de 
la Cruz, 2003; Humphrey, 2003, August 27; Locker, 2003, August 27; Tennessee Justice 
Center, 2005, June 13). 
According to Bonnyman, the concerns that the advocates had that precipitated 
the filing of the John B. lawsuit did not originate in TennCare. In a 2005 personal 
interview, he stated that, 
The background for John B. was that children had not been getting services, 
medical and behavioral, for some time. Again if you go back far enough, the 
problem was lack of community services and a grossly inappropriate reliance on 
inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. So it's not as if there was some policy one 
day in the past when things were good and they fell apart under managed care. 
They were flawed, they were troubled, and they lurched in a new damaging 
direction with the launch of TennCare and TennCare Partners, when it came to 
behavioral health for severely emotionally disturbed children. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, February 15, lines 361-369) 
In addition to the Rosen Agreed Order and the John B. Consent Decree, the 
most significant consent decree relative to TennCare is the Grier Consent Decree 
(Briefing, n.d.). The Grier case has a long history. The Grier lawsuit, filed fifteen years 
before the start of TennCare in 1979, resulted in the signing of a consent decree by 
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Judge John Nixon in 1 999. The case has been opened on several occasions, including 
1 986, 1 996 and 1 999, because of compliance failures. As a result of a 1 999 opening, a 
revised agreement was approved by the court in February 2003. Another revised 
agreement was approved five months later in August (Alexander, 2005; Briefing, n.d. ; 
Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la Cruz, 2003; Humphrey, 2003, August 27; Locker, 
2003, August 27; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005, June 1 3). "The Grier consent decree 
provides appeals for TennCare patients when the state or its managed care contractor 
(HMO) denies coverage for a needed medical service" (Tennessee Justice Center, 
2005, June 1 3) .  A key component of this consent decree required TennCare to obtain 
express physician approval to override prescriptions not on an approved drug list 
(Alexander, 2005; Briefing, n.d.; Caughorn, 2003, August 27 ; de la Cruz, 2003; 
Humphrey, 2003, August 27; Locker, 2003, August 27). Initial ly this decree essential ly 
resulted in an open formulary, hampering the state's ability to manage prescription drug 
costs. The Grier consent decree also spells-out appeals procedures. 
A temporary truce. Although consent decrees can not be appealed, they "can be 
modified whenever one party can convince the court it is no longer equitable that the 
decree be enforced as agreed" (Brooks, 2005) . Consent decrees can be modified or 
terminated as conditions change (Brooks, 2005). 
Governor Phi l Bredesen included TennCare reform as a priority in his campaign . 
He emphasized that reform was necessary, not only to stabilize the beleaguered 
program, but to also shift the balance in the budget to fund other social program 
priorities, particularly education. In August of 2003 Governor Bredesen and Gordon 
Bonnyman negotiated changes to the four outstanding consent decrees concerning 
TennCare in an effort to facilitate Bredesen's reform agenda. The optimism seen at that 
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time quickly faded, calling into question the actual impact of the consent decrees and the 
role they play in bringing about needed changes. 
The changes that were agreed-to in August 2003, and were subsequently 
approved later in the year in the federal courts by the judges presiding when the decrees 
were originally constructed, included, most significantly, the lifting of the Grier consent 
decree until December 31, 2005. The previous 14-day appeal process reverted to a 
three-day appeal limit in accordance with existing federal law and precedent. This 
change coupled with an earlier move by the state to single preferred drug list (POL) or 
formulary allowed the state to extend the use of less costly generic drug alternatives and 
benefit from bulk purchasing discounts and pharmaceutical company rebates. Together 
these changes were projected initially to save $100 million annually (Caughorn, 2003a; 
Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la Cruz, 2003; Humphrey, 2003, August 27; Locker, 
2003, August 27). When the August 2003 settlement to the Grier case was announced 
Governor Bredesen said, "Today's announcement gets the state . . .  back in the driver's 
seat with TennCare. It clears the way for critical reforms we need to make, some critical 
cost savings items we need to deal with" (as quoted in Caughorn, 2003, August 27). 
When requisite papers were submitted to the federal court in September 2003, the state 
said the agreement would "enable the state to achieve substantial savings, thereby 
obviating other TennCare reductions in benefits and/or eligibility that would be harmful to 
members of the plaintiff class" (as quoted in Tennessee Justice Center, 2005, June 13). 
Additionally the state agreed to withdraw proposed reductions in home health care and 
private nurse benefits, the key impetus of the Newberry case. Governor Bredesen and 
Gordon Bonnyman also agreed that prior TennCare recipients that did not meet new 
eligibility requirements specified under a new federal waiver re-verification process 
would have a one-year grace period to reapply. The significance of this change was not 
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that it was expected that there would be a large number of beneficiaries re-instated, but 
rather that the threat of a court-ordered full re-instatement was eliminated along with the 
projected $200 million cost of such a ruling. 
The state's agreement to allowing reapplication was supported by their prior 
experience with the process. Originally 200,000 were affected by the new eligibility 
requirements. Of these, 150,000 previously had the opportunity to reapply; only 5,000 of 
these were eventually reinstated (Humphrey, 2003, August 27). Finally the state 
reaffirmed their commitment to the terms of the John B. consent decree, agreeing that 
screening and treatment services for children under age 21 in TennCare, packaged 
under the rubric Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) would be 
included for all children, meaning the children in the expansion population would not be 
excluded. Bredesen projected that the cost of changes to the Newberry, Rosen and 
John B. cases would be $20 million (Caughorn, 2003, August 27; de la Cruz, 2003; 
Humphrey, 2003, August 27; Locker, 2003, August 27; Tennessee Justice Center, 2005, 
June 13). 
Short-lived optimism. Despite the anticipated savings that Bredesen projected 
when the compromise on the consent decrees was announced, it was just several 
months later, on February 17, 2004, when Bredesen announced that radical benefit and 
beneficiary cuts would have to be made to make TennCare financially viable for the 
state. With the announcement, the Bredesen administration launched a new battle using 
the Grier consent decree as a l ightning rod for the ensuing controversies. Following the 
very public war of words that ensued, state of Tennessee officials, advocates and 
representatives for each found themselves in Judge Nixon's court once again beginning 
June 29, 2005 arguing about the terms of the Grier consent decree. The Bredesen 
administration argued that they needed relief from the decree so that they could proceed 
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with their reform plan. Previously, in March of 2005, CMS had approved the cutbacks in 
enrollment proposed by the administration. Then in April, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Cincinnati overruled a prior ruling from a federal judge in Nashville who had 
called for a temporary halt in the Governor's plan to disenroll 323,000 TennCare 
beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals ruling also gave Judge Haynes Jr. the authority to 
oversee the state notification procedures and to assure that appeal processes would 
protect beneficiaries' rights (Fly, 2005, May 28, May 28; Johnson, 2005, August 14; 
Wadhwani & de la Cruz, 2005, April 16, April 16). The Bredesen administration then 
proposed that 97,000 of the sickest TennCare enrollees targeted for disenrollment could 
be spared if additional changes were made to the Grier consent decree. The advocates 
and enrollees vehemently disagreed with further changes to the consent decrees and 
disputed the rationale given for their need. The advocates and their constituents did not 
prevail. 
Although Governor Bredesen was directly involved with Gordon Bonnyman in the 
negotiations that led to the re-working of the consent decrees in 2003 and he praised the 
progress afforded by the changes, spokespersons for the Governor never indicated that 
he had secured all the changes that would be needed as some assumed. Both 
Governor Bredesen and Manny Martins knew that it would be problematic to not cover 
drugs on the Preferred Drug List (PDL), after a three- day emergency supply of the off­
list drug had been issued if the dispute had not been resolved. This issue was also a 
key reason that the state was seeking prior authorization of all off-list drugs. 
The Executive branch's call for additional changes was prompted by the release 
of the first of two reports by McKinsey and Company on December 11, 2003. The 
report, commissioned by the state, painted a grim picture about TennCare's financial 
viability. One conclusion of the report authors was that an unchanged the cost of the 
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TennCare program would escalate from accounting for 25 percent of the annual state 
budget to 34 to 40 percent depending on economic conditions. Moreover it was 
projected that the TennCare program would consume from 63 to 144 percent of all 
available new tax revenue if the program was not changed (McKinsey, 2003). 
The McKinsey and Company analysis identified that spending for the areas of 
most cost increases, pharmaceuticals, professional services and outpatient services, 
would drive almost 50 percent ·of the growth of future spending with pharmacy cost 
growth as the single most significant source of future growth. The growth in 
pharmaceutical costs is not unique to TennCare, but within the McKinsey projections are 
specific aspects of TennCare's design and delivery that are fueling the dramatic cost 
increase (McKinsey, 2003). 
Armed with the second McKinsey report (2004), the state of Tennessee claimed 
it needed to modify the Grier consent decree to save money and preserve coverage for 
97,000 of the sickest enrollees among the 323,000 to be disenrolled. Officials from the 
Bredesen administration cited several specific issues with the Grier consent decree. 
The issues related to the appeals process, definitions of medical necessity, a generous 
drug benefit which had no limits on the number or cost of drugs prescribed and the 
MCOs insistence that the current terms make the assumption of risk for program costs 
untenable (Wadhwani ,  2005, July 0 1  ) .  
Administration officials also wanted to change the definition of  medical necessity 
so that a medical service would have to be the least costly treatment that is adequate to 
be deemed medically necessary. Opponents to this approach argued that the least 
costly treatment is not always the most cost-effective (Wadhwani, 2005, July 01). There 
was also concern that changes to the medical necessity definition would limit care for 
children stipulated by the John B. agreement (Tennessee Justice Center, 2005, June 
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13). The Bredesen administration also proposed a five prescription limit for all adult 
enrollees (two brand name scripts and three generic) with a prior authorization process 
for all prescribed drugs to foster the use of cheaper but similar drugs on the PDL 
(Wadhwani, 2005, July 01 ). 
Gordon Bonnyman countered that the financial savings the administration 
projected were questionable. "The numbers are derived from politics. This is not about 
savings. For them [the legal agreement] is cover. They've got their story. They've been 
telling it for a year. And they sticking to it" (as quoted in Wadhwani, 2005, July 01 ). 
Bonnyman also questioned the state's ability to manage the volume of prior 
authorizations TennCare would require (most prior authorization review processes in the 
private sector focused only on high cost drugs or drugs with unexplainable patterns of 
variation in prescribing, not all drugs as was proposed for TennCare). Implicit in 
Bonnyman's charge were two important points. The first was that the state does not 
have a good management track record. Secondly the need for additional reforms could 
be tempered by better management (the consent decrees and management of the 
TennCare program will be discussed further in the next section). In the federal court 
hearing that commenced June 29, 2005, Charles Cooper, an attorney representing the 
state of Tennessee, blamed the Grier consent decree for "[turning] TennCare's system 
of managed care into a system of unmanaged care" (as quoted in Wadhwani, 2005, 
June 30). 
Perhaps the state and the MCOs are more accountable for the lack of 
management than this statement reflects. Dr. Harry Jacobson, vice chancellor for 
Health Affairs at Vanderbilt University, who supports the state's more restricted definition 
of medical necessity, did concede on cross-examination that the state's MCOs do not 
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have the infrastructure to effectively manage care del ivered in TennCare according to 





The TennCare appeals process in place prior to the 2005 changes was unique in 
that an appeal was al lowed even when the appeal was not initiated by a provider 
(Johnson, 2005, July 01 ). Additionally the appeals process allowed patients to secure 
services that the state did not cover in the TennCare program (Wadhwani, 2005, July 
01). According to the terms of the Grier consent decree before the most recent 
changes, "defendants and others acting on their behalf are prohibited from denying 
appeal rights on any ground whatsoever'' (as quoted in Johnson, 2005, July 02). When 
the Grier consent decree was originally negotiated the state agreed to provide special 
protections to particularly vulnerable patients. In 2005 the state of Tennessee sought to 
limit appeals to only factual disputes. This is the most prevalent standard for appeals in 
the private sector and for most Medicaid programs (Johnson, 2005, July 02) . 
In early August 2005, Judge Nixon ruled that the definition of medical necessity 
could be changed and that plans to require prior authorizations for all pharmaceuticals 
and l imit the number of prescriptions covered for most beneficiaries to five per month 
could be implemented. He also agreed that it was no longer necessary for the state to 
supply drugs while an appeal was in process ("Court Orders Help Stabil ize TennCare, 
2005, August 1 4; Johnson , 2005, August 03; Johnson, 2005, August 1 4; Wissner, 2005, 
August 1 0). 
How significant are the TennCare consent decrees? Controversy preceded the 
issuance of the TennCare consent decrees and controversy has characterized their 
history. Whether you view the consent decrees as an essential response to serious 
mismanagement by the state and the MCOs and BHOs, or you think the consent 
decrees have been the source of serious problems in the program, there is no doubt that 
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the consent decrees have been an important subplot for the TennCare story. Few would 
dispute the impact of the Grier consent decree when a 14-day supply of drugs was 
required while an appeal was pending. Prior to the inception of TennCare, the state of 
Tennessee already had one of the highest prescription drug rates in the country 
(McKinsey, 2003, December 13). After the Grier consent decree was implemented, 
pharmacy costs skyrocketed in TennCare. The true impact of the other consent decrees 
is not known and views are widely divergent. 
Dr. Russ Petrella of Magellan said prior to the most recent changes that the 
TennCare consent decrees had been a serious management liability. He stated, 
The consent decrees have created a situation in the state that makes managing 
these programs virtually impossible from the state perspective and from our 
perspective. Many of the issues have been painted with a broad brush and so 
that by trying to some issues for an extraordinarily small number of people have 
created obligations for larger numbers of people that waste money and create 
inefficiencies. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 122-124) 
Dr. Petrella cited an order regarding discharge planning as an example of the 
"using an elephant gun to kill a mouse", explaining, 
They are very concerned, for example, that people will not be discharged from 
the hospital without a discharge plan. So now there is something in place that if 
a person chooses not to be discharged from the hospital, they can get extra days 
in the hospital even though everyone agrees that it is not medically necessary. 
Now if you took all the extra days that people spend in the hospital that are paid 
for that the medical folks believe aren't necessary, you'll have an extraordinary 
amount of money there. And so it's a protection that. . .  it's kind of a false 
protection because what it ends up doing is watering down the overall program, 
watering down the benefits for other folks. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
February 25, lines 125-134) 
Manny Martins dismissed the idea that the consent decrees, other than Grier, 
had far-reaching implications (even before changes). He did though bemoan the hassle 
associated with the consent decrees. He said, 
My sense is that you can manage your way around the consent decrees. There 
are some things as a manager that I would never have signed if I were here and 
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were asked to sign those consent decrees because I think some of the things in 
those consent decrees are not possible to reach. They are good goals, but, you 
know, they're not that possible to reach. As an example, can we ever reach a 90 
percent screening rate for kids? . . .  Have we ever been hurt significantly for not 
having reached that? I don't think so, and I think as long as we're progressing to 
reach that and we're doing what we can to reach that, it's a nuisance. Though 
depending on where you are and what you have to do, that nuisance can 
sometimes divert resources. 
As an example, I have had to divert a large number of staff when I was in 
TennCare to deal with a process set up by a special master that was tedious and 
required a huge amount of tedious work. And I had to divert high-level ranking 
people that could have been utilized to, you know, help us monitor where we 
were on a preferred drug list, what do we need to do to keep drug costs down, 
and so on. But because of this tedious approach, I 've had to redirect them. 
That's been more of a nuisance than anything. The Grier consent decree with 
the original fourteen days" supply of drugs was a problem because it essentially 
overrode the formularies that the State had. We re-negotiated that consent 
decree to three days. Once we did that, it would be my belief that that became 
an insignificant issue for us. We implemented the POL [Preferred Drug List] with 
that consent decree when the days were reduced from fourteen to three. We 
have over 90percent compliance with the POL, so I can't be very concerned 
about that. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 581-608) 
Should Consent Decrees be Limited? 
The TennCare consent decrees have bedeviled two governors. The debate that 
has been occurring in Tennessee about the TennCare consent decrees has been 
complemented by a national effort to curtail consent decrees. National debate about 
consent decrees has been prompted by the introduction of legislation March 1, 2005 to 
limit the impact and duration of the consent decrees by Senator Lamar Alexander, a 
Republican from Tennessee who also served as the Tennessee Governor from 1979 
until 1987, and Congressman Roy Blunt, the Republican Majority Whip from Missouri at 
the time the legislation was introduced (in late September, Blunt was picked to replace 
Tom Delay as the Majority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives). According to 
Alexander, "Once these decrees are set, they are very difficult to change, making reform 
and common-sense adjustment over time virtually impossible" (2005, para 3). Because 
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of this and the constraints Governor Bredesen perceives in his efforts to deliver on a 
campaign promise to reform TennCare, Alexander is seeking to make it easier for newly 
elected officials to modify or rescind terms of consent decrees when an election results 
in an office changing hands, or every four years. Additionally, the burden of proving the 
ongoing necessity of the an existing decree would become a responsibility of the original 
plaintiff, in contrast to the current practice of requiring defendants to "prove" that the 
consent decree is no longer needed (Alexander, 2005; Sullivan, 2005). 
One of the major complaints about the consent decrees is their duration, which 
can span decades. Existing federal law though permits modification or termination of 
consent decrees (civilrights.org, n.d.). Consent decrees are also in place to address a 
wide variety of social and other policy and program deficiencies. Change needed to 
remedy such deficiencies often takes years to implement and stabilize. The federal 
courts play a role in fostering and monitoring change. 
Opponents of consent decrees such as Alexander and Blunt say that consent 
decrees have been used to inappropriately extend federal programs and violate the 
principles of federalism. Besides a fundamental concern about abuses of federal power, 
Alexander and others of like mind see consent decrees as inefficient and cost-ineffective 
(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005, July 01 a). 
Those that oppose Alexander's proposed legislative efforts are concerned about 
the prospect of defendants being able to avoid continuing obligations, which were often 
signed to avoid lengthy trials and the potential of even more burdensome terms. 
Opponents think that this move is part of a larger assault by conservatives who perceive 
the consent decrees to be inappropriate judicial activism. Proponents say that out-dated 
consent decrees interfere with needed reform and changes needed for responsive 
government (Alexander, 2005). 
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Dr. Russ Petrella was careful to draw a distinction between the consent decrees 
issued relative to TennCare and the general concept of consent decrees. He related 
that, 
I've done a dozen consent decrees in other states where I was either brought in 
as the monitor or one of the reviewers, or participated with the special master, 
and the whole idea is to make them doable and to focus on what problem they're 
trying to solve. And some of the solutions here I don't think make sense . . .  I've 
been doing public sector policy for 30 years for both the government side and 
private side, and some of these things just have created an untenable situation 
which now has reached a crisis point unfortunately. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, February 25, lines 136-144) 
Governor McWherter, reflecting general opposition to consent decrees, has 
asserted that he "would not enter into a consent decree" (transcript of recorded 
interview, February 4, 2005, line 159). Gordon Bonnyman has called into question the 
realism of this assertion, saying, "No governor ever enters into these things without the 
belief that it is in his interest or the state's interest to do so" (Sher, 2005, March 1 ), 
noting most usually fear losing in court. 
According to Dr. Bruce Vladeck (1999), consent decrees regulate individual 
manifestations of systems rather than fundamentally reform systems. This view is 
consistent with the position of Gordon Bonnyman. He related that the TennCare 
consent decrees were necessary because of serious lapses in the delivery TennCare 
services and the violation of beneficiary rights. The consent decrees were not an effort 
to produce changes in the design of TennCare and TennCare Partners, but rather a 
reaction to serious lapses in the delivery of TennCare services. According to Charlotte 
Bryson, "consent decrees are the due process that people have used if they have found 
that their rights have been violated . . .  or they did not get the services they were supposed 
to get through TennCare" (transcript of recorded interview, February 24, 2005, lines 524-
526). 
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Bonnyman asserts that complaints about the TennCare consent decrees are 
"basically cover; they're a distraction" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 
25, lines 620-621). Furthermore, 
The problem that the State has gotten itself in with these consent decrees is it 
didn't. . . comply with the law. And it hasn't done sound policy. John B. and 
EPSDT reflect well-accepted, established pediatric care standards and if we had 
been living up to that, if the State had been living up to that, we wouldn't have 
gotten into trouble to begin with. We need to live up to it instead of complaining 
about the role of the courts. (lines 599-605) 
Referring to Governor Bredesen's assault on the consent decrees, he stated, 
I think as a result of management problems, he found that he needed the cover, 
and so he picked up the means that George Wallace left behind for southern 
governors . . .  that says, "if you've got management problems that are beginning to 
cost you politically, blame it on the Federal courts". And then you saw the State 
of the State address where he got a standing ovation for pillorying those people 
who were unelected, which of course he's referring not only to me, but he's 
referring to the Federal judges. (lines 608-617) 
Charlotte Bryson also countered Governor Bredesen's claim that the consent decrees 
prevent his administration from reforming TennCare, saying, 
I am concerned so much blame has been placed on the consent decrees 
because the consent decrees just pointed out what some of the problems of 
TennCare are. The important thing is to look at what the problems are and to 
address and fix the problems. The consent decrees are not the main cause of 
the difficulties we are having in TennCare. There are such broad and big issues 
that we need to work on like an efficient data system, accountability, as well as 
drug utilization review. None of that is prohibited in the consent decrees. [What] 
I would like to see us do is look at the consent decrees for what they are, playing 
out some problems with our service delivery, fix those problems and . . .  develop a 
strategy to deal with the major problems in TennCare. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005 February 24, lines 530-539) 
Interestingly, Congressman Blunt contends that "elected officials often use 
consent decrees to excuse inaction on which they-not the federal courts-should be 
responsible" (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005 July 01 ). 
Taking this idea further, Blunt said, 
I really think this is more about inactive public officials than overly active judges. 
Consent decrees are too often used by elected officials as the reason that they 
can't do anything about an area that should be their responsibility. The principal 
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goal of this bill is to get the responsibility for public policy and public institutions 
back in the hands of elected officials ... Consent decrees, in my view, have 
become a place for public officials to hide behind, both in the area of the consent 
decree specifically affects and as an excuse not to do things in other areas 
where public officials should have responsibility. (American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 2005 July 01) 
Although Congressman Blunt noted that the problem with consent decrees is generally 
not the federal judges, Dr. Michael Greve, a political scientist who directs the Federalism 
project at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, has said that the 
judges are the problem with the TennCare consent decrees. He has said, 
Judge Haynes, who's been running TennCare for the past years and thinks he 
owns it, has not been reversed once by Sixth Circuit. He has been reversed 
repeatedly and he doesn't care what the Sixth Circuit says. The same is true for 
Judge Nixon, who runs the other half of TennCare. But I think these judges are 
now really the exception. (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 2005 July 01) 
Governor Sundquist implied that Judges Haynes and Nixon were selected by the 
advocates because of their sympathetic views when he said, 
I don't know what you do about Federal courts. Federal courts bear a huge 
responsibility for the costs of health care increases. And when advocates can 
pick and choose their judges, which is what they do in some form or another, 
because they know this judge or Judge Nixon or whomever, is the one they're 
going to go to because they know it's like fishing in the bathtub. And they know 
what the results are going to be. I'm not saying it's dishonest or anything; it's just 
a fact of life. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 885-890) 
There is a certain irony that Congressman Blunt and Gordon Bonnyman agree 
that consent decrees are used for cover and yet they make such dissimilar conclusions 
about their merit. It is also noteworthy that Governor Sundquist's observations about 
Judges Haynes and Nixon are shared by some outside observers. 
A Contrasting History of Judicial Involvement 
In an interesting aside, both Governor McWherter and Gordon Bonnyman offered 
unprompted comments about their joint experience with another consent decree; 
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Bonnyman also compared experiences. Both McWherter and Bonnyman had 
experience and interactions with a federal court order related to the Department of 
Corrections prior to the implementation of TennCare. McWherter inherited the court 
order from the administration of former Governor Lamar Alexander (1979-1987); events 
leading to the execution of the order actually began in the administration of Governor 
Ray Blanton (1975-1979). Both McWherter and Bonnyman stated that their experience 
with this court order was instrumental in shaping their perceptions of judicial oversight in 
state-administered programs, although their perspectives led to different conclusions. 
In 1982 a federal district court judge appointed a special master to oversee 
prison reforms in Tennessee. This was a result of a determination that parts of the state 
prison system were unconstitutional (Lee & Rogers, n.d.). Relating to the assumption of 
this court order and his experience with the order, McWherter stated, "I would not enter 
into a consent decree until he [apparently referring to Gordon Bonnyman] carried me to 
the Supreme Court. I learned that from ·the experience in the Corrections Department" 
(transcript of recorded interview, February 2, 2005, lines 159-160). 
Bonnyman recently described his eighteen-year history involving efforts reform 
state prisons (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 15). In doing so he 
highlighted the importance of the court's role. He started by delineating the court's role 
in saying, "the courts were necessary, but not sufficient" (line 548). Explaining that the 
value of the court's involvement was that, 
They were the constant pressure and accountability mechanism out there that 
held State government to account. Did not micro-manage. Did not dictate. But 
at crucial points, the special master in the prison litigation, who was former 
Commissioner of Correction himself and who brought in experts whose 
resources were made available to the State, played a very important role both in 
coercion and accountability, and also in technical support and leadership in a 
very politically subdued, but crucial, sort of way. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, February 25, lines 550-555) 
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The good experience that Bonnyman described with the special master in the 
prison litigation was not replicated in the John 8. case. From his perspective, 
The last administration and this administration, the current administration, have 
very effectively . . .  (this last administration less so, but certainly the current 
administration) exploited the mere existence of consent decrees, using litigation 
as cover for its own mismanagement and claiming that problems are not due to 
what are pretty serious management lapses by the state. And it remains to be 
seen whether that. .. strategy wil l work over time. And the weakness of litigation 
is obvious. I mean, the courts can't manage things. The courts can't . . .  all they 
can do is hold people to account and hope that the coercion will force them to do 
the management and the leadership and the reforms that are necessary. But 
there is a staying power about the courts that other institutions don't have. I 
mean, they don't go away. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, 
lines 570-582) 
To address the issues and continuing problems associated with prison 
overcrowding, the General Assembly established an Oversight Committee. Bonnyman 
recounted that reform efforts were ultimately successful, despite turnover in judges, 
legislators, governors, Department of Corrections Commissioners and middle managers, 
saying, 
The one thing that helped was that there was an oversight committee appointed 
by the . . .  Legislature with members from both Branches and both Houses, both 
the Senate and the State House of Representatives, that was allowed to hire 
professional staff that was knowledgeable and could solve this. And that 
developed a body of expertise that could effectively discharge the oversight 
functions, and it also tended to insulate what was a politically-charged 
Department and system from inter-meddling by both Branches, both Houses of 
the Legislature. There was a place where the Legislature could discipl ine itself 
by making sure that there was responsible and informed professional oversight. 
And it could also upgrade the quality of its oversight function and regulatory 
function through those same resources. That was significant. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 487-500) 
Significantly Bonnyman also highlighted the value of involvement of the public 
press, saying, 
But there was also sustained attention by the news media to the prison system, 
to the problems of the prison system, and it was wel l-informed and sustained. 
There were several reporters, several media outlets, that paid attention to the 
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prison story, stayed on it, developed expertise, had institutional memories as 
politicians came and went, and were able to educate the public so that even 
something as subject to demagoguery as prisons and correction and law 
enforcement got to the point where elected officials understood they needed to 
pay attention to this . . . . They were not going to make political hay out of it. If they 
tried, it would bite them, and they needed to get real. They needed to have the 
right people, give them the latitude, give them the resources, and hold them 
accountable, and stand back. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 
25, lines 500-513) 
Bonnyman does not think that effective legislative or executive oversight exists in 
TennCare commenting, 
We don't have any of that from the health system, and we don't have any of that 
in mental health services for children, specifically. So what you're talking about 
is something, an enterprise, [that] is ultimately, publicly accountable, and . . .  
therefore its fate is going to be determined for better or ill in the political sphere. 
And if politics works appropriately, it will depend upon the media being informed 
through a rigorous and professional well-informed news media, the Legislature 
having the resources and the seriousness of purpose to do its oversight 
functions, and the Executive Branch . . .  receiving the resources and then 
committing the appropriate executive leadership and political support to people to 
identify problems, develop solutions, and carry them forward. And all of that with 
the political will that if there's going to be contracting of those services, [to] the 
Behavioral Health Organizations and others, the State has an internal capacity to 
write good contracts and hold its contractors accountable. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, February 25, lines 515-528) 
Bonnyman also reflected on the parallels between the privatization that occurred 
with the Tennessee prisons and the Medicaid program with the advent of TennCare, 
saying, 
I saw good things and bad things of privatization in the corrections contracts. 
The problem with privatization is that there, in my view, it tends to be an 
ideological agenda that says, 'We're going to privatize this, and the genius of the 
private sector will do a better job of the public sector. We can wash our hands of 
this and be gone.' No, you've got to have enough residual capacity within state 
government to hold your contractors accountable. And so thaf s a critical 
function that you've got to have, you know, and reasonable people can differ 
about whether privatization is appropriate at what level, for what functions. I'm 
somewhat agnostic on that, but I'm not agnostic at all and I feel very strongly, 
and I think the record supports it, that if you're going to do privatization, you've 
got to have internal capacity to hold your entities responsible. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 528-538) 
120 
Final Thoughts on Consent Decrees 
When you sort through all the rhetoric and posturing about the consent decrees, 
three things are apparent. First, conceptually consent decrees are a necessary option to 
protect rights. Secondly, though sometimes the remedy seems extreme, it must be 
remembered that serious grievances are often the genesis of the need for the relief 
offered by consent decrees. Thirdly, a distinction must be made between intent and 
execution. The intent of consent decrees is consistent with the balance of governmental 
power envisioned by our country's founding fathers. Poor execution is no excuse to 
"throw the baby out with the bath water''. Even with the dismantling of the TennCare 
consent decrees, the state still has the legacy of mismanagement of the TennCare 
program. The consent decrees are not the root cause of TennCare's troubles and their 
removal will not alleviate the longstanding deficiencies in the design and delivery 
TennCare. Nevertheless, consent decrees have had a key role in reordering priorites 
and shifing focus in the program's operation. 
TennCare Oversight 
A variety of state, legislative and other entities have jurisdiction over TennCare. 
The TennCare Oversight Division is a part of the Department of Commerce and Industry. 
The TennCare Oversight Committee, also referred to as the Select Committee on 
TennCare Oversight is a joint House and Senate committee of the state Legislature. 
The TennCare Partners Roundtable is a forum that includes providers, consumers, MCO 
and BHO representatives and other interested parties (Milbank Memorial Fund, 1999; 
Tennessee Blue Book, n.d.; Tennessee.gov, n.d.). 
The TennCare Oversight Division examines and monitors MCOs and BHOs that 
participate in TennCare. The group also monitors market practices and tracks 
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complaints (Milbank Memorial Fund, 1999; Tennessee.gov, n.d .). It is important to 
remember that Tennessee's experience with managed care was very limited, even in the 
commercial sector, prior to the start of TennCare. 
The role of the Tennessee Legislature relative to TennCare was minimized from 
the outset, in part because of the leadership position Governor McWherter was willing 
and able to take, and in part because of the legislators' reluctance to confront hard 
political realities. Faced with raising taxes or slashing Medicaid benefits, the legislators 
were more than willing to defer to Governor McWherter initially and subsequently to his 
successors. Members of the TennCare Oversight Committee are appointed by the 
respective speaker of each house to oversee TennCare. All legislative proposals that 
might impact TennCare come before this committee. The major actions of this 
committee pertain to annual appropriations (Milbank Memorial Fund, 1999; 
Tennessee.gov, n.d.). 
The TennCare Partners Roundtable was created by Governor Sundquist 
(Milbank Memorial Fund, 1999). The Roundtable is viewed as an important venue for 
various stakeholders to come together. There is concern though about the erratic 
meeting schedule, which for behavioral health care is coordinated by the Department of 
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD). During the Sundquist 
administration when Elizabeth Rukeyser was the Commissioner for the DMHDD, the 
group met regularly on a monthly basis. During the Bredesen administration, the group 
has not met regularly to discuss behavioral health issues (personal e-mail, C. Heflinger, 
2005, June 3). 
The TennCare Bureau is a state agency within the Department of Finance and 
Administration. The Bureau of TennCare and the Department of Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD) jointly oversee the BHOs (the Department of 
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health is not similarly involved in overseeing the MCOs). There were off-the-record 
references to the dominance of the Commissioner of Finance and Administration, David 
Goetz, and Deputy Commissioner J.D. Hickey of the Bureau of TennCare in the 
determination of strategy, particularly as it related to the Bredesen administration's 
development of a reform strategy. Administrators in community health centers and 
behavioral health care providers frequently mentioned interactions with DMHDD staff on 
program administration issues and many cited an improvement in the responsiveness of 
the department in the last few years. 
Unfortunately no informant from the DMHDD was interviewed. Interviews that 
were scheduled with Commissioner Virginia Trotter Betts; Candace Gil ligan, who serves 
as the Executive Director for the TennCare Partners program; Dr. Frieda Outlaw, 
Executive Director of Special Populations; and Dr. Judy Regan, Executive Director of 
Clinical Leadership were blocked by Cynthia Clark Tyler, the Director of the Office of 
Legal Counsel .  In a personal communication, she stated, 
This is to confirm our telephone conversation this afternoon regarding your 
interviewing several members of the TDMHDD staff, including Commissioner 
Virginia Trotter Betts, as part of your dissertation. As we discussed, due to 
pending federal court litigation, i .e., Grier, John B. , Brian A and Rosen, I have 
advised TDMHDD staff to not participate in these interviews. Once the litigation 
is closed we may be free to discuss the issues surrounding your dissertation 
subject. I regret that this may adversely impact your dissertation. Should you 
have any further questions, please feel free to give me a call. (e-mail 
communication, 2005, January 31 ) 
When an attempt was made to reschedule interviews in April after Commissioner Betts 
suggested that circumstances may have changed, Tyler responded to the Commissioner 
in an e-mail that, 
In an abundance of caution I would recommend that senior staff at MHDD not 
participate in Ms. Myers" project at this time. Until the lawsuits are settled it 
would not be to our advantage to have comments or opinions from MHDD on the 
TennCare program on the record. There is no legal coverage that would prohibit 
obtaining the material, which could be used against the Department or the State 
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in the on-going litigation. I appreciate the fact that a good deal of the information 
may have been provided to the press and/or introduced in the litigation. It was 
my understanding, however, that the project was not focused so much on the 
facts and data around TennCare but was an attempt to gain some quantifiable* 
insight into the policy and history of the TennCare program. The possibility for 
misunderstanding would be greater in that instance rather than in a presentation 
of hard data. My recommendation is made in an attempt to avoid the prospect of 
a misunderstanding as well as to protect the State and the Department from 
potential use of material that could be misconstrued to our disadvantage. 
(forwarded copy of a personal e-mail from C. Tyler to V. Betts, 2005, April 8) 
* Most likely Ms. Tyler meant qualitative, not quantifiable. 
The authority that is conferred on state and elected officials arises from the 
people they serve. The DMHDD inability to discuss issues related to TennCare with a 
researcher is a sad and disturbing commentary on how dysfunctional the administration 
of TennCare and TennCare Partners has become and serves as another example of 
inappropriately limited public discourse. The position taken by Ms. Tyler is very different 
from other informants. Manny Martins epitomized the response received from other 
pubic figures when he said, "there is a story to be told" (personal conversation, 2005, 
March 11). 
Public programs by their very nature should be transparent and responsive. 
Public programs serve citizens, and public officials and employees serve at the will of 
citizens. The pervasive problems of TennCare management have resulted in state 
officials running for or creating cover, instead of standing in the bright light that public 
service demand. 
Authority of a Different Kind 
Gordon Bonnyman's direct involvement with the leveraging of federal judicial 
powers has already been described in relation to TennCare and prison reform in 
Tennessee. In addition to this formal use of authority, Bonnyman and other key 
advocates used their personal expertise, influence and power to advocate for the need 
for TennCare and to shape the design and delivery of the program. 
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The accumulated clout of the advocacy community was instrumental in the 
establishment of TennCare. According to David Manning, the Commissioner of Finance 
in Administration during McWherter's entire tenure as governor, 
We also were convinced that there were two groups that we had to have working 
with us. One was BlueCross because we had to have an organization that had 
the capacity to do the whole thing if they had to do the whole thing. We didn't 
really want one organization to do the whole thing, but if you were going to have 
one, that had to be it. So we had to have BlueCross. The other was we thought 
we had to have the advocacy community with us. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 11, lines 197-205) 
In the contentious debate about TennCare since its inception, the advocates 
"have been the only check and balance in forming public policy since Bredesen took 
office. With nearly all lawmakers shirking their responsibility to vet Bredesen's cuts this 
past session, advocates have been the only voice for thousands of Tennesseans" 
according to Tim Chavez (2005, August 05), a writer with The Tennessean, a Nashville 
newspaper that has covered TennCare extensively. Mr. Chavez's activism is a good 
exemplar of the strong and engaged public press mentioned by Gordon Bonnyman, and 
clearly he recognizes the authority that Gordon Bonnyman and others have been able to 
wield. 
Thoughts on TennCare Oversight 
Many have contemplated an alternative state Executive and Legislative oversight 
model for TennCare. Former Governor Don Sundquist and Dr. Warren Neel suggested 
that the TennCare program would be better served if it was insulated from the 
vicissitudes of politics and governed by "some independent organization" (transcript of 
recorded interview, D. Sundquist, 2005, March 15, line 625). They suggested a model 
similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or a Port Authority. Neel 
related that he told Governor-elect Bredesen that, "you can not manage TennCare the 
way it is" and he added, "my solution is that you have got to get it out of the Legislature. 
125 
Now that does not mean . . .  that you are not accountable to the Legislature" (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 594, 604-609). Neel suggested that the 
Governor and Legislature should appoint people to such a body "who have 
experience . . .  and understand complexities" (lines 616-618). 
Dr. Bruce Vladeck does not agree with the concept of an independent governing 
board, asking, "what could be more important for the people's elected representatives to 
pay attention to than the single biggest thing on which tax dollars are spent?" (transcript 
of recorded interview, 2005, March 4, lines 663-666). Taking the idea further, Vladeck 
asserted, 
If the political system is incapable of addressing the health needs of the 
population, . . . we need to fix the political system . . . . We've got to find ways to get 
people re-engaged in politics at the community level. We've got to find ways to 
deal with information and communications since the current ways aren't working 
very well at public interest and public education. (lines 671-678) 
Gordon Bonnyman echoed with a similar perspective, stating, 
It's [referring to TennCare] funded with public funds. It intersects with all sorts of 
other public agencies. There is accountability for the legislature to approve the 
budget and oversee the expenditure of funds. I don't think that there is any way, 
practically speaking, to insulate it from politics and in fact it is not appropriate or 
desirable to insulate it from oversight by the legislative branch and by the 
executive branch. I don't think that there is any substitute for electing the right 
Governor who gets it . . .  who makes it a priority, will keep it a priority, appoints the 
right people, and gets them the resources and the latitude to both set goals and 
pursue those goals over time without being disrupted by fits and starts and new 
initiatives and new political gambits and so forth. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, February 25, lines 466-478) 
Governor Sundquist convened a panel of experts in 2000 to assess the future of 
TennCare in anticipation of the expiration of the original waiver. The final report issued 
by the commission contained recommendations about oversight and governance 
(Commission on the Future of TennCare, 2000, November 17). The commission 
concluded that, "the TennCare Bureau might, in the long run, benefit from a different 
structure. The future structure might include features of public/private organizations or 
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of alternative government agencies" (Smith & Snodgrass, 2000, p. 20). The 
commission also suggested replacement of the legislative Oversight Committee and 
others with oversight function with "a board of 12-15 individuals qualified to oversee a 
program of the size and significance of TennCare" (p.20). Finally the commission 
recommended the designation of the TennCare bureau as a separate Department of 
state government with the TennCare Director as a Commissioner and the establishment 
of an advisory commission to "serve as an advisory board of directors for the TennCare 
program, and as a critical public voice in evaluating the direction of the TennCare 
Program" (pp. 52-53). 
Regardless of what the "right" model or structure for oversight is, it is safe to say 
that the stakeholders who came together to create TennCare are no longer working in 
concert. It is also safe to say that everyone must reach a consensus and workable 
strategy for assigning authority for the TennCare and TennCare programs to succeed. 
Those in authority, as the term connotes, must possess the expertise and have the 
legitimate, recognized and conferred power and will to control their clearly demarcated 
domain. 
The discussion about authority in TennCare also illustrates the value of 
governmental checks and balances. Government in the United States is set up with a 
structure that seeks to prevent abuses of power and creates an avenue to remedy the 
violation of rights that can occur from abuses or lapses in the exercising of authority. 
The debate concerning authority in TennCare shows the value of these checks and 
balances. 
Reflections on the Theme of Authority 
The strong executive authority of Governor McWherter was needed to make 
TennCare a reality. A void was created when Governor McWherter left office. There 
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was a failure to transition to a more balanced and inclusive authoritative structure after 
McWherter left office. An adequate oversight model has yet to be developed. The 
continued mismanagement of program operations set the stage for the imposition of 
federal judicial authority which created a cadre of new issues. The strong authority and 
hands-on involvement that Governor McWherter envisioned and embraced was not 
duplicated by his successor, Governor Don Sundquist. Nor was Sundquist able to 
establish an effective leadership infrastructure to give direction to program management. 
Governor Bredesen has been a strong authoritative executive, but he has not shown a 
willingness to collaborate with stakeholders. A discussion of Governor Bredesen's 
exercise of authority is included in the discussion on TennCare reforms in a subsequent 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE THEME OF MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
Management is a central theme in the creation and implementation of TennCare 
and the ongoing program operations. Management is a key to envisioning and 
operationalizing the program components. Management, which includes exercising 
executive, administrative and supervisory direction (Merriam-Webster, 2000) transverses 
all levels of operation from the setting or translation of strategy to the execution of the 
activities that support the mission of the program. Management conveys "the judicious 
use of means to accomplish an end" (Brainy Dictionary, n.d. ; Merriam-Webster's, 2000). 
Managing includes skill and caring; to succeed in managing is to succeed in 
accomplishing strategic objectives. Management is purposeful, and the act and art of 
managing includes directing, controlling, guiding, operating, carrying on and using for a 
purpose. Contrasting words for managing include collapsing, failing, giving up and 
falling down (Brainy Dictionary, n.d.). 
The management of the creation and implementation phases of TennCare was 
purposeful and proactive. Management of the operational phase of TennCare has 
largely been reactionary and politicized and, in many instances, inappropriately 
abdicated or conferred upon the wrong or unprepared people or entities. 
Birth of the Idea: TennCare Implementation 
Governor McWherter and his team made two key management decisions during 
the implementation phase for which they have been both praised and condemned. The 
first of these concerned the implementation timetable and the second decision is 
commonly referred to, not kindly, as the "cram down". 
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A Very Tight Timetable 
TennCare was purposely created and implemented quickly. By most accounts, 
the McWherter team anticipated start-up problems. They were aware of the downside 
associated with undertaking such a major change in such a compressed time with so 
little infrastructure to support the change. Governor McWherter, Manny Martins and 
David Manning made a deliberate choice that a rapid implementation was preferable to a 
longer one. The trio of McWherter, Manning and Martins felt pressured by time because 
of the need to generate immediate savings in the Medicaid program and avert a looming 
budget crisis in the state and to limit political opposition. The thinking was that an 
imperfect program was preferable to no program (Gold, Frazer, & Schoen, 1995). 
The decision to proceed with a rapid implementation was made with cognizance 
of the risks of the approach. According to Gold (1997), "TennCare developers were well 
aware of the operational challenge of the schedule, but thought they could address 
short-term problems as they arose" (p. 651 ). When McWherter announced his intentions 
for implementation to HCFA, Dr. Vladeck reflected that, the Tennessee representatives 
"were on a very tight timetable that we thought was unrealistic and we kept suggesting to 
them that they stretch it out, and they resisted. They said [because of] their political 
situation, however accurate it was, whatever it was, they had to go live by January 1st or 
the whole thing would blow up" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 4, lines 
125-130). The TennCare creators apparently wanted the program implementation to 
occur before the legislature was convened for the 1994 session. Dick Blackburn, the 
Executive Director of the Tennessee Association of Mental Health Organizations 
(TAMHO), said 
I t  just was done willy-nilly. I remember Governor McWherter saying, when you 
asked him, . .. " I f  we had to wait until everybody was [ready] and everything was 
set, we never would get this off the ground, so we'll just do it and, you know, let 
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the chips fall where they may. We'll deal with what happens afterwards". 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 89-92) 
Even after the chaos of the first year of operation, McWherter, Martins and 
Manning held this view. In defending the rapid implementation, Manning wrote, 
Critics contend that we moved too quickly in implementing TennCare, but 
TennCare had to be implemented in a very short period of time, and the 
problems created by massive changes were understandable. State officials 
readily acknowledge that there would be widespread confusion as those covered 
by the new program, the managed care organizations and provider struggled to 
cope with the massive changes taking place. But without TennCare, they were 
quick to point out, the problems resulting from an almost complete collapse of the 
Medicaid program would have been much worse. Taxes would have to have 
been raised, provider fees would have been slashed, and Medicaid patients 
would have suffered. Instead, TennCare's crash implementation was, as one of 
the state's leading editorial writers recently put it, "a bold escape from disaster". 
(Manning, 1995, p.22) 
The lack of preparedness necessitated by the very tight timetable created many 
issues, some that persist until today. Some of these issues did not originate with 
TennCare and others could have been remedied. 
The Cram-Down: Mandating Provider Participation 
One of the defining characteristics of the TennCare implementation was what is 
referred to as the "cram down". This approach required all providers participating in the 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield TPN network utilized by state employees to participate in 
TennCare with the same contractual terms, but a different fee schedule. It was a bold 
approach, "the one thing that the people of the state of Tennessee did that state officials 
everywhere in the country were unwilling to risk" (transcript of recorded interview, B. 
Vladeck, 2005, March 4, lines 207-208). 
Although at one time 2,000 of the 7,000 TPN physicians cancelled their contracts 
with Blue Cross-Blue Shield because of the cram-down, the network composition 
eventually stabilized. Despite these initial difficulties, the cram-down, according to 
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Vladeck "was the most brilliant part of the whole implementation . . .  and that's what made 
it go" (transcript of recorded interview, B. Vladeck, 2005, March 4, lines 217-218). 
"Into the Fire": TennCare Operation 
Once TennCare was implemented, attention turned to the delivering on the 
promises of the program. A colloquialism that is used to refer to an ordeal, commonly an 
initial experience, is "baptism by fire" (Phrase Finder, n.d.). Certainly the early years of 
TennCare and later TennCare Partners were a baptism by fire for those in state 
government, the vendors and TennCare members. 
The rapid implementation of TennCare produced the expected problems, and 
more. When Don Sundquist was inaugurated as governor, one year after the start of 
TennCare, his administration inherited a host of residual start-up problems. These 
problems were further exacerbated by inevitable issues related to underlying 
deficiencies in the infrastructure and competencies of the state and their contracted 
vendors. 
The stability and evolution of the marketplace that the McWherter administration 
expected in the TennCare program after a rough start was never broadly realized. The 
reasons for this failure are hard to dissect. The failure, in part, can be attributed to 
decisions made by both the McWherter and Sundquist administrations. Often hard 
decisions were made with few good options. Problems were worsened by the lack of 
managed care expertise and experience, especially as it applies to a specialized 
population like Medicaid recipients. Performance management capabilities, the key to 
the successful deployment or delivery of managed care, were lacking both in the state 
and the largely immature MCOs (the BHOs will be discussed in the following section on 
fragmentation). The untoward intrusion of partisanship into the management of 
TennCare was also a deterrent to success. 
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Accountability for Performance Management 
The ability of state officials to manage and continually improve a program like 
TennCare or TennCare Partners, where contracted vendors, such as the MCOs and 
BHOs, and a large cross-section of staff are accountable for day-to-day program 
administration, is contingent upon adept performance management. Managers do not 
transfer accountability when they delegate or contract-out tasks. Their challenge is to 
manage the performance of staff and contractors and answer for results. Performance 
management begins with a clear and specific articulation of requirements and priorities 
and is realized through the design and execution of processes designed to meet or 
exceed expectations. Performance management wil l be discussed in relation to the 
state's accountability to manage contracted vendors, the state's management of the 
performance of the services and functions for which they are directly responsible for, and 
MCO and BHO accountabilities. 
The failure to manage performance is one of the most important issues plaguing 
TennCare and TennCare Partners. The reasons for this failure are both related to 
fundamental deficiencies within the state and with vendors, and a lack of the priority and 
focus needed to correct these deficiencies. The state did not have the right mindset, 
staff, processes or systems in place to be effective in performance management. The 
MCOs, most newly created with the start of TennCare, lacked experience, organizational 
capabilities, financial resources and information management systems. Furthermore, 
when significant deficiencies were identified within state government or in the 
performance of the contracted MCOs and BHOs, the state was unwil ling or unable to 
cancel contracts, find adequate replacements or mobilize the right resources. 
Management confers accountability for performance. In a program as complex 
as TennCare, state officials either delegate or contract out many responsibilities and 
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functions to staff or vendors. For TennCare Partners, performance management is the 
primary accountability of both the Bureau of TennCare and the Department of Mental 
Health and Developmental Disabilities. It is imperative that state managers oversee the 
performance staff and vendors and be proactive when performance does not meet 
expectations. 
Accountability includes three essential components: who should manage, what 
should be managed and how management is accomplished (Emanuel & Emanuel, 
1996). The state as a purchaser of health care services has the accountability for 
managing the services it provides and the performance of the MCOs and BHOs it 
contracts with to provide services. It is incumbent upon the state to define required 
specifications, identify the staff resources and contractors best able to meet 
requirements and manage performance for the purpose of continuous improvements in 
serving beneficiaries. State departments and the MCOs and BHOs are responsible for 
having management processes and resources in place for the delivery of services to 
beneficiaries and the support of contracted providers. In addition the contacted MCOs 
and BHOs must have the capabilities to meet the needs of the state as a purchaser. 
Furthermore, the MCOs and BHOs must consistently deliver on contractual promises. 
Interviewees, and the literature, primarily focus on the "who" and, to a lesser extent, the 
"what" of accountability. There was very little discussion of the "how" of accountability. 
By most accounts, the state administrators and most of the managed care companies 
contracted to provide TennCare managed care services were ineffective. 
In performance management, a term that is sometimes used to describe 
processes that produce quality outcomes is in control and capable. In control refers to 
processes that have minimal variation, meaning that performance is consistent and 
predictable, a key quality characteristic. For example, an in control administrative 
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process, such as answering the phone when members call with questions or issues, 
would consistently show that members calls were answered in conformance to a 
measurable specification. An example would be that 95 percent or more of all members' 
calls were answered within 30 seconds. Capable denotes high-performing processes 
that are designed specifically to meet or exceed customer specifications. Capable 
processes are those that are linked to desirable outcomes. The underlying relationship 
that supports the goal of capable processes is the basis for the model developed by 
Donabedian (1988) that directly links process and outcomes. Performance quality 
requires the complement of in control and capable processes. 
The tendency to place blame on others is a common human and political practice 
that, even when justified, is commonly divisive and non-productive. The story of the 
administration of the TennCare and the TennCare Partners programs is riddled with 
blame. Governor McWherter and his team, driven by a looming financial disaster and a 
desire to leave a legacy of increasing access to health care services, launched 
TennCare cognizant of the issues associated with such a massive change in an 
incredibly compressed period of time. Chaos reigned during the first year of TennCare. 
Shortly after the first year of operation, Governor McWherter's term ended and Don 
Sundquist assumed office, inheriting the ongoing evolution of problems expected with a 
change of the magnitude of TennCare. 
Many charges have been made about mismanagement during the Sundquist 
administration. The validity of the many charges is not clear. What is clear is that the 
forward thinking, expertise, cooperation and commitment to change that epitomized the 
launching of TennCare was lacking in the Sundquist administration or completely 
overwhelmed by the sobering reality of the program's fallout. 
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Following is a discussion of the management failures related to TennCare. 
Topics that will be discussed include the lack of state staff experience and expertise 
related to managed care and vendor performance management, confused strategic 
objectives and priorities and ineffectual MCOs (BHOs will be discussed in the next 
section). 
A Cracked Foundation 
When TennCare was launched, 12 MCOs were under contract with the state 
(See Table 9 for a history of the TennCare MCOs). Most of these MCOs had been 
created after April 1, 1993 in mere months leading up to TennCare's implementation. 
Only one of the participating MCOs, Access Med Plus, had any prior Medicaid 
experience and this was on a limited scale (Access Med Plus had less than 35,000 total 
enrollees in a limited geographic area). Few of the contracted MCOs had any managed 
care experience. Statewide, in the private and public sectors, only 300,000 people of 
5. 7 percent of the total population of Tennessee were enrolled in HMOs at the inception 
of TennCare. About one million were enrolled in a Blue Cross-Blue Shield PPO plan, 
but these enrollees were primarily employees of the state or other large employers 
(Gold, 1997). By 1999, there were nine TennCare MCOs. 
With the first TennCare enrollment in 1994, 800,000 beneficiaries were placed in 
managed care plans. Fifty percent of all TennCare enrollees selected Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield during the first enrollment and another 25 percent selected Access Med Plus. By 
January, 1995, the TennCare enrollment had grown to 1.2 million. 
Access Med Plus, who projected that their enrollment would grow from 35,000 to 
100,000 to 150,000, saw their enrollment grow at a rate twice the expectation. The 
company, with just 50 staff members, no claims processing system and no specialty 
providers under contract, was overwhelmed (Gold, 1997). 
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Table 9: TennCare MCO H istory 
· Date • . :-,- · :  
January 1 994 1 2  MCOs available when TennCare was implemented: 6 HMOs (1) and 6 PPOs (2): 
• Two plans were offered in every county (Blue Cross Access Med Plus) 
• Two plans withdrew because they were required to participate for 1 8  months 
(Gold & Aizer, 2000) 
January 1 997 All four PPOs converted to HMOs per state requirement (Chang & Steinberg, 2005, May; 
Gold & Aizer, 2000) 
March 31 , 1 999 Xanthus (third largest MCO) placed in receivership (Tennessee.gov, n .d. c). 
April 1 999 State assumed control of Xanthus Health Plan of Tennessee (formerly known as Phoenix) 
after Xanthus reported negative net worth of $24 mi llion in 1 998 (Chang & Steinberg, 
2005, May). 
June 1 999 Prudential (second smallest HMO serving only Shelby county) gave notice it would leave 
TennCare effective December 31 , 1 999 (Tennessee.gov, n.d . c). 
November 1 999 State provided Xanthus with a $26 mil l ion loan to pay providers (Tennessee.gov, n .d .  c). 
December 1 5, 1 999 Blue Cross (largest HMO) gave notice it would leave TennCare effective July 1 ,  2000; 
this notice was later removed (Tennessee.Qov, n .d . c). 
March 2000 Access Med Plus placed under state supervision (Chang & Steinberg, 2005, May; 
(Tennessee.Qov, n .d. c). 
May 2000 Access Med Plus placed under involuntary supervision and assets frozen by the state 
(ChanQ & SteinberQ, 2005, May; (Tennessee.gov, n .d . c). 
July 2000 Risk-sharing provision of Blue Cross contract terminated (Tennessee.gov, n .d . c) . 
John Deere (second smallest HMO after the departure of Prudential) gave notice it would 
leave TennCare effective January 1 ,  2001 ; this notice was subsequently withdrawn 
(Tennessee.gov, n.d. c). 
December 2000 Access Med Plus files a $ 1 60 mil lion lawsuit against the state alleging inadequate funding 
(ChanQ & SteinberQ, 2005, May). 
May 2001 TennCare officially cancelled contract with Access Med Plus (Chang & Steinberg, 2005, 
May). 
July 2001 Two new MCOs added to TennCare: Better health Plan and Universal Care 
(Tennessee.gov, n .d . c). 
October 2001 Access Med Plus contract terminated (Tennessee.Qov, n .d . c) . 
April 2002 Universal Care contract terminated (Chang & Steinberg, 2005, May). 
June 2002 TLC signed a contract that eliminated risk-sharing provisions of contract through 
December 31 , 2003 (Chang & Steinberg, 2005, May). 
July 2002 TennCare "Stabil ization Plan" implemented. Plan was originally intended to provide 
MCOs with an eighteen month timeframe to operate under no-risk contracts (Chang & 
SteinberQ, 2005, May). 
January 2003 State assumed 1 00 percent financial risk for all TennCare covered benefits (Chang & 
SteinberQ, 2005, May). 
June 2003 Contract with Universal terminated; enrollees move to TennCare Select (Tennessee.gov, 
n .d. c). 
August 2003 Contract with Xanthus terminated; enrollees moved to TennCare Select (Tennessee.gov, 
n.d. c). 
(1) The six HMOs were Access Med Plus, John Deere, Phoenix/Xanthus, TLC, Total Health Plus and Vanderbilt ; n ly 
two of the HMOs existed before TennCare and only Access Med Plus had Medicaid experience 
(2) The PPOs were Prudential, Health Net, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Omnicare, Preferred Health Partnership and 
Tenn Source 
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There were serious problems with several of the MCOs that became apparent as 
time passed. The process used to select the MCOs created problems that plagued the 
start-up and early years of TennCare and persist to this date. This negative legacy has 
consistently overshadowed the good track record of certain MCOs. Numerous 
informants cited shortcomings in the state's ability to manage the MCOs. Many 
discussions centered on the state being unable or unwilling to successfully manage 
vendors and insurmountable issues with certain vendors. Some of the issues originated 
with the selection process which was dictated by the state of managed care in 
Tennessee, the speedy implementation and concerns about the program's design. 
MCOs were not selected through a competitive bid process. According to David 
Manning, "there really was not a round of bids . . . . There was an offer to consider 
proposals" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 285-286). Twenty 
MCOs applied to the state to be TennCare providers. Twelve were accepted. Two of 
the MCOs, Blue Cross-Blue Shield and Access Med Plus, had statewide offerings. 
Manny Martins added that, 
We put out, as I recall, [request for] proposals that would have allowed 
individuals to come in and provide Managed Care services to the entire Medicaid 
population, with the exception of long-term care, through a managed care 
system. We, as I recall, divided the State up into regions. We said you either 
had to take an entire region or do it Statewide. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 11, lines 181-186) 
Acceptance criteria primarily included a willingness to meet state terms and 
accept the state's financial terms. Manny Martins related that, 
[The MCOs] put up their money and met the requirements for HMOs under the 
Tennessee Commerce and Insurance laws. If they could meet those 
requirements and were wiling to contract with the state, prove they had a 
provider network [and] show the state signed contracts, then they would be 
allowed to enter into a contract with the state. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 11, lines 390-395) 
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The fact that the Department of Commerce and Insurance was minimally involved in 
prospective discussions about TennCare and there was so little time to develop 
processes to meet the demand imposed with the introduction of TennCare, speaks to 
the pervasive effects of strategic decisions like the cram-down, the hasty 
implementation, and stakeholder exclusion. 
Manny Martins acknowledged that some of the initial MCOs selected were not 
good ones. He noted that, "I think one of our failures was that some managed care 
organizations did come in that were homegrown. And those managed care 
organizations were not good managed care organizations. That hurt us, and it hurt 
TennCare, I think" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 357-361). 
Governor Don Sundquist and Dr. Warren Neel, who served as one of Sundquist's 
Commissioner of Finance and Administration, related their perspectives on how the 
MCOs were selected. Sundquist said, 
I think there were a lot of political decisions made as to who the MCOs were . . . .  
They were not always good business decisions, but they were political decisions 
as to who would operate the MCOs geographically, racially, and in other ways. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 51-54) 
Neel added that, "the MCOs, because some were politically selected, were not just 
poorly managed; they were undercapitalized and had no experience" (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 56-57). 
David Manning justified the selection of less than stellar MCOs by saying, 
The state's obligation was to not enter into .. . contracts with organizations that it 
knew were going to fail. And, you know, there's some legitimate criticism there of 
what we did at the time, but I think what we did at the time makes sense given 
where we were and what we were dealing with. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 11, lines 367-372) 
After a period of time, Manning thinks the state made a "critical mistake [when] 
they basically began the process of assuring that the MCOs could not fail" (lines 329-
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330), further asserting that, "they have to allow them to fail and take them out. That's 
what they didn't do" (lines 346-348). 
The discussion about failures of the MCOs and eventual efforts to shut down a 
few is an interesting one. There is general consensus that the failure of some of the 
MCOs was expected, and, to some, part of the maturing process of managed care was 
letting poor performers fail. How failing MCOs were handled tells a tale about 
management of the TennCare program. Some have been critical of the Sundquist 
administration's management of the failing MCOs. Governor and Dr. Neel related being 
constrained in their ability to take action against failing MCOs. 
Manning attributes the state's reluctance to not let MCOs fail to "provider politics" 
explaining, 
Basically, there was a little reluctance on the part, I think, both of the Sundquist 
administration and the General Assembly to say to a provider group, "You 
entered into a contract with a group to pay for health care. And they have been 
going out of business. And just as if, you know, another HMO down the street 
went out of business, you have to write some of that loss off. You just have to. 
That's just. . .  that's the world in which you're now operating." There is no risk if 
you're not going to allow somebody to fail and people lose money. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 359-365) 
Manning disagreed with "propping [the MCOs] up even though [they] were about to fail" 
(lines 371-372). He argued that, 
Your real obligation there is not to the provider, it's to the patient to insure that 
you move them to another organization that has the wherewithal to carry out your 
obligations to them. Now I think the State does have an obligation not to enter 
into contracts with people who are not doing business well or who are going to 
fail, which was . . .  and they should have withdrawn from them. They should not 
have held . . .  tried to hold everybody harmless. (lines 375-380) 
Manning specifically said, 
The state needs to manage the MCOs, not the care they deliver necessarily, 
except at 50,000 feet, but they need to manage the MCOs. And they have to 
allow them to fail if they do fail and take them out. And that's what they didn't do. 
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When Xantus failed, and it did, the effort was to try to rehabilitate it. Well, that's 
okay. I mean, there's insurance provisions to do that. And I think they asked 
myself and Manny Martins to help with some of that work at the time, and we did 
come back and try to do that. But you don"t go in and pay off all the creditors 
which is what they tried to do. And then Xantus came along and they tried to do 
the same thing. You let them fail. (lines 343-355) 
Dr. Warren Neel explained some of the difficulties associated with closing MCOs 
had to do with how the MCOs were structured and how the contracts were originally 
structured. He said, 
The construct of the MCO organization was a management company 
superimposed on an operating company. And all of the regulatory relationships 
that were established at the time they were brought in were focused on the 
operating company . . .  .You could not get to the information in the holding 
company, i.e. the capital. So they had structured themselves to preclude any 
what would now we'd call in the financial markets as 'transparency of the 
operating companies'. The operating companies didn't show anything except a 
bunch of people on the payroll. But all of the flow-through and the capital was in 
the holding company. So if we got ready to try to close one down or alter it was a 
heck of a mess. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 114-122) 
The state Department of Commerce and Insurance used existing regulations for due 
diligence regarding the TennCare MCOs. Per Neel, 
Commerce and Insurance was charged [to think] just like an MCO were an 
insurance company. The only difference though is you don't have a rating 
agency, which is what you have in an insurance business, called AM Best. You 
don't have the equivalent for an MCO. You don't have any way nor do you have 
the same sort of regulatory relation of the capitalization as you would with the 
Financial Institutions Commissioner and Banks. You just simply . . .  you don't 
have that. You didn't have it. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, 
lines 127-134) 
Turmoil and Turnover 
The revolving door of appointed TennCare Directors during the Sundquist 
administration was indicative of the management turmoil that characterized TennCare 
during this period of time. Governor McWherter appointed Manny Martins to serve as 
the first TennCare Director, a post he held from January 1994 through April 1995 in the 
early days of the Sundquist administration and again from July 2002 until July 2004 
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during the waning days of the Sundquist administration and early days of the Bredesen 
administration. In between Martins" two tenures, Governor Sundquist appointed seven 
TennCare Directors. Table 10 has a listing of all TennCare Directors. Currently J. D. 
Hickey is the TennCare Director, a post he has held since July 2004. 
Adding further to the turmoil was a move to consolidate certain state 
departments. This effort, initiated early in 1997, created further management chaos. 
Part of the planned consolidation included moving the Department of Mental Health and 
Retardation (the Department was later renamed the Department of Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities) into the Department of Health as a cost-cutting measure. 
While the move was under consideration, there was uncertainty and confusion which 
was a distraction. The failure to consummate the consolidation after several years 
perpetuated a diffusion of accountabilities, unneeded variations and inefficiencies. 
There was significant fallout during the time departmental consolidation was 
being discussed. Key staff left the Department of Mental Health, the department was 
basically impotent and accountability was inappropriately transferred to the BHOs. In an 
interview with Dick Blackburn and Kelly Lang-Ramirez of TAMHO, they relayed their 
perspective about the proposal to move the Department of Mental Health and 
Retardation into a mega-Department of Health. According to Blackburn, at the 
beginning of the Sundquist administration, 
There was a caretaker Commissioner of Mental Health at the time. They 
basically had the Deputy Commissioner function as your Commissioner, so there 
was really no one with any real voice around how things ought to be done. 
Then . . .  they decided what they wanted to do was consolidate the Department [of 
Mental Health] into . . .  a mega . . .  Department of Health. All of the mental health 
stakeholders opposed that notion. And the battles began to rage. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 458-471) 
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Table 1 0 : Tenn Care Directors 
Tenure (Appointed by) · · · · · Director · 
January 1 994-April 1 995 Manny Martins 
(Ned Ray Mcwherter) 
April 1 995-May 1 996 Rusty Siebert 
(Don Sundquist) 
May 1 996-March 1 998 Theresa Clarke 
(Don Sundquist) 
March 1 998-January 1 999 Dr. Wendy Long (Interim Director) 
(Don Sundquist) 
January 1 4, 1 999-January 31 , Glen Jennings 
1 999 
(Don Sundquist) 
February 1 ,  1 999-September Brian Lapps 
27, 1 999 
(Don Sundquist) 
September 27, 1 999-June John Tighe 
2000 
(Don Sundquist) 
June 2000-June 2002 Mark Reynolds 
(Don Sundquist) 
June 2002-early July 2004 Manny Martins 
(Don Sundquist/Phil 
Bredesen) 
July 2004-present Dr. J .D. Hickey 
(Phil Bredesen) 
1 43 
Blackburn added that, 
There was a person in charge at that time, Commissioner Nancy Menke . . . .  Her 
experience . . .  primarily was in education . . .  but she had been a lobbyist for a 
number of years and knew the Legislature. During that time, there still was a 
caretaker Deputy Commissioner at the Department of Mental Health who couldn't 
do anything because the Governor had made the decision, "nobody needs to do 
anything: I 'm putting all of this in the Department of Health". This lasted almost 
two years. (lines 473-480) 
Lang-Ramirez related, "The Department of Mental Health . . .  just evaporated or got shifted 
over to TennCare Bureau . . .  So it wiped out a good core-like expertise of the Department" 
(lines 499-502). Blackburn added, 
They had no power, I mean, basically no role except to administer, oh maybe 
$17 . . .  $18 million dollars worth of block grant and different kinds of grant 
programs, and to run the state hospitals. That's it. Period. Everything else, 
Manny Martins or one of the eight TennCare directors, I can't remember exactly 
what sequence they came in, but one of them said, "We don"t need your help. 
We'll run this. " So the BHO just had a field day during that time. And I mean, 
that was a horrible time . . . . A lot of things that really happened, that happened 
during that time, that are irretrievable. I mean you never, never get back to 
where you were with the . . .  with some of that. (lines 505-513) 
In Blackburn's view, "The BHO was setting policy, was calling the shots, was deciding 
everything" (lines 491-494). 
When Elizabeth Rukeyser became the Commissioner of Mental Health, the 
situation changed. Blackburn related that, 
When Commissioner Rukeyser came, she negotiated with Manny Martins a 
memorandum of understanding, which was the first point at where the 
Department began to try to recover some power, or gain some authority over 
behavioral health. And so basically, they worked out an arrangement where they 
had all the responsibility . . .  authority over policy, and the only thing that the 
Department. .. that TennCare had responsibility for was the budget, the money. 
But they would have . . .  they couldn't necessarily veto what happened with the 
money, but they . . . at least they were advised of something that was going on 
there, or something, you know. So they had a lot more information, a lot more 
interface with the TennCare powers than they'd ever had. And they had, you 
know, authority to make certain decisions. For example, September. . .  well, 
probably about the second year, Rukeyser, Commissioner Rukeyser was there, 
the managed care company put out a memo saying, "We've decided we're not 
going to fund adult continuous treatment teams anymore. " Well we had . . .  you 
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talk about outcome data, we had enough to fill this room and that showed how 
effective they were at keeping people out of the hospital. And it was just a cost­
cutting measure that they, you know, they didn't feel they ought to be spending 
the kind of money they were spending to accomplish that. Just let them go to the 
hospital, I mean, we already got our 9 percent, 10 percent administrative fee; 
what do we care where they get the services. So Commissioner Rukeyser 
basically said, "No, you're not going to do this." And that is the first indication 
that the memorandum of understanding had produced a, you know, a change in 
the Department in that they could make decisions like that and enforce them. So 
that's one service that is still around. It's kind of on shaky ground, but it's still 
around. But I think some of the things that you're talking about [are] irretrievable. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 515-539) 
Less significant, but still an issue, was shuffling of the TennCare Bureau. When 
Don Sundquist was inaugurated in January of 1995, one of his first executive orders was 
to move the TennCare Bureau to the Department of Finance and Administration. In 
January of 1997 the TennCare Bureau was moved back to the Department of Health 
and subsequently in October of 1999 back under the Finance Department. 
Ill-Prepared Staff 
Manny Martins is the one individual whose experience with TennCare spans time 
in the administration of all three governors since the inception of TennCare. After 
helping to launch TennCare during the McWherter administration, Martins returned 
during the Sundquist administration as the Deputy Commissioner of Commerce and 
Industry where he was in charge of TennCare regulation for the express purpose of 
dealing with some of the struggling MCOs. Martins' assessment upon his return of 
TennCare management was , "we weren't managing it well from the MCO side; we 
weren't managing it well from the policy administration side" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 11, lines 227-228). Then when Mark Reynolds, the seventh 
TennCare Director during the Sundquist administration, departed, Martins again 
assumed the position of TennCare Director, a post he also held during the early days of 
the Bredesen administration to facilitate the transition between governors. When 
145 
Martins returned to TennCare, he noted, "management was in disarray. Middle 
management was essentially not coordinated" (transcript of recorded interview, lines 
244-245). 
In the original waiver application (McWherter, 1993), state officials outlined a plan 
to reorganize, but not otherwise change staff. The problem of this approach was that 
when the transition was made to the TennCare program (and later the TennCare 
Partners), significantly different staff requirements were imposed, requirements which 
state government was inappropriately staffed to fulfill. Many factors may have 
contributed to this issue. State employees are relatively protected. It is difficult to recruit 
managed care experts to state government because of the relatively low salaries and 
politics. Some state employees were ambivalent about, or even opposed to, the 
changes precipitated by the introduction of TennCare. 
David Manning remarked that, "State government had no experience in 
purchasing [emphasis added] health care services. State government had lots of 
experience in paying [emphasis added] for health care services" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 11, lines 242-243). He further reflected that, "the problem with . . .  
state government. . .  was that it did not have the capacity, nor does i t  have today, to be an 
intelligent purchaser of health care" (lines 255-256). 
Manny Martins elaborated, saying, 
You have to recognize that the Medicaid staff did not have a great deal of 
experience in managed care. In fact even the second time I came back, I was 
kind of appalled by the lack of understanding within top management of managed 
care systems and how they worked. So that was clearly an issue. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 403-406) 
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"Fighting Fires": A Pervasive Mentality 
The lack of agreement about priorities and the constant pressure to react to 
relevant and extraneous issues has been a key impediment to managing TennCare 
effectively. State officials and employees and MCO and BHO staff were frequently 
consumed with designing capable processes at the same time they were trying to get 
administration of the program in control .  Frustration with short-term thinking and a 
"fighting fires" mentality were expressed by interviewees both inside and out side of 
government. 
Gordon Bonnyman commented, 
Part of the problem is that TennCare has been a political footbal l since "98 and 
"99, relating to totally extraneous issues like whether we're going to have a state 
income tax or not. I mean, that shouldn't be that important to whether the service 
is being delivered to SED kids who are eligible for Medicaid in any event. But it 
has been because what we've seen is that year after year, people in charge with 
running [TennCare] go to work one day and find that the Governor, whoever the 
Governor might be at the moment, has just set some dramatic new policy 
direction that forces them to drop whatever they were doing and suddenly be in 
work groups, on task forces that are designing some new concept, or executing 
some new plan. And it's difficult to sustain any forward momentum around clear 
management objectives like drafting new contracts, bidding out the behavioral 
health services, monitoring compliance. Basic nuts and bolts sort of 
management gets neglected. We've seen it over and over again. It occurred in 
the Sundquist administration. It certainly happened within the past 15 months in 
the Bredesen administration. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 
25, lines 404-419) 
When referring to a work group created to improve the delivery of behavioral 
health care services to children under the auspices of the Department of Children 
Services as an example, Bonnyman expressed frustration that, 
If you have people in the State government who are tasked with trying to work on 
those issues and develop those systems, and suddenly Governor Bredesen says 
in a speech on February 17, 2004, at the Joint Session of the General Assembly, 
that says, "I'm going to take us off on some whole new area, and by the way, 
tomorrow I'm going to tell the Commissioner of Finance and Administration David 
Goetz to strip his department, the TennCare Bureau, the Department of Human 
Services, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, of all 
available middle managers to create task groups or work groups to work with 
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McKinsey and Company and who knows what other consultants to design a new 
TennCare Reform Program." Well, you know, you just shot your efforts in the 
head. And we've seen that happen over and over again across the 
administrations. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 446-
458) 
From a different perspective, Manny Martins recounted a similar frustration 
related to the consent decrees. He related having to, 
Divert resources to meet the meticulous requirements of [consent decrees], and 
that I think hurt us . . .  because you only have a certain amount of resources, and 
when you have to redirect those resources to meet what you consider to be from 
a management perspective ineffective, inefficient, tedious paperwork, then that 
does create a problem. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 
629-631) 
All Deals Are Off: Changing Players, Problems and Relationships 
A coalition of potential adversaries found common ground and a way to work 
together in designing and launching TennCare. The coalition was strained and 
eventually dissolved in the delivery of TennCare. 
It was during the watch of the Sundquist administration, after the turbulence of 
the implementation, that the tolerance for "start-up" problems expired and new refractory 
issues, including problems with MCO and BHO stability and performance and cost 
escalation became prominent. 
The Sundquist administration has been vilified for what happened with the 
TennCare program, despite the fact that they were dealing with intractable national 
issues and the residual effects of choices made to facilitate the compressed 
implementation. Nevertheless, the Sundquist administration did not make appropriate 
adjustments to move the program forward, and they made missteps that impeded 
progress. 
Prominent among the issues that became intolerable to the advocates and 
enrollees included problems with the administration of the drug formulary (laying the 
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groundwork for the Grier lawsuit) and burdensome prior approval processes. Turmoil in 
the management of the Sundquist administration was also an incendiary point. 
The cumulative frustrations with the administration of the TennCare program and 
the lack of meaningful progress in remediation eventually led to the demise of any 
agreement to be tolerant regarding "start-up" problems. There came a point when 
Bonnyman, Garr and others felt that they had tolerated the expected initial problems 
enough. Tony Garr related this history of the growing frustrations, 
During the first year of TennCare, the managed care organizations . . .  they were 
like the fox guarding the hen house. I f  someone had a problem because they 
couldn't get a service that they were supposed to get, and they were supposed to 
report that grievance to their MCO. And you know, at the end of the year when 
they're supposed to report how many grievances did you have, when someone 
like Access Med Plus, which was one of the most problematic of all the MCOs, 
report that maybe they had two grievances, you knew something was wrong. We 
as advocates knew something was wrong. We knew that a lot more people were 
not getting care than what was being reported. And so, after the first year and 
the way, you know, the waiver that the grievances . . .  the grievance procedure was 
established, we knew early on there needed to be a new method. And Gordon 
began working with the Sundquist administration trying to come up with a new 
grievance procedure, and there were lots of agreements. They executed an 
agreement, I think in '96, and "this is how it should work" that did not work very 
well. They came up with another agreement in '97 or in '98, a couple of years 
later, which actually, I think, began to work. And so now we have . . .  what 
happened, I think, is Judge Nixon realized that when you have a managed care 
organization, when they can make money by denying care, there needs to be a 
different process. You couldn't let the fox guard the hen house. And so at that 
point, and I can't remember exactly when it was, they set up . . .  there's going to 
be an independent unit at TennCare who will handle the grievances and then we 
have administrative law judge to decide over these agreements, 'cause what was 
happening is the grievances were going to the MCOs and they weren't going 
anywhere else there. The MCOs were dealing with these as complaints as 
opposed to grievances. And many times there was no record of these 
complaints. And so there was nothing to track or trace. And so at a point in time, 
there was an independent procedure that wa . . .  an independent body of a set-up 
in TennCare that began to see . . .  field procedures. And I think that happened in 
'96. Now what happened in '96 is that the State can intervene on behalf of the 
MCO where, and I 'm not sure, this is what you have to talk with Gordon about, 
the way that was working is that many times the State was actually doing the 
dirty work for the MCO. In other words, it really wasn't working. And finally there 
had to be a point where, you know, the State could not speak on behalf or for an 
MCO, that they had to act independent as the independent broker that, you 
know, these are services that are being sought by this MCO, now we need to 
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allow an independent voice. And also if the enrollee has a doctor that wants to 
weigh in on this, we need to let them weigh in. So a lot of times the only people 
who were making any of the decisions was the TennCare medical director and it 
wasn't anybody else involved. And so, I think what happened . . .  what finally 
came out of there, maybe it was in '98 or so, was really a very good grievance 
procedure well laid out. The only problem was around prescription drugs. They 
still couldn't figure that one out since that was a service that was being the most 
prescribed, and it wasn't a matter of dealing with thousands but millions of . . .  the 
State did not have the capacity to deal with all the grievance around prescription 
drugs. People were being denied; the appeals weren't going right, and so they 
had to . . .  this is where the Grier got into it, where there had to be a separate 
process that needed to be looking at. . .  around prescription drugs. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, January 19, lines 221-272). 
Adding to the frustrations and break-down of cooperation was a change in 
relationships and perceptions. The advocates and other like-minded individuals did not 
have the same cooperative working relationship with the Sundquist administration that 
had been cultivated with the McWherter administration. Tony Garr expressed some of 
these frustrations, saying, 
It's never been a good relationship after McWherter and Manning and David 
Manning left office. It's always been very antagonistic. Governor Sundquist 
appointed people like Rusty Seibert as TennCare director, who is an independent 
entrepreneur. . .  didn't know anything about public programs and rights of people. 
I think they did a lots of crazy, stupid things that just made it easy for Gordon to 
sue 'em. I mean, Rusty Seibert decided he was going to terminate people 
because he got this one group that could identify property that was zoned . . .  
Rusty had this thing that a lot of  people in TennCare lived out-of-state. So Rusty 
got this information . . .  a company did a contract with them and got them to find 
the names of everybody who was a TennCare enrollee if they owned property 
somewhere else. And so we found there were some cases where a person who 
really lived in Tennessee but they owned a piece of property in Alabama, well 
they ended up being terminated without being given a right to appeal. They were 
just terminated "cause you're not living in the State of Tennessee, but they were. 
So you had Rusty Seibert who was just doing some crazy idiotic things, who 
didn't understand the public programs. Then you had someone like Brian Lapps, 
who also was a, I don"t know what. .. maybe he was a right-wing apostle, thinking 
he was going to come in to cure the program and fix the program. Interesting 
thing about Brian Lapps is that he was on TennCare until he was hired by the 
State. Actually, Brian Lapps owed several months worth of . . .  he was actually 
overdue. He owed premiums. So all of the sudden, we had a TennCare Director 
appointed by the Governor, and we understand he was appointed by the 
Governor because he had written a letter and didn't do a whole lot of research on 
his background. And to everybody's embarrassment, he actually was on 
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TennCare at one time, which was not an embarrassment. The embarrassing 
part was that he owed the State of Tennessee thousands of dollars of past due 
premiums. TennCare premiums. And he was supposed to come in and clean up 
the Program? So anyway, the Sundquist administration, by their management 
decisions, they just created just a real problem. And not only were these people 
that they were hiring, you know, didn't understand public policy, but had no 
recognition that people had rights. And they just were making decisions that I 
think was contrary to the public interest and to the rights that were given to 
enrollees by Medicaid law. So just because we had an expansion population and 
many of the TennCare rules were waived, people's rights were not waived. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 19, lines 283-322) 
The growing embitterment culminated in the filing of all but one of the lawsuits that 
eventually led to the negotiation of the consent decrees that have in many ways 
characterized the breakdown between the state and the advocates. If the site had 
managed the TennCare program well and been responsive to beneficiary issues, it is 
unlikely that the state's authority would have been challenged in the courts. 
A Vicious Cycle 
Mismanagement contributed to the imposition of the consent decrees. In turn the 
consent decrees created a whole new version of mismanagement. This distressing 
cycle has adversely impacted all involved parties. 
In benefits administration, the most immediate needs relate to basic 
administrative processes and the interface between vendors (including MCOs and 
BHOs) and members and providers. In the industry it is said that you must be able to 
"block and tackle" before you can do anything else, meaning simply that basics come 
first. Examples of basic administrative processes include enrolling members, answering 
phones and responding to member and provider needs, educating providers and 
members, contracting with providers and paying providers. 
Because of the short timeframe, immaturity of managed care markets and 
companies in Tennessee, inexperience of state employees and the special needs of the 
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Medicaid population, the majority of failures and attention in the initial years focused on 
responding to problems created by not being ready to do the basics. I ll-prepared staff 
was overwhelmed. "Fighting fires" and being reactive, rather than proactive, too often 
characterized management efforts. "The short implementation timeframe required a 
focus on urgent administrative and oversight systems. Instead of preventing problems 
before they arose, TennCare systems in the first year dealt with problems after they 
arose, addressing most problems on a case-by-case basis" (Aizer, Gold, & Schoen, 
1999, p. 30). Although the reasons changed for this mentality over the years, the 
practice did not. 
A Missing Management Tool 
Information management, which requires sophisticated information management 
systems, is the currency of managed care. Since TennCare was implemented, the lack 
of information management has been a significant barrier to managing the program 
successfully. Different types of information are needed by different players. The state 
should have access to information management systems that facilitate program 
management and the management of their contracted vendors. In turn, MCOs and 
BHOs need systems that help them manage contracted providers, the care delivered 
and administer the benefit program. Both the state and many of the contracted vendors 
lacked needed information management capabilities. 
Data drives managed care in innumerable ways. Manny Martins envisioned the 
state using data in a variety of ways. He said, 
We knew that early on that we would need encounter information, diagnostic 
information, because we had to develop actuarial rates. We wanted to 
understand what was happening with the health care of people. We knew we 
wanted to look at health outcomes. We wanted to look at what MCOs were 
delivering the good care, what the health outcomes for . . .  patients in particular 
MCOs [were] . We had envisioned developing report cards that not only would 
rate the MCOs, but we would actually go farther and rate the providers, the 
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hospitals, things like, you know, who's surviving open heart surgery and who's 
not. And we were even looking at things back then like single medical records 
across the board. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 434-
445) 
When TennCare was implemented and for years afterward, the lack of good information 
has been a liability. Martins explained, 
We patched a MMIS Medicaid system to actually implement TennCare. That 
system was never intended to be the system to transition into managed care. 
When I came back the second time whenever it was ten years later, I was 
shocked to see the same patched-up system being utilized by TennCare with 
modifications. (lines 445-452) 
He concluded, "the idea of the patched-up system and keeping that system as the 
ongoing legacy system for TennCare was the wrong management decision to make. 
When the State did that, I think it created a significant issue for the program" (lines 473-
477). 
Dr. Neel agreed, saying that there was a "hodge-podge of systems" and that 
"there was no integration . . . . All systems within all agencies . . .  none of them were 
integrated" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 216, 221-224). 
David Manning concurred that not having an adequate information management 
system was "a major flaw". He related that, 
It's a major problem that Bredesen inherited, but unfortunately [the 
administration] has not done a great deal to resolve. When we started 
TennCare, we did it with the old Medicaid system. We didn't have a choice. But 
one of the things we said to the incoming Sundquist administration is your top 
priority ought to be getting a state-of-the-art information system in place. They 
couldn't keep anybody in place long enough to do it. They had so many 
directors. And then, and I'm not sure . . .  I was never sure how much they focused 
on . . .  but they had a . . .  you know, late in the administration, just before . . .  
sometime before Manny went back over there, they got involved in the system 
that is now up and running, I think. And I think it's a better system, and it may 
have the potential to be the kind of analytical system that they need. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 576-591) 
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Upgrading the information management systems to meet the demand of the 
complexity of TennCare program was a stated priority of the Sundquist administration, 
but the group was unable to transition to a new system until very late in their second 
term. According to Neel, 
We kept trying to craft an RFP. And it was . . .  I 'll just give you an example. When 
we first started this . . .  I was under a lot of pressure down on the Plaza to select a 
certain firm to do the RFP because of people who were in that firm. It was only 
$35 million more in the bid than was the case with the lower bid of a very 
competent company . . .  it was that sort of pressure. I t  took us a long time, as you 
can imagine, that's a very comprehensive project. And the bill kept rising . . . . We 
put it in place the year before we left. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
March 15, lines 205-213) 
Despite system upgrades, even today, there is little integration across systems or 
even within systems. Lack of data integration is both a root cause and a symptom of the 
problem of fragmentation that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
David Manning also relayed that there is wide variation in the information 
capabilities across contracted MCOs. He said, 
I think Blue Cross is closer to a having the data infrastructure, more than 
anybody else. I would suspect that John Deere and a few of the folks here who 
have been serious about this business for a long time have good information 
systems, although I've seen a few that have existed for a long time and have 
lousy information systems. CIGNA is an excellent example. But I think that you 
have to put into place that kind of data, and I think . . .  it's not the same system that 
the MCOs should have. But this system to be able to . . .  analyze what's going on, 
to be able to project, to be able to monitor the kinds of quality issues that you 
ought to be able to monitor, to be able to help MCOs, and be able to effectively 
look about strategies that may help you contain costs as you do contracts. And 
the vision we had . . .  when TennCare began, that would have been the major role 
of the State, and that's a piece of it that has never come together, and it's 
unfortunate because . . .  I think that's one of the key problems. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 596-609) 
Fallout from the lack of an information technology infrastructure in TennCare took 
many forms. During the early days of TennCare, there was a failure to collect $37 
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million in TennCare enrollees because of a backlog of applications and the failure to 
distribute payment booklets. 
There was other fallout related to enrollment. In October 1993, prior to the 
original TennCare waiver being approved, enrollment forms were sent to 714,000 
Medicaid beneficiaries. No MCOs were yet under contract. Several identified MCOs 
subsequently elected not to participate in TennCare and provider panels had not yet 
been assembled. In addition, more than 40% of the enrollment forms were not returned. 
Because of these factors, a second enrollment was conducted in December 1993 (Mirvis 
et al., 1995). 
Financial Risk and Management 
It is impossible to talk about TennCare or the TennCare Partners program 
without talking about program funding and costs. Finances and financial management 
are an inextricable part of the story. Although this study does not focus on financial 
concerns, it is impossible to ignore the impact that financial influences have had on 
TennCare and TennCare Partners and how financial issues have dominated the 
discourse about TennCare. Although TennCare has accomplished many of the original 
goals regarding access and coverages, these accomplishments have been 
overshadowed and impeded by financial concerns. Financial concerns were a primary 
driver in the inception of TennCare, just as they were in the radical cuts in eligibility and 
coverages instituted by the Bredesen administration in 2005. 
The original TennCare proposal was based on financial assumptions that have 
been called into question. Few questioned Governor Bredesen's assertion in late 2003, 
following the release of the first McKinsey report, that the state of Tennessee could no 
longer afford the cost of the TennCare as it existed. Whether poor financial performance 
or prognosis is an indicator of poor design, poor delivery or some combination is 
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debatable. What is important for this study is how financial concerns have either caused 
or resulted from issues discussed in this study. What also is apparent is that financial 
concerns (along with sustainability) have been the most significant factor in both the 
genesis and recent revamping of TennCare. Lack of experience and unrealistic 
expectations have been significant deterrents. 
Capitation, Risk-Sharing and Global Budgeting Strategies 
In an effort to control cost escalation and be able to afford the cost of the addition 
of new Medicaid beneficiaries and expanded benefit coverages, the state intended to put 
the MCOs, at later the BHOs, at full risk through capitated payments. In addition, the 
state initially developed a global budget. Overlaid over these requirements was the 
federal government's requirement of budget neutrality. Unfortunately, the history of 
MCO and BHO risk has been disappointing. By most accounts, the original global 
budget was set too low, and, by some accounts, the methodology and adjustments used 
to create the budget were unsound. 
Regarding the MCOs and risk assumption, David Manning recalled, 
We contracted with them on two bases, one of two bases. One was an "at-risk", 
and the other was basically an ASO-type arrangement that we would allow to 
occur for the first few years and then it would have to transition to an "at-risk". 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11) 
In addition to the assignment of risk, the state made adjustments to address 
longstanding issues with health care costs in the state, as well as projected issues. 
Issues included cost of the uninsured, cost-shifting due to uncompensated care, "patient 
dumping", charity care and disproportionate shares payments to traditional safety net 
facilities. 
According to Mirvis, Bailey and Chang (2002), 
The global budget was initially set at the then-current Medicaid budget, which 
was deemed sufficient to support an expanded population in a healthcare system 
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functioning under managed care principles. Capitation rates were then 
determined administratively by, in essence, dividing the previous Medicaid 
budget by the number of anticipated enrollees. This rate was discounted by 
20.4% to consider ongoing charity care; by 1. 7% for local governments' 
contributions to health care; and by 3.9% for the TennCare mandated cost­
sharing. (p. 61) 
Additionally the state put in place processes to monitor "patient dumping". The 
state, according to Manny Martins, wanted to be proactive in managing instances of 
either employers or the insurance industry state abandoning their accountabilities to the 
state. He related that, 
We were very concerned, as part of our approach, that there might be some 
shifting of the employer-based system to TennCare if we established a program 
like TennCare that covered the uninsured/uninsurable population. And we were 
also concerned that insurance companies might also begin dumping into the 
market. So as part of that process of going to the Federal government through 
the waiver, we tried to set up some approaches to deal with those kinds of things. 
We said that we would look at employer-sponsored health insurance on an 
annual basis and develop a baseline; and if we saw that dropping, we would cut 
off enrollment to the uninsured/uninsurable population. And we also initially 
contracted with, I think, the Farm Bureau, if my memory serves me right, to 
review all applications ... to determine whether the individual was eligible for 
employer-based insurance. So anytime we got an application, it would have 
been sent to our contractor. The contractor would verify whether the person was 
employed, could get insurance through their employer or not; and based on that, 
we would make eligibility determinations. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
March 11, lines 141-154) 
No other informants spoke of the process Martins described. 
When the global budget was created, the state took a novel, and controversial, 
approach to handling charity care. According to Manny Martins, 
We also recognized that within the State, there was a great deal of charity care 
funding that was out there, that was being utilized by the health care system ... . 
We knew, as an example, that the uninsured/uninsurable were not paying for that 
service . . .  and that that was then earmarked or identified by hospitals largely as 
charity care . . . .  We recognized that the cost of that is built into the rates, so it had 
been cost-shifted to rates ... . We recognized that by taking on the 
uninsured/uninsurable population, we would suddenly be paying again for that 
cost-shifted charity care. So we identified that charity care in the system, and we 
discounted our actuarial rates by the amount of that charity care in the system, 
recognizing that we didn't want to pay twice for the care. That was probably 
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something that was very innovative, that most people to this day do not 
understand. And that became one of the ways we funded the program. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 157-170. 
Another issue the state had to' deal with in the creation of the original TennCare 
budget was the disproportionate share payments. When the TennCare budget was 
created, "the idea was that if you cover everybody or if you insure everybody that you no 
longer have to make disproportionate payment shares to the hospitals" (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 04, lines 231-234). This approach became problematic 
because of the burden of uncompensated care rendered to residents of other states. Dr. 
Vladeck recalled that in late 1994, the Regional Medical Center in Memphis began 
complaining. He explained, 
And they did have a problem because they provide a lot of uncompensated care 
to Mississippi residents and Arkansas residents. Under the old system, under 
the old DSH-subsidies, they had been treated very generously and they were a 
major TennCare provider, obviously. They didn't have any complaint against the 
Tennessee TennCare residents, but they still have this big hole in their finances 
from the uncompensated care of the out-of-state residents. And we went back 
and forth. Manning . . .  was still in Finance at the time, and he didn't want to do 
anything for them. And there were some [who said] "That's Memphis. That's 
Harold Ford territory. We're not . . .  we don't like them anyway," and you know, of 
course Congressman Ford was on the Ways and Means Committee so he was 
on our case. And then that sort of dragged out for a while. And then you got 
U.T.-Chattanooga came in with a complaint that there was no subsidy for the 
teaching stuff, and so the UT folks got organized and started banging on 
Manning, and the people in Nashville. So finally we modified the Program to 
make some additional sort of teaching, safety net hospital payments. 
Inevitable Issues and Criticism 
Numerous interviewees commented on specifics about how the TennCare 
budget was derived. Dr. Warren Neel was particularly critical of how the budget was 
developed, saying, "[the McWherter administration, particularly David Manning] had 
absolutely no experience in taking a new program with an expanded population and 
doing any sort of cost trends. They had no actuarial studies behind it" (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, March 15, lines 82-84). Mirvis, Bailey and Chang (2002) also 
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decried the lack of adequate reference points in developing the budget, saying, "Rates 
were set administratively without assessing market conditions by competitive bidding or 
price negotiations" (p. 65). 
Apparently budget adjustments were not made for the richness of the TennCare 
benefits package either. In addition to the required mandatory services (including 
inpatient, outpatient, professional and home health care services), the TennCare 
program also includes pharmacy, behavioral health, dental and long term care services. 
The TennCare program, unlike the Medicaid program in place previously (or most 
private plans), has minimal or no benefit limits. Additionally, the TennCare program had 
no formulary or POL in place from the year 2000 through most of 2003. 
During the Sundquist administration there was an attempt to limit the scope of 
plan coverages. These efforts ultimately failed. The original TennCare waiver was 
extended twice. In 2002, the Sundquist administration submitted a new waiver 
application, called TennCare I I. This waiver outlined a two-tiered benefit design in which 
the traditional Medicaid population's benefit would be unchanged and those in the 
expansion population would be reduced. This plan was abandoned in mid-2003 as part 
of a legal settlement. 
In addition to having a rich plan design in TennCare, the number of Tennessee 
citizens covered by the plan is noteworthy. In FY 2001 28 percent of Tennessee's 
population was enrolled in TennCare. This gives Tennessee, along with the District of 
Columbia, the distinction of being number one in this category in the nation (Kaiser 
statehealthfacts.org). 
Alarming Sequelae 
Lack of experience hindered appropriate risk allocation more than any one factor. 
The state was inexperienced with capitation and so were the majority of the MCOs. 
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Inexperience led to the bankruptcies of Xanthus, Access Med Plus and Universal. 
Access Med Plus, the largest of the TennCare MCOs at the time, was shut down by the 
state in late 2001 because of a negative net worth of $54 million. In 1999 the state took 
over the day-to-day operations of Xanthus. This plan was shut down in August of 2003 
after it was determined that the plan's negative net worth was $77 million. Another small 
TennCare MCO, Universal Care, was closed in June 2003 because of a negative net 
worth of $54 million. In response to these events, the state assumed accountability for 
setting provider rates in 2000. Before this time, provider rates were highly variable 
across the state and across vendors. In 2002 the state then eliminated all risk-sharing 
provisions in the MCO contracts. Similar ASO contractual arrangements are also seen 
in one of the BHO contracts and the pharmacy and dental benefit manager contracts. 
The Bredesen administration has announced plans to reinstitute risk into the MCO 
contracts as a part of their overall reform strategy. 
The Projections 
In the McKinsey and Company report (2003), it is projected that total Medicaid 
costs of $6.9 million ($2.1 million in state spending) for FY 2003 will increase to $11.8 
billion total and state spending of $3. 7 to $3.8 billion in 2008. The percent of total state 
spending for TennCare is projected to increase from a 2003 level of 25 percent to 34 to 
40 percent in 2008. The primary drivers of the projected increases are pharmaceuticals, 
professional services and outpatient services cost increases, as well as increased 
enrollment. The McKinsey and Company attributes the projected growth in these 
categories to "TennCare's program design, the general health care environment and 
some aspects of program execution" (p.19). 
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Reflections on the Theme of Management 
The initial chaos that members of the McWherter administration and their allies 
accepted in exchange for the promise of TennCare was more extensive and damaging 
than anticipated. Even more formidable and far-reaching was the weak infrastructure 
which could not bear the weight of the ambitions of the program or the speed of change. 
Whether a concerted, well-managed and sustained strategy for dealing with the initial 
fallout and remediating deficiencies in state leadership and staffing, the MCOs and 
information technology could overcome these gaps will never be known. The 
unfortunate legacy of TennCare is one of mismanagement. The results of financial 
mismanagement have been the most damaging to the program as far as public 
perception and viability, although it will be argued later that management of some of the 
cost escalators is out of the control of the state of Tennessee and indicative of a more 
systemic national problem. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE THEME OF FRAGMENTATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ON 
THE STUDY FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The third theme that is prominent in the telling of the TennCare narrative is 
fragmentation. A fragment is a broken-off or incomplete part (Merriam-Webster's, 2000). 
Fragmentation, the act or process of making something fragmentary, denies the intrinsic 
and synergistic value of wholeness. There are multiple instances of deliberate 
fragmentation of the TennCare program beginning with the "carve-out" of the behavioral 
health care and pharmacy programs. Another sequela of fragmentation is an over­
emphasis on one fragment to the detriment or exclusion of other parts of the whole. A 
classic example of this is case management in the TennCare Partners program. A 
fragment, detached from the whole, is disconnected. In many respects the state's 
management of the BHOs was detached and disconnected from the basic tenets of 
performance management. The state's "hands-off'' approach created a situation where 
actions were not aligned with purpose. 
Elements of fragmentation which will be discussed include plan administration, 
care delivery and information management. The primary focus of this discussion on 
fragmentation will be the TennCare Partners program. 
Plan Administration 
Plan administration focuses on all non-care delivery functions related to selection 
and management of the BHOs, and performance of the state and the BHOs. In this 
section, descriptive information and commentary will be presented about how TennCare 
Partners started and evolved over time. 
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The Advent of TennCare Partners: The Behavioral Health Carve-Out 
When TennCare was first being developed by the McWherter administration, the 
intent was to have behavioral health care fully integrated with medical care and to have 
a single vendor accountable for the delivery of both medical and behavioral health care 
services. This plan was derailed abruptly, and temporarily the McWherter administration 
thought, by opposition to the plan (Chang et al . ,  1 998) . 
Dick Blackburn shared his thoughts on the beginnings of the carve-out when he 
commented that the partial carve-out was an "after-thought" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, January 25, line 58) . He related that, 
There was never any intention . . .  on the part of the McWherter administration to 
put mental health into the waiver demonstration because a great deal of work 
had happened between the previous . . .  three years; and we were two and a half 
years into what was called "the Mental Health Master Plan" . . .  which over that 
period of time they'd put $27 million dol lars into the mental health system. And at 
that time, that was a lot of money . . . . That had been done through selling off the 
state hospital property in Nashville, and using part of the proceeds to build a 
new, more modern acute care facility for the state hospital there, and to close 
down some of the beds and shift the operating dol lars that had gone into those 
beds into the community. So . . . everybody was happy with how that was working. 
We added some Medicaid-optional programs, the case management option, and 
the rehabilitation option, and were able, with the new state dollars, to draw down 
additional Federal dol lars for mental health and put a lot of new services in place. 
So everybody was happy, but somewhere in the negotiations [to get] the Federal 
"powers-that-be" to agree to put as much Federal money into Tennessee as was 
being requested, there had to be some more state money to match what we were 
asking for . . . . Most of us feel that the state mental health dol lars . . . that was what 
they offered up. So after the fact, to the surprise of everyone including . . .  the 
commissioner and the assistant commissioner to the department, we learned that 
upon the approval of the waiver that mental health was, in fact, included. (lines 
58-77) 
The influence of the Federal government in the decision to implement the partial carve­
out initially was not corroborated by other sources. 
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Kelly Lang-Ramirez also noted that, "substance abuse is even more of an after­
thought, thrown in at the last minute" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, 
line 79). Blackburn also related that, 
There had been absolutely no thinking at all about how to transition the Master 
Plan to managed care, there was a two-year interim period before anything really 
happened. They had to complete a procurement process to get the behavioral 
health organizations in place. They had to design the benefit package, and what 
they said initially was . . . the state Medicaid and financial people said, "Well, if this 
will just improve the Master Plan, we'll just duplicate the Master Plan benefit 
structure; but we'll administer it through managed care, and there will be all these 
additional sophisticated providers that are much better than mental health 
centers that will be coming in to Tennessee and doing all these wonderful 
things." So they sold families and consumers on that basis and legislators and 
everybody else. So, but there was a . . .  for two years we . . .  there was no Partners 
program. We just billed the Department of Mental Health instead of Medicaid, 
the way we had been doing, at the rates that were in place in '93 that were based 
on '92 costs and billed in part on a fee-for-service basis, and then they billed 
TennCare . . . . That's the way we operated for two years. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, January 25, lines 93-110) 
Several other factors led to the decision by the McWherter administration to 
partially carve-out behavioral health care services. Although the MCOs said they were 
willing to accept capitated payments, they were concerned about how the global rate 
was derived and whether it was adequate. Questions about how mental health costs 
were projected were particularly prominent. The five state regional mental health 
institutes (RMHls) and the community mental health centers (CMHCs), who were the 
key safety net providers for the most vulnerable populations, including children with SED 
and SPMI adults, were most concerned. Among the reasons causing concern for these 
players were the prospect of waning influence of the Tennessee Department of Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) and the CMHCs, the increasing influence of 
managed care and the possibility of adverse selection for safety net providers and 
favorable selection for the MCOs (Chang et al. , 1998). Assumptions about selection 
were based on the projection that the SPMI and SED populations would continue to use 
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the traditional safety net providers and other, less severely i l l  patients, would use private 
providers. 
Because of these factors, TennCare was implemented with a partial carve-out of 
behavioral health care services. In this arrangement, the TDMHMR contracted with the 
five state-run regional mental health hospitals and 26 community mental health centers, 
the traditional safety net providers, for the provision of care for seriously and persistently 
mentally il l adults and children with SEO. Behavioral health services for all other 
populations were initial ly provided by the MCOs (Chang, et al, 1998; Conover & Davies, 
2000; Saunders & Heflinger, 2003). 
Funding of the partial carve-out had two components. The state, through the 
TOMHMR, funded services for SPMI adults and SEO children through direct grants and 
contracts with the RMHls and CMHCs and through fee-for-service payments to private 
providers. For all other populations, the MCOs either directly managed behavioral 
health care or subcontracted with a BHO with funding from the global capitated rate 
(Chang et al., 1998). 
For the behavioral health care services that were not part of the carve-out, the 
MCOs subcontracted with BHOs to manage the delivery of health care benefits or the 
benefits were managed directly by the MCO. Either way, the MCOs retained ultimate 
accountabil ity and risk. 
The goal of the McWherter administration was to integrate all behavioral health 
care services into the TennCare program. Although HCFA approved a waiver in 
November of 1994 to integrate care for SPMI adults and SEO children into the MCOs 
with the stipulation that the MCOs contract with approved BHOs, this was not 
accomplished before the administration ended. 
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When Governor Sundquist was inaugurated in January, 1995, a decision was 
made by his administration to delay the implementation of the plan outlined in the 
November 1994 waiver and to make revisions to the proposed plan. The revised plan 
the Sundquist administration submitted (Tennessee Department of Mental Health & 
Mental Retardation, 1995) for approval was significantly different. The proposal for a full 
carve-out of all behavioral health care services for all TennCare enrollees, was approved 
though and implemented July 1, 1996 (Conover & Davies, 2000). How this change was 
accomplished is very telling. The launching of the new plan, called TennCare Partners, 
marked the beginning of an unstable and unfortunate period of time. The strategy used 
by the state to "select" the BHOs, the state"s hands-off approach and the emergence of 
Magellan as the primary vendor created a shameful level of neglect and chaos for the 
most needy beneficiaries in the state of Tennessee. TennCare was created with 
minimal external influence (Chang et al. . ,  1998). The same can not be said for 
TennCare Partners. Many groups weighed-in on the program design and it appears that 
the Sundquist administration was influenced by this input. Table 11 provides a history of 
behavioral health care in TennCare. 
A Flawed Contracting and Implementation Strategy 
History repeated itself with the implementation of TennCare Partners. TennCare 
Partners was implemented eight months after the submission of the necessary waiver 
and only three months after the program was approved by HCFA. Chang et al. (1998) 
noted that TennCare Partners "started chaotically and soon deteriorated" (p. 864). The 
way the state contracted with the BHOs contributed to the operational problems seen 
when TennCare Partners was implemented. 
166 
Table 1 1 :  Behavioral Health Care H istory in  TennCare 
Date · 1 : Event 
. . .  
:'.: . .  : . .. .. .· 
1 /1 /94 TennCare implemented with a partial carve-out of behavioral health care services: 
TDMHMR contracted with five state-run regional mental health centers and 26 CMHCs for 
the provision of care to SPMI adults and SEO children; behavioral health care services for 
al other populations was provided by MCOs (Chang, et al . ,  1 998; Conover & Davies, 
2000; Saunders & Heflinger, 2003). 
1 1 /94 HCFA approves a waiver submitted by the McWherter admin istration to integrate all 
behavioral health care services into the TennCare program (Conover & Davies, 2000). 
1/95 Governor Sundquist inaugurated; decision made to delay implementation of plan 
approved 1 1 /94 and make programmatic revisions {Conover & Davies, 2000) 
9/95 Revised plan submitted to HCFA (Tennessee Department of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 1 995). 
1 /96 Revised plan approved by HCFA (Chang, et al. ,  1 998). 
3/96 After a bid process, state signs risk contracts with five BHOs (Merit Behavioral Health 
Care, Tennessee Behavioral Health, Greenspring, Value Options and Columbia HCA. 
5/96 At the state's urging, the five BHOs are consolidated into two, Tennessee Behavioral 
Health Care (which consisted of Merit Behavioral Health Care and Tennessee Behavioral 
Health*) and Premier (consisting of the three other companies). 
7/1/96 TennCare Partners implemented. 
7/98 Pharmacy benefits for TennCare and TennCare Partners carved-out to a separate entity. 
6/03 Mobile crisis services carved-out to a separate vendor. 
* Tennessee Behavioral Health (TBH) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Preferred Health Partnership (PHP); PHP is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Covenant Health. TBH had a contract with Merit Behavioral Health of Tennessee to 
perform all administrative, management, financial and operational functions of TBH. 
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Merit Behavioral Care, Tennessee Behavioral Health, Greenspring, Value Options and 
Columbia HCA. Two months later, at the state's urging, the five consolidated into two for 
the TennCare Partners business. The first BHO, consisting of Merit Behavioral Care 
and Tennessee Behavioral Health, was called Tennessee Behavioral Health (TBH). The 
second, called Premier, consisted of the other three companies. The consolidation was 
designed to minimize the risk of adverse selection (a risk that grows as population size 
decreases) and create administrative efficiencies while still maintaining some 
competitive tension. Both of the BHOs were offered statewide. The financial terms for 
TBH and Premier differed. The TBH contract was partial risk and the Premier contract 
was ASO. 
Ann Boughtin, who was serving as the General Manager of Magellan Health 
Services (Magellan is the holding company for all of the TennCare Partners BHOs; 
information on Magellan follows) for the TennCare Partners Program when she was 
interviewed (she has subsequently left Magellan) offered this telling of the contracting 
process, 
In '96 the TennCare Partners [contract] was awarded to five Behavioral Health 
Organizations. About two months before the "go live" date of July 1, "96, the 
State determined that there were too many points of interface between the 
Behavioral Health Organizations and the MCOs. So they asked that the 
companies pick partners so that there would only be two Behavioral Health 
Organizations. At that point, Merit Behavioral Care and Tennessee Behavioral 
Health formed a partnership; and Greenspring, which is the legacy company of 
Magellan Health Services, Greenspring partnered with I think it was Value . . .  
Options, . . .  HCA and Foundations. So when we went live July 1 st, we had two 
companies whose names were known as Premier Behavioral Health, which was 
the three companies, and Tennessee Behavioral Health, which was the other two 
companies. Those contracts remained in place until an RFP process was 
initiated in the fall of 2003. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, 
lines 39-50) 
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The state originally planned to have each of the MCOs contract with one of the 
five selected BHOs. Because of the complexity of this approach, the state engineered 
the creation of two hybrid BHOs. Each MCO was assigned to one of the two newly 
created BHOs; participants were required to enroll in the BHO assigned to their selected 
MCO. Enrollees were not required to make an annual BHO selection, as they did for 
MCOs. This blunting of competitive pressures was initially an issue. Over time the issue 
became moot as will be discussed in a later section. The contrived construction of two 
BHOs, each composed of traditional competitors, was problematic from its inception and 
did not meet two of the three objectives outlined in the original TennCare waiver related 
to efficiencies and competition over time, nor did subsequent contracts. Gordon 
Bonnyman shared his view on the consolidation of the five BHO bidders when he 
projected the state saying, "we're not going to have [five] different vendors in 
here . . . . We're going to oversee a "shot-gun wedding" and require these [five] to merge 
into two consortiums" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 271-
273). 
Concerns about administrative efficiencies led to the creation of a company 
called AdvoCare. When Greenspring, Value Options and HCA came together they 
agreed to create a free-standing entity to provide all administrative services to their 
BHO, Premier. This free-standing entity, AdvoCare, was created as a subsidiary of 
Greenspring. AdvoCare today is a Magellan entity that both Premier and TBH pay an 
administrative fee to essentially run the two BHOs (personal communication via phone 
with R. Petrella, 2005, August 09). 
The consolidation of the competitors into two state-wide BHOs created a new 
cadre of difficult problems. There were questions about which of the provider networks 
would be used, which risk contracts would be honored and how plans would be 
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administered. Bonnyman observed that, "They had different corporate cultures. They 
had different business models. They had different computer systems. They were 
competitors, and suddenly they were supposed to be partners. It was a very ill­
conceived sort of thing" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 273-
277). 
None of the CMHCs or RMHls singularly or collaboratively was able to meet the 
requirements to be a BHO. To offer some protection for these providers, the state 
designated them as "essential providers" and required that that each BHO contract with 
them. The CMHCs were not savvy about managed care or negotiating contracts with 
national companies. In a move to protect their interests and protect their viability, the 
CMHCs turned to their trade organization, the Tennessee Association of Mental Health 
Organizations (TAMHO). What happened after this was described by Gordon 
Bonnyman, 
The Community Mental Health Centers, which were going to be providing the 
basic network of services, had been bargaining through their trade association 
with the plans. At [this] point Columbia HCA, which plays hardball and played 
hardball, and was involved in one of the major entities in Premier . . .  made a 
complaint to State officials about antitrust violations, and not just civil antitrust. 
This is criminal antitrust. So there's a grand jury investigation in Memphis, and 
suddenly the executives in the trade association and their member team of 
mental health centers found themselves the target of a criminal investigation. I 
mean, you talk about playing hardball . . .  you took relatively unsophisticated non­
profit agencies that were having to learn how to now enter into very complex 
contracts with much bigger, tougher, more experienced business entities, with 
their major revenue streams on the line, this is a very challenging environment. 
Suddenly they couldn't talk to each other. They couldn't talk to their trade 
association. It just gave the whip hand to the Behavioral Health Organizations, 
these new conglomerates. And as a result, those contracts that were thrown 
together were pretty much imposed on the Community Mental Health Centers. 
There's not much of a "give-and-take" that one would have expected, and that 
would have been better. . . . The gestation of TennCare Partners was really 
unfortunate. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 25, lines 278-299) 
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Added to these issues, again, was a short lead time. Organizations that opposed 
the TennCare Partners' abbreviated implementation timetable included the Tennessee 
Medical Association, the Tennessee Association of Family Physicians and Tennessee 
Alliance for the Mentally Il l (TAMI). Unlike as was seen with the rapid implementation of 
TennCare, few national groups leveraged complaints about TennCare Partners and no 
lawsuits were filed to block the program's implementation (Chang et al . . , 1998). 
Dr. Bruce Vladeck offered one explanation concerning the speedy 
implementation. He said, 
There was time pressure because there was a court order relative to 
deinstitutionalizing the State hospital ,  the big State hospital [Arl ington] . And [the 
carve-out] was going to be the vehicle through which they provided services to 
the SPMI population that was being communally relocated from the State 
hospital . . .  They had had a . . .  very limited bidding process for the carve-out, and 
we weren't very happy or very comfortable with how all that had gone or the firms 
that got the contract. But it had been technically not in violation of any of our 
rules, just by a l ittle bit. . . .  Sundquist was hearing from the losing competitors or 
other folks . . .  they knew about and really sort of wanted to rebid it, but there was 
time pressure because of the court order on the deinstitutionalization, so I think 
that's what caused the implementation date to be exactly what it was. (transcript 
of recorded interview, 2005, March 4, l ines 272-291) 
Regarding the TennCare Partners program following the hasty implementation, 
Dr. Bruce Vladeck said, 
It just flat out didn't work. The plans [BHOs], first of al l, didn't do what they 
promised to do . . . . They didn't have the capacity to meet the needs. But they had 
also committed themselves to contracting with the Community Mental Health 
Centers, who are the primary providers, and then making sure that patients who 
had been primarily . . .  patients of Community Mental Health Centers would stay in 
that system, and they didn't do it . They didn't turn in the contracts. They didn't 
follow up on it. They just didn't do it. And so patients continue to show up at the 
Community Mental Health Centers who now [had] no way of getting paid. 
(transcript of recorded interview 2005, March 4, lines 292-300) 
Governor Sundquist concurred that the rapid TennCare Partners start-up was 
related to a judicial decree. He said, "I don't know what you can do about the federal 
judges . . . . We were in office two weeks when we got the Arlington decision. Ned 
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[McWherter] told me it was going to happen" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
March 15, lines 780-782). The Arlington decision called for the deinstitutionalization of 
residents of a state-run development center. 
The Use of Carve-Outs 
Full carve-outs can create a host of problems that impact patient outcomes and 
hinder efficient and effective management. There are strategies that can be employed 
for minimizing these adverse effects, but few were used in TennCare Partners. 
Carve-outs can disrupt holistic care. According to Manny Martins, a carved-out 
behavioral health care program "tends to take the individual apart" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, March 04, lines 203-204). He explained, 
A big deal of mental health issues are found in your primary care visits. And 
suddenly with the carve-out, and actually just to this day, you have the BHO 
saying, "Well, that's not a mental health responsibility." You have the primary 
care physicians dealing with some of the mental health issues and . . .  prescribing 
psychotropic drugs. There's a big question as to what is a mental health service 
and what is a primary care service, and who's paying for what. When you split it 
like that, you have two pieces and points of responsibility. I kind of liken it to the 
days when I first came into public health years ago. We had different clinic days 
in local health departments. We'd have a sexually disease transmitted day. 
We'd have a maternal and child health day. We'd have a nutrition day. And it's 
almost like you carve the person apart, and you can't really do that and be 
effective and efficient in your delivery system. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, March 04, lines 206-216) 
Carve-outs also diffuse risk. David Manning cited this as a concern in his 
opposition to the full carve-out, saying, 
I thought the carve-out was a major mistake. I still think it was a major mistake. 
had a little bit of experience on . . .  the BHO carve-out, when I was working at 
Columbia HCA, after I left State government. Columbia HCA owned a piece of, 
actually owned a BHO that [submitted a proposal] when the Sundquist 
administration made the decision to carve [behavioral health care] out. [The 
Sundquist administration] made two mistakes. First was the mistake was to do it. 
I have believed for a long time, and I still believe, that a great deal of the acute 
care that is consumed in this country is consumed for behavioral 
reasons . . . .  Symptoms that are treated medically . . .  really have a behavioral basis 
and that you can never truly incentivize the system to do what it should do to try 
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to address those kinds of issues if you carve the liability out and put it over 
here . . . . So if I've got the medical risk, my goal now is to convince somebody that I 
want to move you over here into this other pool, and then I can wash my hands 
of you. I really think that was wrong, and that's the reason we didn't do it that 
way when we set TennCare up. We said that [the MCOs] had to, within a 
reasonable period of time, contract with a qualified organization, a Behavioral 
Health Organization, to manage the care, but under their contract, not under a 
separate contract. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 11, lines 614-
634) 
Gordon Bonnyman expressed similar concern, saying, 
My own view is that the concept of managed care is that you have an entity that 
is responsible for delivering services and producing outcomes, and you make 
payments to that entity, and then you hold it accountable for those outcomes. 
Obviously every time you do a carve-out, you weaken the ability to hold any 
single entity responsible, and you create incentives for cost-shifting and distortion 
of services at the boundaries between your different contractors. And so I'm 
generally skeptical about the wisdom of different carve-outs. If you're going to do 
managed care, you ought to hold a single entity responsible in my view. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 05, February 25, lines 260-267) 
David Manning was blunter in his summation of the full carve-out. He said, 
"There is no accountability, and there's the problem" (transcript of a recorded interview, 
2005, March 11, line 674). 
Fragments of a Fragment 
On January 1, 1998, the TennCare Partners program was further fractured when 
the state carved-out pharmacy benefits. One of the reasons given to support the 
strategy of using a specialty carve-out, such as a BHO or pharmacy benefit manager 
(PBM), is the need for specialized management expertise. Yet because the BHOs "do 
not manage pharmacy in any way" (transcript of recorded interview with A. Boughtin, 
2005, February 25, lines 617-618), accountability is diffused and expertise is not 
leveraged to maximize patient outcomes. Pharmacy management is completely 
dissociated from behavioral health care management. The BHOs bear no financial risk 
for the use of psychotropic drugs and the BHOs have no access to pharmacy data. 
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Since so much behavioral health treatment integrates the use of psychotropic drugs, this 
disconnect is a concern. 
The need for specialized behavioral health care management of 
psychopharmacology was illustrated in a recent study by Cooper, Hickson, Fuchs, 
Arbogast and Ray (2005). In their study, these researchers showed that "the proportion 
of TennCare children who were new users of anti-psychotics, adjusted for demographic 
characteristics, nearly doubled from 23/10,000 to 45,000/10,000 in 2001 (adjusted 
incidence ratio, 1.98; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.82-2. 16). In 1996, 6.8 percent of 
new users received an atypical antipsychotic, by 2001 this had increased to 95.9 
percent" (p. 755). Beside the obvious concern of the high incidence drug use is the 
concern about "off-label" uses of atypical antipsychotic drugs. In 2003 and 2004 
Saunders and Heflinger demonstrated the dramatic increase in the use of medication 
management while other outpatient therapeutic services declined. 
Since June 2003, all mobile crisis services in the TennCare Partners program 
have also been carved-out to a single state-wide entity. Although there was good intent 
in defining the need for a state-wide vendor, including unevenness of service across the 
state, the implemented solution has not remedied concerns and, in some case, has 
caused deterioration in service. 
One of the reasons given for the move to a carve-out for mobile crisis services 
was variability. In concept, a statewide vendor, it was reasoned, would manage this 
variability and, in a complementary way, the state would manage the vendor. According 
to a member of the TennCare Partners Roundtable, this did not happen. 
Everyone thought the Department of Mental Health was still in the game. We 
wanted them in the game . . . . The message that we keep getting is, and I think this 
is like the State took with all the MCOs, "We contracted this out. We're not 
micro-managing. We're paying these people to manage". Even when it was 
issues like . . .  " Is this the best way to handle crisis management and really build a 
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coordinated system?" , the response . . . that people at the Roundtable got was , 
"This isn't the Department of Mental Health's decision to make. We contracted 
this out. It's the BHO's decision to make". (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
February 24, l ines 258-265) 
Gordon Bonnyman offered a poignant example of poor performance prior to the 
carving-out of mobile crisis services when he recounted testimony from the John B. 
lawsuit. He said, 
In the John B. case, which is the Federal case having to do with the enforcement 
of Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment, or EPSDT standards, 
the Federal Medicaid standards for children, there was testimony that the 
dynamic would be that a child was in crisis [and] Mobile Crisis teams [were] 
called. They may or may not come. They may or may not come in a timely 
fashion . . . .  The people who come are not particularly sophisticated . . . . They wil l ask 
a series of questions of the child or others that are designed to elicit the question 
of whether the child is immediately dangerous to self or others because the child 
is either homicidal or suicidal . And not only does the child have various 
intentions, but does the child have a practical plan for acting on that. A couple of 
examples from the court record . . .  a 5- or 6-year-old who's been diagnosed as 
SED for two or three years, l iving in a rural community, sets fire, hears voices, 
dead uncle saying, "Burn down the house". [He] burns down the family 
home . . . .  The family is outside watching the house burn. The chi ld hears voices of 
dead uncle saying, "Run into the fire. Run into the fire" . They restrain the child. 
Mobile Crisis comes, talks to the chi ld about the chi ld's thoughts of harming self 
or others. The chi ld says . . .  [he] plans to burn down the fami ly home whereupon 
the Mobile Crisis leaves, saying the chi ld does not meet standard for inpatient or 
residential treatment because the home has already been burned and there's no 
immediate risk that the child acting on that ideation. Another example . . .  an 
adolescent, is talking about shooting himself. The psychiatrist is trying to get re­
certification to extend the psychiatric inpatient care of the child. The BHO, or I 
guess it was AdvoCare on behalf of the BHO, makes a judgment that the chi ld 
does not meet the hospitalization standards because there are no . . . the specific 
idea was using a gun, and there are no guns in the hospital ,  so the child's not a 
risk to self or others. The chi ld is released and goes home and shoots himself 
with his father's gun that he finds at his parents' home. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, February 25, l ines 191-219) 
Turning mobile crisis services over to a separate vendor did not necessarily 
remedy these problems, and certainly created other problems such as duplication of 
services, diffuse accountabi l ity, care disconnects and increased patient hassle. The 
member of the TennCare Partners Roundtable commented, relative to adding Youth 
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Villages (the mobile crisis vendor) that, "it is kind of crazy to be putting in additional 
providers when we need to have better coordinated services" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, February 16, lines 249-251). A Master's-prepared clinical social worker, 
who works in a full-service community health center, noted, 
We used to be the ones that did the hospitalization for children. Now that 
contract has been [let to] another agency for kids 18 and under. One problem 
that we have is we have to call that agency to come after we've already done the 
assessment, enough to know that they need to come. That work's been done. 
Then they have a two-hour window to get here, and then they do the assessment 
that we've already done. And so a patient can be here four or five hours before 
that's completed and a decision's been made about hospitalization. That has 
been a challenge. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, May 13, lines 412-420) 
When asked about instances where the provider does not agree with the patient 
disposition recommended by the Youth Villages Mobile Crisis Team, the informant 
added, 
What I've found is that we've been the ones kind of more pushing hospitalization. 
And when the agency comes in and completes their evaluation, they want to try 
maybe some . . .  less intensive treatment first before going that route when we feel 
like the child might need" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, May 13, lines 
431-434). 
When asked how this was handled, she added, 
"Generally, it involves getting . . .  a clinical supervisor involved. If we think the 
child really needs to go to the hospital and the agency that comes doesn't, then 
we have to call TennCare. We have to call that agency's highest level supervisor 
which is in another city across the State. And usually some kind of decision is 
made among the supervisors what we're okay with doing. Sometimes we agree 
and then, you know, it's not a big issue. There have been times when we 
haven't. (lines 441-447) 
The Demise of the Guise of Competition 
Ultimately through acquisitions and other changes Magellan became the primary 
principal behind both of the state's BHOs, essentially negating any semblance of 
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competition . Compounding the issues associated with the loss of leverage possible 
through the use of competing vendors was Magellan's precarious financial footing. 
Magellan became the sole principal in TBH when Merit Behavioral Health was 
acquired in 1998. With Magellan's acquisition of Greenspring and Value Options drop­
out, Premier became a 50-50 joint venture of Magellan and HCA (Wade, 2000, April 7; 
Wade, 2001, August 24). In 2000 Magellan attempted to buy-out HCA's interest in 
Premier Behavioral Systems. The state blocked the request (Wade, 2000, April 7). In 
2001 Manny Martins, serving as the TennCare Director, invoked a contract clause to 
keep HCA from terminating their participation in Premier as they planned (Lewis, 2003, 
March 12) . In another move in 2003, officials with Premier sought to dissolve the 
partnership. The state also opposed this plan (Lewis, 2003, March 12). In each case 
the state's opposition stemmed from concerns about financial viability and the fear of 
creating a monopoly (Associated Press, 2002, July 17; Lewis, 2003, March 12; Wade, 
2000, April 7; Wade, 2001, August 24, August 24). 
Magellan's aggressive acquisition of companies, loss of contracts and increased 
demand for services in the aftermath of the terrorists' attacks on September 11, 2001 
culminated in the company filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 11, 2003 (Lewis, 
2002, March 12 & Wade, 2001, August 24, August 24) . Magellan's deteriorating 
financial status had been monitored by the TennCare Bureau and Department of 
Insurance and Commerce prior to this (Associated Press, 2002, October 5). 
In each of these instances, advocates, including Gordon Bonnyman, raised 
alarms about what had already happened and what was being proposed. Bonnyman 
explained, 
The State became totally dependent upon Magellan which was over-leveraged 
financially, was financially unsound. Obviously it ultimately went into Chapter 11. 
But before that, it was well known that it was failing. And the State was in a 
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position where it had a pretense of having two Behavioral Health Organizations, 
but Magellan was the principal behind both. And so here it was totally dependent 
upon an entity you didn't know each time you got up in the morning every day 
whether you're going to look and see that Magellan had finally gone into 
bankruptcy. That meant that the State was unwilling to enforce financial 
sanctions to hold them accountable. The providers were living on tenterhooks, 
and who would want to sign up in their networks when you didn't have a way of 
knowing you're going to get paid . . . .  The main entity that the State was depending 
upon, they felt that it could not hold it accountable, and the entity itself was 
failing. Financially, it was pre-occupied with some survival and with meeting Wall 
Street and financiers" expectations. So you talk about tightening the perverse 
incentives, if you ever had a situation where you could look at it from the outside 
and say, "Do you want to create such powerful, compelling, ruthless incentives 
for under-service?", as what you have when you create contracts that give the 
single Behavioral Health entity enormous power, very unequal relationships with 
their providers, and on the other hand, give the State almost no practical way to 
hold it accountable, and then to enhance those perverse incentives, you throw 
that Behavioral Health entity into financial crisis, so that its very survival is at 
issue and have got tremendous pressures to under-serve, beg, borrow, and steal 
from whomever it can to keep its doors open from one day to the next. I mean, 
that's what we were talking about. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005 
February, 25, lines 324-337, 342-356) 
According to Dr. Rene Lerer, the President and Chief Operating Officer of 
Magellan Health Services and Dr. Russ Petrella, not long after Magellan filed for 
bankruptcy in the waning days of the Sundquist administration, the state put a seizure 
order on Magellan. This eventually resulted in added contractual supervision. Because 
of these events, the new Bredesen administration's intent was to initiate a request for 
proposals (RFP) for the TennCare Partners business soon after assuming office. Had 
the RFP gone out while Magellan was in bankruptcy, they would not have been allowed 
to respond to the RFP. However, because of struggles the TDMHDD encountered with 
mounting a bid process, Magellan was able to participate since they had reached 
approval from the bankruptcy judge on their plan of reorganization (phone conversation 
with R. Lerer, 2005, January 14; phone conversation with R. Petrella, 2005, August 09). 
Table 12 details Magellan's involvement with TennCare Partners. 
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. . · .· 
March 1 1 , 2003 
9/03 
1 1 /03 
1 /05/04 
1 /31 /04 
Event 
•: 
Merit Behavioral Health acquired by Magellan, making Magellan the sole principal in 
Tennessee Behavioral Health. Magellan acquired Greenspring; since Value Options 
had already dropped-out of Premier, this BHO now became a 50-50 venture between 
Magellan and HCA (Wade, 2000, April 07; Wade, 2001 , August 24). 
Magellan attempted to buy-out HCA's interest in Premier; this move was blocked by the 
state (wade, 2000, April 07; Lewis, 2003, March 1 2) .  
Manyy Martins invoked a contract clause to keep HCA from terminating participation in 
Premier (Lewis, 2003, March 1 2). 
Officials with Premier sought dissolution of the Magellan/HCA partnership; the state 
blocked these efforts (Lewis, 2003, March 1 2). 
Magellan filed for bankruptcy. In tum, the state put a seizure order on Magellan; 
previously the state had placed the organization under contractual supervision. 
The TDMHDD issues a request for proposals for BHO services (Lewis, 2003, 
September 1 3). 
TDMHDD announced that BHO business for Middle and West Tennessee awarded to 
Value Options and business in East Tennessee awarded to Tennessee Behavioral 
Health (Lewis, 2004, January 3 1 ). 
Magellan emerged from chapter 1 1  bankruptcy reorganization 
The state, citing failed negotiations with Value Options, awards business for Middle and 
West Tennessee to Premier (Lewis, 2004, January 31 ) .  
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A Second Try is a Little Better 
In 2003 the TDMHDD re-bid the BHO contracts. Gordon Bonnyman related the 
following, 
We had a failed effort to re-bid that [went] along for a couple of years. The state 
saying, . . .  "We're about to bid [the business]" . They couldn't get the bid out; they 
didn't get responses. They got close to contracting with Value Options, but then 
that fell by the wayside. There's a limited number of vendors out there to choose 
from . . . . As experience with Magellan attests, those that are out there are not well­
qualified to do the work that would be expected of them. (transcript of a recorded 
interview, 2005, February 25) 
Another informant who asked to not be identified added, 
Who knows what happened behind closed doors. The rumors that spread was 
[Value Options] wanted to take some of the money being put into their original 
Mental Health Institutes and put them into community-based care, and the state 
wasn't willing to go there. The Department of Mental Health wasn't willing to go 
there. So [Value Options] said, "Never mind if you're not serious about 
community mental health" . (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, 
lines 337-342) 
In the RFP, the TennCare business was divided by the three grand regions of the 
state, East, Middle and West Tennessee. Magellan only bid on the East Tennessee 
business because the financial terms were most appropriate given prior experience. 
CompPsych bid on the business for West Tennessee and Value Options bid on East, 
Middle and West Tennessee. Value Options was selected for the business in Middle 
and West Tennessee and Magellan was selected for East Tennessee (phone 
conversation with R. Lerer, 2005 January 1 4; transcript of recorded interview with A. 
Boughtin, 2005, February 25; phone conversation with R. Petrella, 2005, August 09; 
email from R. Lerer, 2005, August 1 0) .  The state was not able to come to contract terms 
with Value Options. Because of this, the state determined there was no viable bidder 
which allowed them to waive standard procurement requirements (phone conversation 
with R. Lerer, 2005, January 14; phone conversation with R .  Petrella, 2005, August 09) . 
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The state subsequently asked Magellan to retain their current contracts in Middle and 
West Tennessee and they agreed. This resulted in Magellan, through TBH, being 
awarded a full risk contract based on the merits of their proposal for East Tennessee 
and essentially continuing the TBH and Premier contracts in Middle and West 
Tennessee with TBH being a partial risk contract in these areas and Premier being an 
ASO arrangement (phone conversation with R. Lerer, 2005, January 14; phone 
conversation with R. Petrella, 2005, August 09; email from R. Lerer 2005, August 10). 
Conflicting Roles and Disconnects 
When a vendor, such as a BHO, is employed, the contractor, in this case the 
state, must articulate requirements and hold the vendor accountable for performance. 
The foundation of performance management includes a clear specification of 
expectations, generally through contracts and other discussions and agreements, and 
active and ongoing oversight with adjustments, as needed. The vendor and contractor 
must be continually engaged in a common purpose, and that purpose, in the case of the 
delivery of health care services, must be customer-focused. The evidence in the case of 
TennCare Partners points to the state being either unwilling or unable to oversee the 
BHOs. Many of those interviewed described the state as unengaged. As a result, 
outcomes suffered. 
Previously factors which hindered the state in thei r management of the TennCare 
and TennCare Partners programs were discussed. In addition, there are other factors 
related to TennCare Partners which contributed to disappointing results. These other 
factors include fragmented roles, untoward organizational splits and a hands-off 
approach by the state. 
The 'TDMHDD is fragmented and encumbered because of their multi-faceted 
roles and objectives. The TDMHDD has the "dual role of being a provider of services as 
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well as a contractor for the manager of services" (transcript of a recorded interview with 
an unidentified member of the TennCare Partners Roundtable, 2005, February 24, lines 
343-347). Glenda Sublett, Administrator for Peninsula Hospital in Louisville, Tennessee, 
presented a similar view, saying, "The Department (from an inpatient perspective) has to 
wear two hats. They are the ultimate COO and CEO of the State Institutes, but yet they 
have to manage the TennCare Partners benefits as well as the overall needs. I know 
that can be a delicate balance at times" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 
11, lines 567-572). 
Further complicating this split is the fact that the state is accountable for the 
safety net. The state also oversees the Regional Mental Health Institutes (RMHls). The 
same member of the TennCare Partners Roundtable labeled the RMHls as "a huge 
state political issue" (line 348). In many ways the RMHls are "sacred cows" (line 362). 
The state, as overseer of the RM His is a large employer. This fact is significant when 
you consider that the RMHls are often located in rural or semi-rural areas. When there 
have been discussions about reallocating money traditionally earmarked for the RMHls 
to community-based providers, there has been "a lot of resistance that comes up 
through the legislature" (lines 359-360). 
It was also mentioned that conflicts in roles concerning the stewardship of the 
RMHls and the management of the TennCare Partners program may have been a factor 
in the state's inability to consummate a contract with Value Options, a major national 
competitor of Magellan, when the business was out to bid in 2003 . The same 
unidentified source said, 
The rumors that spread was [Value Options] wanted to take some money being 
put into [the RMHls] and put them in community-based care and the state wasn't 
willing to go there. The Department of Mental health wasn't willing to go there. 
So Value Options said, "Never mind if you are not serious about community 
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mental health" (transcript of a recorded interview with an unidentified source, 
2005, February 24, lines 337-341 ). 
Another split that is seen in the delivery of behavioral health care services in 
TennCare Partners is organizational . Substance abuse oversight is under the purview of 
the Department of Health whereas mental health oversight rests with the TDMHDD. A 
Masters-prepared social worker who directs services for children and youth noted that 
this separation has caused problems. He said, 
They don't work together. In fact, we just had a site visit for one of our programs 
that's funded through the Department of Mental Health, but it's a co-occurring 
provision program. He was talking about the difficulties in the State of 
Tennessee of enveloping co-occurring programs because they're two separate 
departments, and they don't cooperate (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
March 02, lines 484-490). 
The separation though is not unique to state government. Sterling explained, 
You've got the TAMHO . . . and you've got TAADAS which is the Tennessee 
Alcohol & Drug Association. There's a whole lot of conflict between the two. 
Often we've tried at TAMHO, . . . and TAADAS is trying, I think, to try to blend 
some of that; but there's still a lot of animosity between the two. It's kind of 
been . . .  this artificial separation. I think they're not helping that at all (lines 519-
525). 
One of the most significant deficiencies in the TennCare Partners program 
emanated from how ineffectively the state managed the BHOs. According to Gordon 
Bonnyman deficiencies were fundamental and persistent. He said, "There's not 
appropriate oversight. . .  Appropriate contracts were not written . . .  Resources were not 
committed to holding the BHOs accountable" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
February 25, lines 241-242). 
Many informants expressed concern that the state took a "hands off' approach to 
managing the BHOs. Others spoke of how ineffectively the state managed the BHOs 
and administered contractual terms. 
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The state contracted with the BHOs to manage the delivery of behavioral health 
care benefits to all TennCare enrollees. The principles of effective performance 
management specify that in such a relationship the state should maintain accountability 
for the performance of their selected agents. By many accounts the state abdicated 
their accountabilities to the BHOs and this created perverse incentives for poor 
performance. 
By far the greatest concern about state's management of the BHOs was related 
to their lack of meaningful involvement and oversight. When persistent problems were 
brought to the attention of the TDMHDD, they deferred to the BHOs. One informant who 
asked· to remain anonymous related that, 
One of the concerns is that everyone thought the Department of Mental Health 
was still in the game. And we wanted them in the game. The message that we 
keep getting is, and I think this is like the State took with all the MCOs, is "we 
contracted this out" (transcript of recorded interview with an unidentified 
informant, 2005, February 16, lines 257-260) 
When issues concerning coordination of care and crisis management arose and 
were brought to the attention of the TDMHDD, 
The response . . .  that people at the Roundtable [got was], 'This isn't the 
Department of Mental Health's decision to make. We contracted this out. It's the 
BHO's decision to make.' or 'This is between you and the BHO. We're not going 
to get in between the BHO and their contractors' (transcript of a recorded 
interview with an unidentified informant, 2005, February 16, lines 263-265, 80-81) 
Similar sentiment was expressed by Dick Blackburn. In his view during the Sundquist 
administration, "the Department totally abdicated all responsibility for anything . . . . The 
BHO was setting policy, was calling the shots, was deciding everything" (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 485-489). Kelly Lang-Ramirez agreed, 
saying, 
The accountability factor seemed to go away entirely. They had a hard time 
reining in the BHO, much less trying. And they certainly never wanted to get 
involved in anything between the BHO and the providers. They were just totally 
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hands off. "You guys, don't worry about . . .  we're out of this."  You know, 'Not our 
problem. '  (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, l ines 569-573) 
Whether the TDMHDD distanced themselves from the problems associated with 
the administration of the TennCare Partners program as a del iberate strategy, because 
of a power hierarchy among state departments, or both, is unclear. Dick Blackburn 
attributes the TDMHDD's stance to a power differential between the Bureau of TennCare 
and the TDMHDD. Kel ly Lang-Ramirez cited the fallout from Governor Sundquist's plan 
to create a mega-Department of Health. She said, 
[The TDMHDD] lost, I don't know, how many staff positions to the TennCare 
Bureau? This is when they were trying to make that mega-Department and they 
thought people needed to have the knowledge of the inner workings of Medicaid 
and grants and claims processing, and all that. And the Department of Mental 
Health . . . either. . .  just evaporated or got shifted over to TennCare Bureau. So it 
wiped out a good core-l ike expertise of the Department (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, January 25, l ines 493-499) 
Blackburn said, 
[The TDMHDD] had no power, basically no role except to administer, oh maybe 
$17 . . .  $18 mi l l ion dol lars worth of block grant and different kinds of grant 
programs, and to run the state hospitals. That's it. Period. Everything else, 
Manny Martins or one of the eight TennCare directors, . . .  I can't remember exactly 
what sequence they came in, but one of them said, "We don't need your help. 
We' l l  run this. "  And so the BHO just had a field day during that time . . . .  That was 
a horrible time . . . . A lot of things . . .  that happened during that time . . .  are 
irretrievable. I mean you never, never get back to where you were with the . . . 
with some of that (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, l ines 500-
510) 
This changed, in Blackburn's view, when Elizabeth Rukeyser became the Commissioner 
in 1999. According to Blackburn, 
When Commissioner Rukeyser came, she negotiated with Manny Martins a 
memorandum of understanding, which was the first point at where the 
Department began to try to recover some power, or gain some authority over 
behavioral health. And so basically, they worked out an arrangement where they 
had all the responsibil ity . . .  authority over pol icy, and the only thing that . . .  [the] 
TennCare [Bureau] had responsibi l ity for was the budget, the money . . . .  But [the 
TDMHDD] . . .  couldn't necessari ly veto what happened with the money, but. . .  at 
least they were advised of something that was going on there . . . . So they had a lot 
more information, a lot more interface with the TennCare powers than they'd ever 
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had. And they had authority to make certain decisions. For example, . . . the 
second year Commissioner Rukeyser was there, the managed care company put 
out a memo saying, 'We've decided we're not going to fund adult continuous 
treatment teams anymore. '  Well we had . . .  outcome data, we had enough to fill 
this room and that showed how effective they were at keeping people out of the 
hospital. And it was just a cost-cutting measure that they . . .  didn't feel they ought 
to be spending the kind of money they were spending to accomplish that. Just 
let them go to the hospital, I mean, we already got our 9%, 10% administrative 
fee; what do we care where they get the services. So Commissioner Rukeyser 
basically said, 'No, you're not going to do this. ' And that is the first indication that 
the memorandum of understanding had produced a change in the Department, 
in that they could make decisions like that and enforce them. So that's one 
service that is still around. It's kind of on shaky ground, but it's still around. (lines 
516-534) 
It is important to note that a few informants mentioned that the current TDMHDD 
staff has been more engaged than previous staff. Brian Buck of Ridgeview noted that, 
"[The current staff] has a really good understanding of the services that are being 
delivered . . .  and the role that the BHO plays in terms of our relationship with the BHO" 
(transcript of a recorded interview, 2005, April 05, lines 527-529). 
"The Current Dragon We're Trying to Slay" 
While Magellan representatives made note of the fact that they have 
continuously held a contract with the state of Tennessee for the TennCare Partners 
business (transcript of recorded interview with Russ Pertrella, 2005, February 25, lines 
660-661), the implication of stability belies the tumultuous history of the relationship and 
the perception of contracted providers. The mismanagement and fragmentation of the 
TennCare Partners program caused tremendous chaos for the CMHCs, the essential 
community-based providers. Brian Buck is the CEO of Ridgeview, a CMHC based in 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee; his quote is the title for this section (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, April 05, line 388). Reflecting on change, he made note of there 
originally being seven BHOs, these in turn consolidated into two organizations for the 
TennCare Partners business, the financial difficulties of Magellan, the aborted contract 
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negotiations with Value Options and the recent introduction of TennCare reforms (lines 
287-300). He noted, "The only consistent has been change. One of the things that 
hasn't changed [though] is the mental health needs of . . .  kids and adults in the 
community . . . .  The need is always there" (lines 300-3 13). 
In this environment of constant change, Buck said, "one of the biggest 
challenges . . .  is to not become overwhelmed with not knowing what the big picture is 
going to look like. {you need to] just stay focused on delivering care, delivering care in 
an environment that is going to change" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, April 05, 
lines 308-31 1 ). He expressed the resolve that the CMHC had to "adapt, improvise and 
overcome limitations in terms of delivering services" (lines 1 33- 1 35). 
Buck cited uncertainty about funding being prominent, saying, "It's the funding 
piece of it that keeps changing and is real ly the difficult part in trying to plan for the 
future, take care of things now with all of this uncertainty" (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, April 05, lines 317-31 9). Buck related that, 
There are so many question marks that it's a matter of planning for the future not 
knowing what the future holds, and that's the hardest part. That's the hardest 
part to retain staff. It's the hardest part to deliver services with any real stability 
that things aren't going to change because you know they're going to change. 
(lines 370-376) 
Is there hope in slaying the dragon? The question is difficult to answer. There 
are signs of encouragement amongst the concern and the turmoil of change. The signs 
of encouragement come from the advocates, compassionate policy-makers and others 
that remain committed to not letting our state forget the needs of those suffering from 
mental il lness. His commitment was exemplified by Brian Buck when he said, 
The need wil l not go away. SEO kids and SPMI folks will not go anywhere. The 
need remains. The mission of Ridgeview [and other CMHCs] is to meet that 
need. That's what has really sustained us through a lot of this change and 
transition. One of [our] strengths is to stay focused on what we do best, and to 
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figure out how to make this work so that we can do what we do best. That really 
helps get us through this [change]. A lot of times the players will change and the 
rules will change and the funding mechanisms will change, but it seems to come 
back around to that we still have this need and we still have folks that are going 
to meet this need, and that carries us through. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, April 05, lines 424-435). 
Care Delivery in TennCare Partners 
The changes in health care delivery brought about by TennCare Partners were 
far-reaching. An explosion in access was followed by a shift in the complement of care 
available to beneficiaries. Some of the changes that were anticipated never 
materialized. Many informants mourned changes in relationships and roles and the 
impact these changes had on care delivery. Another hasty implementation, prompted by 
external events again, produced avoidable problems. 
The fallout from the implementation. During the tumult of the early days of 
TennCare Partners, patient care suffered. Delivery of care and therapeutic relationships 
were disrupted. CMHCs faced severe financial difficulties. Even the BHOs threatened 
to not renew contracts because of financial losses. 
A 2003 study by Ray, Daugherty and Meador demonstrated what many already 
perceived about disruption of care. In their comparative study of the continuity of care 
before and after the implementation of TennCare, the researchers found that the post­
implementation cohort of adults with SPMI had an 18 percent increase in the odds of a 
loss of continuity of therapy ([95 percent confidence interval, 1.07-1.30]; P=0.001). 
When high-risk patients were segregated, this difference increased to 79 percent ([95 
percent confidence interval, 1.45-2.2]; P<0.001). In addition to discontinuous care, the 
researchers also found that participants experienced a 4.2 days shorter mean duration 
of antipsychotic therapy ([95 percent confidence interval, 1.7 70 6.7], P=0.001). On the 
same measure, the high-risk cohort experienced a 14.4 days reduction [95 percent 
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confidence interval ,  9 .4 to 19.4] ; P<0.001 ). The high risk patients experienced disruption 
immediately after the implementation of TennCare Partners and this disruption persisted 
for one year. 
Although the predominant impression is one of the state not being engaged, this 
was not the case when TennCare Partners was first implemented. Instead the state 
attempted to maintain central regulatory control in the beginning which, it is alleged, 
undermined the BHO's ability to manage care and effectively complete tasks such as 
developing and managing care plans. Early on, it was not uncommon for the state to 
overturn many care denials issued by the BHOs. The BHO's ability to perform case 
management was further hampered by the state's mandate that no patient could be 
moved to an alternative form of care for three months after the implementation of 
TennCare Partners (Chang et al . , 1998) . 
During the early days of TennCare Partners, the BHOs were having difficulty 
stabilizing networks and providers and patients grew increasing frustrated with bungled 
plan administration. CMHC suffered significantly during this time. Revenues plummeted 
placing many of the organizations in precarious financial positions. Some CMHCs 
eventually closed down and many of the CMHCs were forced to turn away new patients 
during the transition. Some of the CMHCs notified the state that they would not renew 
future contracts with BHOs, extending the threat to the safety net (Chang et al., 1 998) . 
The rampant discontent and disruption resulted in the Tennessee Department of 
Health announcing on February 13, 1 997 that TennCare Partners would be folded back 
into TennCare effective January 1, 1998. Although this plan never materialized, it was 
indicative of how troubled the program was. This was further confirmed when HCFA 
began an investigation into TennCare Partners in February, 1997. As a result of this 
investigation, the state had 30 days to institute corrective actions to assure that patients 
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received care and BHOs fulfilled contract obligations, provided separate funding for 
SPMI adults and children with SEO, reduced provider financial risk and reduced the rate 
of inpatient care (Chang et al. , 1998). 
Hope Gives Way to a New Reality 
Hopes regarding the continuation of the continuation of the Master Plan for 
Mental Health, increased access, better care and the ongoing partnership of the state 
and the CMHCs gave way to a whole new reality once TennCare Partners was 
implemented. Views about this reality are complex and evolving. Most interviewees 
spoke of some level of disillusionment. Some spoke of the need for changes that 
TennCare Partners precipitated. Most acknowledged the important legacy of creating 
more access for children. The criticisms regarding access mainly center on the question 
of access to what? 
Many advocates spoke of the Mental Health Master Plan as being an ongoing 
template for reform when the TennCare program was being developed. According to 
Dick Blackburn, 
A great deal of work had happened [the three years prior to the start of 
TennCare]. We were two and one-half years into what was called the Mental 
Health Master Plan, which over that period of time, they'd put $27 million into the 
mental health system. At that time, that was a lot of money. That had been done 
through selling off the state hospital property in Nashville, and using part of the 
proceeds to build a new, more modern acute care facility for the state hospital 
there, and to close down some of the beds and shift the operating dollars that 
had gone into those beds into the community . . . . Everybody was happy with how 
that was working. We added some Medicaid-optional programs, the case 
management option, and the rehabilitation option, and were able with the new 
state dollars to draw down additional Federal dollars for mental health and put a 
lot of new services in place. So everybody was happy. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, January 2005, lines 60-70). 
The Master Plan did not address children, but prior to the start of TennCare Partners, 
the CMHCs had initiated a model of case management for children. A member of the 
TennCare Partners Roundtable said, 
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The hope was that the BHOs and TDMHDD were going to basically support best 
practices including case management, and that this would be a way of enforcing 
it statewide because there was great variation across the state in terms of quality 
of care . . . . The assumption was that there would be a more statewide level playing 
field and the BHOs and state would continue to reinforce the good things that 
were there. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 1 00-1 05, 
1 21 -1 23) 
Another hope was that "it didn't just have to happen with the community mental health 
centers . . .  that other people could get reimbursed from Medicaid. That had not happened 
before" (lines 1 46-1 47) . 
Unfortunately the Master Plan was not continued as envisioned and a new 
complement of providers never became a force in TennCare Partners. Dick Blackburn's 
recollection of planning for TennCare shows how little deliberation actual ly occurred 
about the Master Plan. He said, 
[The planning] just was done 'wil ly-nil ly' . I remember Governor McWherter 
saying . . .  , ' If we had to wait until everybody was [ready], everything was set, we 
never would get this off the ground, so we' l l just do it and let the chips fall where 
they may. We' l l  deal with what happens afterwards. '  So there really wasn't very 
much [planning], but because there had been absolutely no thinking at all about 
how to transition the Master Plan to managed care, there was a two year interim 
period before anything really happened. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
January 25, lines 89-94) 
More telling is how the results that were being seen with the Master Plan 
changed in TennCare Partners. Kel ly Lang-Ramirez explained, 
The goal of the Master Plan [was] they were going to decrease inpatient and 
expand community services. That's what you would want to have happen, 
obviously. It was going along quite well doing that. And Partners came along, 
and for a whole variety of reasons, inpatient has gone up. Total costs of inpatient 
have gone up. Now the length of stay went down, but total days have gone up. 
Even right now they're seeing increases in residential services for 
kids . . . . Everything is really misaligned, with the incentives of the whole service 
delivery system; it's not putting resources where they should be. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 41 3-430) 
Nor did the advent of TennCare Partners, 
Open the door for private providers. A lot of the folks who access those private 
providers were kids that weren't as sick . . .  or [from] families who were educated. 
1 91 
TennCare has a broad spectrum of those who qualify for it and who prefer not to 
go through the public sector and wanted to have someone. But the providers 
found out real quickly that they may be eligible for reimbursement, but boy what a 
pain it was to get reimbursement. So they started like dropping like flies, 
[saying] . . .  'I'm not going to get reimbursed $25 for what I would get reimbursed 
$75 by another managed care company . . .  so, I think, in large part, that network 
that started out looking good kind of faded away. (transcript of recorded interview 
with an anonymous informant, 2005, February 24, lines 159-173) 
Adding, "I think there are a lot of providers, especially in the urban and the surrounding 
urban areas, that are trained and were willing and then found that it was just a hassle, 
and they weren't getting reimbursed basically" (lines 201-203). Dick Blackburn noted, 
There really haven't been any new providers as such. Our membership and it 
has a different structure as we said, but it is still basically the same providers out 
there. [The CMHCs] provide more than 90% of the services and have all along. 
There have been a few, what I would call 'specialty agencies' that have 
developed. The major ones there have developed because the BHO funded 
their development at the start and offered grants or enhanced kinds of financing 
mechanisms that helped them get off the ground. They did that in several cases 
that didn't make it, but in a few cases they did make it and they're still around; but 
they're very small and insignificant. (transcript of recorded interview, 25 January 
25, lines 161-170) 
The inability to attract available providers is a concern because there is not an 
adequate enough provider base for all the demand that was created when access was 
expanded. This concern could be addressed by a concerted effort of the BHOs and the 
state, if it became a priority. More perplexing problems, less amenable to direct 
intervention, are the dearth of certain needed specialties, such board certified child 
psychiatrists, and the difficulty of attracting providers to rural areas. 
The CMHCs, the backbone of the public sector delivery system (along with the 
RMHls), underwent significant change as a result of TennCare Partners and other forces 
that preceded TennCare. There were 33 CMHCs when the Master Plan was developed. 
By 1996, there were 28. Kelly Lang-Ramirez related that, 
Starting just prior to Partners, a lot of consolidation [was] going on and that 
continued through at least the first couple of years of Partners, and it's leveled 
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out [now] to some degree. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, 
lines 122-124) 
The consolidation was prompted primarily by "survival" according to Lang-Ramirez, 
although it "may have benefited some care coordination . . .  it was more trying to gain 
economies of scale and survive" (lines 127-129). Dick Blackburn added, 
We knew that there was going to be less money in the system, less funding, 
because when the managed care companies take nine, ten percent off the top, 
then there's going to be less money going into direct care right off the bat. And 
we knew that it administrative costs would go up because of all the requirements 
that they put in place. And so, many of the centers got together and decided that 
they would consolidate under one management structure and in that way they 
didn't have to have two chief financial officers and two accounting offices and so 
forth. They would have one. They probably did save some administrative costs 
by doing that type of thing, but a lot of it was ... to gain clout with the managed 
care companies because ... the BHOs ... , in negotiations, basically come in and 
say, "If you're not willing to do 'X' for this amount of money, we'll just go to the 
next county and they'll be glad to serve this in the county where you are. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 131-144) 
Prior to the start of TennCare Partners, a major paradigm shift had already 
occurred that had significant implications for CMHCs. The CMHCs were no longer 
"enfranchised". The implications of this change became more apparent as competition 
was introduced by the advent of managed care. 
Historically the CMHCs had very specific geographic catchment areas. 
Beginning sometime in the Reagan administration, laws were changed such that 
CMHCs, 
were expected to be competitors with each other, whereas up to that time, [they] 
really looked at each other almost like a single system and that [each was] a 
component in the system and real partners with the state in trying to ensure that 
[the CMHCs] were carrying out the state's mission through contracts .... [The 
CMHCs] were [now] expected to be competitors with each other. (transcript of 
recorded interview with Dick Blackburn, 2005, January 25, lines 204-219) 
Because the shift was still unfolding, there was ambiguity in roles. Dick 
Blackburn explained, 
193 
What I've often said is the state now uses [the CMHCs being competitors] to their 
advantage, in that when we need to be lean, mean, competitive machines out 
there and not live off of state funding or are expected to do something a lot more 
efficiently, then that's what they say, . . .  [you] ought to be competitors just like any 
other business. But when they want us to be like an arm of state government 
almost, just quasi-state entity that they want more control over and want to use to 
deliver some service that they don't have the money to pay for, then they come 
back and talk about mental health centers like they were before TennCare that, 
you know, that they have this community mission, this responsibility to the state's 
citizens. So they really kind of like to have it both ways, and it puts us at a real 
disadvantage . . . . A lot's happened and things are unbelievably different; it's like a 
whole different world. Legislators, for the most part, still look at their Community 
Mental Health Center in their community as almost a public entity than instead of 
a private entity, which it's always been but. .. when we operated in full partnership 
with the state in delivering these services, it operated like a public entity . . . .  Many 
legislators, they think people who work at mental health centers are state 
employees, like it's a state agency almost. . . .  A lot of them, even those who've 
been around a long time, still don't understand that we are no different now than 
a private construction company that contracts with the state to build a bridge. 
That bridge is going to cost 'X' amount and have certain specifications they have 
to meet, and if the state says, 'Okay, we'll provide that amount', then you got a 
deal. They can do it. If they say, 'No, you . . .  have to meet the same 
specifications, [but] we can only provide 70% of what you're asking for', then 
most of those companies will say, " I 'm sorry; you're going to have to go 
somewhere else. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 219-
252) 
Despite all the changes, the reality still is that TennCare Partners or any other public 
assistance program for behavioral health care benefits can not exist without the CMHCs. 
Over the past ten years, the CMHCs, in varying degrees, have positioned 
themselves better for the reality of today's marketplace. Kelly Lang-Ramirez related 
that, 
[The CMHCs] all are very heavily dependent on TennCare as the payer-source 
for the people they serve. But it does vary from agency to agency . . . . Some . . .  
specialize in other arenas and are leveraging more private-pay, commercial 
insurance contracts than others, so there's a bit of a mix. But I 'm not sure if any 
of them could just totally, you know, drop the TennCare contract. (transcript of 
recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 258-262) 
Dick Blackburn added that, "on the average . . .  60-65% of the [CMHCs] operations 
statewide are funded with TennCare . . . . Some centers are down to maybe 25 to 30%, 
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and some are at 85%" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines, 263-
265). 
One of the things that has suffered in the transition is the sense of partnership 
enjoyed by the state and the CMHCs. Blackburn explained further using the bridge 
builder analogy, 
I think the centers are doing as much as possible . . . . The things they did before 
TennCare in terms of trying to find some way to provide services to someone 
who has no resources . . . . Some do a better job of that than others. I'm just saying 
that if 'push came to shove', [the CMHCs] would have every right to [walk away 
from the state] because of the relationship . . .  with the state. It is no different than 
a bridge builder . . .  they can walk away and say, ' I  can't do this work for you 
because you can't meet my price. I would lose money doing that". We're in the 
same situation whereas before the relationship was more of a partnership . We 
would say, 'We recognize you are not paying full costs, what it takes to provide 
these services, but if you contract with us and tell us exactly what you want us to 
deliver, we' l l  rely on other sources. We' l l use other parts of our budget to 
supplement the cost of care for people who have no other way to pay for it' . 
That's the kind of relationship we had. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, 
January 25, lines 267-284) 
The CMHCs also saw a significant change in the complement of care. A good 
il lustration is what happened with children's services. According to Kel ly Lang-Ramirez, 
"the higher cost, [more] intensive services dried up" (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, January 25, lines 297-298). An example cited was therapeutic nurseries. There 
were close to 30 therapeutic nurseries in the state prior to TennCare. Lang-Ramirez 
related that, 
Those have dried up to the point [where] there are two left in the state and that's 
just because the private foundations are keeping it going. I still hear testimony 
from school systems today about how effective that early intervention, intensive 
level of care is. So that's one example of how . . .  [TennCare Partners] rationed 
care differently. It seemed to give less to more people, but unfortunately some of 
the critical components of a ful l  continuum of care went away entirely. There 
may be something to be said for reducing something or planning a more efficient 
way to do it, but there were just literally components of care that the network cut 
out. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, January 25, lines 305-313) 
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The Shift to Case Management 
With case management there is a disconnect between the promise and the 
reality. Case management, an initiative with momentum prior to the institution of 
TennCare Partners, was envisioned as an over-arching added function that would 
complement care being delivered. Instead case management became a poor substitute 
for care. 
A member of the TennCare Partners Roundtable relayed this history of children's 
case management, 
Right before TennCare, the Department of Mental Health had done this huge 
[case management project]. The Master Plan did not address kids. This 
happened simultaneously. All the community mental health centers had a model 
of case management. They were doing all this training, and they were using 
some of their block grants to do children's case management. So word is coming 
[about managed behavioral health care]. TennCare had come in '94, but it 
wasn't coming to behavioral health until '96. In these two years, the community 
mental health centers didn't quite know what was coming. They knew something 
was coming. [Meanwhile] case management was going . . . . The TDMH children's 
directorwas worried about what was going to happen to kids' management. They 
felt they had a really good kids' case management model. (transcript of a 
recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 34-45) 
The continuation of this work on children's case management was included in the waiver 
request the TMMHMR put together (Tennessee Department of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 1995, September). The TennCare Partners Roundtable member recalled, 
What was envisioned was taking the best of the services, including the case 
management model like they wanted it, and having that as one of the specified 
preferred models of care. The hope was that the BHO and the Department were 
going to basically support best practices including the case management and 
that this would be a way of enforcing it statewide because there was great 
variation across the State in terms of quality of care. The assumption was that 
there would be more Statewide leveling playing ground and that the BHO and the 
State would continue to kind of reinforce the good things that were there. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 98-105, 121-123) 
The state's specifications for case management were operationalized by the 
BHOs. Ann Boughtin, a former General Manager of Magellan Health Services for the 
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TennCare Partners account, explained how this BHO views case management. She 
said, 
There are many, many different models of case management. There are 
treatment models of case management. There are brokering models of case 
management. There are supportive models of case management. And the 
current array of services that we have provide some of each. The more intensive 
services, the treatment-oriented services, are pretty limited in terms of their 
availability across the state. Case management, though by and large in the 
system of care right now, is more of a brokering or supportive model . And there 
are a couple of additional distinctions . . .  that I think are important to make relative 
to case management. That is that case management can either be defined as a 
service or a person in your life. Some members need case managers, someone 
who's there with them frequently to make sure that their basic needs are met, 
that they're accessing their appointments, and if additional supports or services 
are needed, go out and find them. Others, depending on the nature of their 
il lness and what's happening for them at a moment in time, may need some case 
management support that could be provided by the therapist, by the social 
worker that they're seeing, and that tends to be somewhat more intermittent and 
short term. We have a system in which case management is provided to a vast 
array of people for very long term. (transcript of a recorded interview, 2005, 
February 25, lines 564-581 )  
A Master's-prepared social worker, who is now part of a CMHC management 
team, lauded the inclusion of case management in TennCare Partners. He said, 
We didn't have case management really to speak of back pre-TennCare. On the 
adult side, that's where some of the more recovery-oriented services came in, 
like psychiatric rehabilitation and the drop-in centers and supportive employment 
and some of those kinds of things. They're a much cheaper alternative that meet 
people where they're at in their communities [by] trying to help them adapt to the 
world that they live in while adapting and learning to control their mental il lness 
and fill the gap that existed years ago [when] all of those functions that were not 
being performed by professional ly trained licensed people simply because that 
wasn't what they were trained to do and the system couldn't afford to pay 
psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses and LCSWs to go out and do these kinds of 
tasks. So to me, one of the good by-products of [case management] is that I 
think it has forced us to get more creative, and it's forced us to become more 
outcome-focused . . . . If the only way you know to practice a profession [and] 
deliver mental health services is that old medical model that only includes the 
social worker, psychologist, nurse, and doctor, then you are missing a big piece 
of what is happening in a person's life who has a mental illness whether it's the 
child that's SED or the adult that's SPMI; you are missing it. I mean, I look back 
on those days and I think, wow, we weren't very effective at dealing with the 
person in their world. We dealt with their symptoms. We dealt with controlling 
those symptoms. We dealt with some insight-oriented kinds of issues for people 
that had that capacity. But we weren't dealing with those practical matters of 
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living in the world with a mental illness. That seemed to make so much 
difference. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 01, lines 79-113) 
Children's case management was often cited by informants as a service that did 
increase in the TennCare Partners program. The problem is that, in many instances, 
case management may have a substitute for care rather than an adjunct. A Medicaid 
researcher commented that a lot of emphasis has been placed on case management, 
but everything else has been neglected. The researcher asked, "If kids are getting case 
management and nothing else, what is that? We see quite a few . .. kids that are in case 
management only" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 784-785) 
This same researcher suggested that substituting case management for actual therapy 
is related to capitation. The informant said, 
We see quite a few of those kids that are the case management only. Where do 
we put our incentives? [There are incentives for increasing case management.] 
When you have a case rate of, whatever it is, $250 a month, that you have to do 
'X' number of case management contacts and then have to see the psychiatrist, 
where's there . . .  money to provide family therapy and group therapy, and 
consulting with the school teacher? So they're being paid to provide case 
management and case management, obviously if you don't have enough 
resources, that's [what] they're going to go. So who's monitoring for best 
practice? And if you've got a kid with ADHD, they're supposed to be doing 
behavioral component and the meds component. What about people with bipolar 
and depression? Every one of those that have practice standards says there's 
supposed to be therapy component and/or family component along with the 
meds. (transcript of a recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 786-798) 
Utilization data can be used to understand access, including the number of users 
of service and the number of services each uses. Saunders and Heflinger (2003) 
showed interesting trends in utilization of services before and after the implementation of 
TennCare Partners. The researchers used four categories of metrics to analyze the 
utilization of behavioral health services, including overall access, use of inpatient 
services, use of specialty outpatient services and use of supportive services which 
include case management and medical management. 
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The study (Saunders & Heflinger, 2003) confirmed an overall 50 percent increase 
in the absolute number of school-aged children (ages 4-17) that received a behavioral 
service from the state between 1995 and 2000 (TennCare Partners was implemented in 
state fiscal year 1996). During this same time, TennCare enrollment grew by 19 
percent, resulting in an increased annual access rate increased from 72. 7 per 1000 to 
91.7. 
Between SFY 1995 and 2000, the rate of use of inpatient services was relatively 
stable at 5 per 1000. However the proportion of inpatient services for all youth who were 
treated declined from 69.9 to 53.4 per 1000 users during the study period. Length-of­
stay also decreased from 26.2  days to 11.3 days per admission. During the same time, 
the rate of readmissions within 30 days increased from 9.2 to 12.2 percent (Saunders & 
Heflinger, 2003). 
The proportion of outpatient services for all youth who were treated declined from 
617.7 users (62 percent) to 581.6 per 1000 users (58 percent). There was an initial 
decrease in the rate of access and number of youth receiving individual and group 
therapy, but the post-implementation rates eventually surpassed pre-TennCare Partners 
levels. Rates of family treatment utilization increased from 2.8 to 15.4 per 1000 users 
(Saunders & Heflinger, 2003). 
Although rates of access increased, the average overall number of specialty 
services fell from an average number of treatment days of 18.51 to 6.4. The average 
number of individual therapy treatment days declined from 6.08 to 4.62; day treatment 
and partial hospitalization days declined from 46.26 to 8.40. The average number of 
treatment days for family therapy increased from 2.79 to 3.27 days (Saunders & 
Heflinger, 2003). 
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Saunders and Heflinger's analysis (2003) showed a dramatic increase in the rate 
of access to case management from 2. 7 per 1000 enrollees to 21.2 from SFY 1995-
2000. The average number of treatment days also increased from 3.32 to 11.51. For 
medication management, the increases were similar. The rate of access increased from 
3.9 to 25.9 per 1000 enrollees and the average number of treatment days increased 
from 2.08 to 3.60 days. 
Although the study by Saunders and Heflinger (2003) lends credence to the 
concern that case management is being used with children and adolescents as a 
substitute for needed care since the inception of the TennCare Partners program, it does 
generally not tell us how this change has impacted patient outcomes. The increase in 
patient readmissions within thirty days is a concerning outcome measure, but the other 
measures do not tell us if the utilization changes have adversely impacted patient 
outcomes. 
Bad Options 
Even the discrete fragment that the BHOs have clear accountability for, the 
management of the delivery of behavioral health care services, is incomplete. 
Behavioral health care services, including assessment and management, provided by 
contracted providers in the TennCare program are not managed in any way by the 
BHOs. This is very concerning given the large percentage of behavioral health care 
services in the outpatient setting are provided by primary care providers, not behavioral 
health care specialists. 
An advanced practice nurse from a rural primary care clinic in East Tennessee 
described a troubling situation that shows how unmanaged the behavioral health care is 
in primary care (and also illustrates nagging access questions, as well as cultural 
appropriateness of care). She said, when referring to her pediatric patients with a 
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variety of behavioral health care problems, including ADHD, depression, bipolar 
disorder, substance abuse and other problems, that, 
There's really not a good resource for referring these kids. We have a real ly hard 
time finding a place to see them. There's a psychologist in the area, but they are 
booked up for months . . . Sometimes he wil l  eventual ly see the child, and he' l l  
send us a letter about what to do. We usually wil l prescribe the medicine he 
recommends. Some of these kids have to be seen by a child psychiatrist. That's 
the trouble now. We don't know where to send them (transcript of recorded 
interview, unidentified source, 2005, February 18, lines 31-41) 
There is not a child psychologist in the county to meet the specialized needs of children 
with SEO and "a lot of [the children's] parents can not take them other places" (line 45) . 
The "fix" for this problem, like so many others discussed, creates new problems. 
According to the APN, she is "real ly uneasy [about] prescribing [psychotropic drugs] to 
kids when they have not seen a child psychiatrist. I'm just going by the psychologist's 
recommendations" (transcript of recorded interview, unidentified source, 2005, February 
18, lines 51-54). The alternative, untreated children, is even worse. 
The issue of lack of coordination between the triad of the MCOs, BHOs and PBM 
was mentioned by a CMHC director of services for children and youth. He asserted 
that, "a lot of the over-medication of children . . . [is] coming from primary care doctors, not 
psychiatrists" (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 02, lines 268-270) . He also 
observed that primary care providers not only over-medicate, they mis-diagnose, saying, 
Out of the kids that came in . . .  on medication for ADH D, and diagnosed ADHD by 
a family care doctor, based on our diagnosis, probably 10% were actual ly ADH D. 
The majority were coming from violent situations [with] tremendous pain and 
turmoil [and] a lot of anxiety disorder. You know, they really need an anxiety 
medication rather than a stimulant. [There's] a lot of depressed kids. It real ly 
concerns me here that so many kids were getting this medication based on 
maybe a fifteen minute interview that the primary care doctor had had with them. 
And here they were on, you know, heavy-duty medication. (lines 316-326) 
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Hope Shines Through 
There are examples of delivery systems that are thriving, minimally constrained 
by the introduction of TennCare Partners. A pediatrician and clinical social worker 
employed in a full-range community health center where 80 percent of the clientele are 
TennCare recipients were interviewed. Because both providers are direct links to 
children receiving care, there identities will not be revealed, nor their specific location. 
Their story though is worthy of attention. 
The pediatrician described the practice setting and staff alignment, saying, 
I 'm a general pediatrician, so I see children between the ages of 1 day and 18 
years of age. I see children from all walks of life. We do not limit who we see, so 
they can have insurance, no insurance. The lack of ability to pay does not keep 
us from seeing patients . . . . [We are in] a non-profit organization [where] we do 
integrated health care, so we have general medical plus behavioral health all 
under the same roof, and actually not just co-located but actually has 
behaviorists in the clinic with me seeing patients as well. (transcript of recorded 
interview, 2005, May 13, lines 22-28) 
The clinical social worker that works with the pediatrician added, 
My discipline is clinical social work. I'm a licensed clinical social worker working 
as a behavioral health consultant in the pediatric clinic along with the 
psychologist who's also a behavioral health consultant there. And our role is to 
be a consultant to the primary care providers. We assist a lot with assessment, 
intervention, health promotion . . .  and act as kind of a liaison between the clinic 
and more specialty mental health care. If children need to access that, we help 
get that set up for them. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, May 13, lines 30-
36) 
Elaborating on her role, the pediatrician said, 
As far as I'm concerned, I act really as the medical home for . . .  children. You can 
consider it as a team [and] I'm the coach of the team. Whenever a child needs to 
see some specialist, access the mental health side, has issues at school, I will 
help coordinate all those different disciplines and efforts and make certain that 
the child is receiving all the health care that he or she needs and receiving the 
services at the school that he or she needs. (transcript of recorded interview, 
2005, May 13, lines 49-56) 
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The pediatrician maintains the coach role even when the child has a behavioral 
health problem. This was illustrated in the following scenario that was described. The 
pediatrician said, 
[If] a child comes in and is depressed and needs help acutely, . . . instead of me 
spending time bogged down if you will, because, you know, I'm a general 
pediatrician, so I'll have a schedule that's already full or maybe even double­
booked. I can't spend 45 minutes with that one patient, but that child needs care 
right then. So I will talk about the fact that I have a behaviorist with me in the 
clinic and that we can go ahead and start providing help. And then that's when 
the behaviorist will come in, go ahead and assess the patient further. And then 
she'll come out, discuss the case with me; and if I see, based on what I hear, if 
there's a need for medication, then I'll go ahead and start it that day and talk 
about the side effects and risks and all that and monitor them closely. So 
basically, she's able to get a lot of the past medical history, the social history, 
school history, things like that that are important and will be in the record; and I 
can review it, but I don't have to hear it for the very first time. So, it's time 
efficiency. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, May 13, lines 259-275) 
The pediatrician maintains primary accountability for medication management and other 
ongoing care needs. The charts that are used in this practice are also integrated with 
all members of the team recording in a similar format. 
The pediatrician also stressed that because of the close collaborations with the 
behaviorist (and psychiatrist) on the treatment team, the clinic is able to meet most of the 
needs of their clients, including children with SEO, without having to refer to other 
providers. Many informants talked about the many patients who do not follow-through 
with referrals or they are lost to the practice once the referral occurs. Her social worked 
colleague agreed, saying, 
[With] some of the less severe emotional behavioral disorders that we see in 
children, we're often able to manage them in the pediatric clinic, meaning a 
behavioral health consultant meets with them regarding intervention and 
education. Our primary care physicians will be prescribing for them, such as the 
ADHD, mild to moderate depression, those kinds of issues which then opens up 
space in the traditional psychotherapist's schedule to see children that have 
more severe disorders which we tend to think of as being things like bipolar 
disorder, ... reactive attachment disorder, autism, and those kinds of issues. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, May 13, lines 677-684) 
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The pediatrician added, 
I can move from that and say that all our children that have ADHD and no core 
premorbid diagnoses, the pediatricians may [treat] that solely. They are not seen 
by the psychiatrists, and they are not seen by another therapist. They're not 
seen in the traditional behavioral health system. Of those children who have 
ADHD and another premorbid diagnosis, I would say less than 25% of those see 
a psychiatrist. So what I was saying before was that I feel that because we are 
an integrated clinic and I have a behaviorist in my clinic that I have greater 
comfort in treating children who have behavioral health problems or SEO or 
depression, anything like that, better than someone who does not have a 
behaviorist in their clinic. And that's because . . .  we're able to cross train, if you 
will. So I can share some information regarding medications and some 
physiology and things like that with the behaviorist, and they can share with me 
some techniques and other pointers that I can share with families. So there's 
some cross-training going on there and increased comfort levels. That goes on a 
daily basis. Every day we work together. (transcript of a recorded interview, 
2005, May 13, lines 685-705) 
The social worker elaborated, saying, 
The one thing that's nice about it is then there's an integrated treatment plan; and 
if the child then comes back for an ear infection and she still knows that they're 
recommended in intervention for her ADHD, and she can in two minutes just say, 
"I just want to make sure you're doing 'X', 'Y', and 'Z. Have you had any 
obstacles to that?" Then if so, somebody can come back in and help problem­
solve with the family. (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, May 13, lines 706-
713) 
This model of integrated practice has not been constrained by the administrative 
requirements of TennCare and TennCare Partners or the financial structure of the 
programs. This is refreshing since all too commonly, providers abdicate their 
responsibility to provide high quality care, using the excuse that "the MCO (or BHO) 
won't let me do what I want to do". 
Although the appeal of integrating primary health care services with behavioral 
health care services is strong, it is imperative that there be patient outcomes data to 
substantiate the effectiveness of this model of care. Additionally this data must 
discriminate between different delivery systems and provider within those systems. 
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A Look Back 
Understanding how the introduction of TennCare Partners impacted the delivery 
of behavioral health care services requires an understanding of the delivery system in 
Tennessee prior to the inception of the program and how the industry has evolved 
nationwide since. A social worker that is currently an administrator of a behavioral 
health care organization, has the advantage of multiple levels of involvement in the 
delivery of behavioral health care services in east Tennessee over a number of years. 
When asked to reflect back on care delivery before and after the introduction of 
TennCare Partners, he cited first the need for change, saying, 
Now in my mature years, I am able to look back and see that in some ways I 
think our profession was a runaway freight train at that time, and we probably did 
not make efficient use of the benefits that were available. But I didn't see that at 
the time (transcript of recorded interview, 2005, March 01 , lines 54-58). 
He added, 
I now realize that at the time, we were not doing a great job looking at outcomes 
[or] managing utilization. I believe many people in our profession back in the 
'80s just kind of believed that we should be paid because we were doing holy 
and noble work and therefore shouldn't be questioned;  and we should be paid. 
think we dispensed a lot of resources without really thinking about what's the 
most focused way to reach outcomes and make sure that people are getting 
better and that their lives are changing for the least amount of money possible 
(lines 64-7 1 ). 
The influence of managed care was hastened and extended by the 
implementation of TennCare Partners turning the world Petty described upside down. 
Petty remembered that "prior to Partners, we had begun to see managed Medicaid . . .  the 
first signs of that [were] reducing admissions to all kinds of higher level programs, 
reducing length of stay, reducing reimbursement . .  . .  That's what providers see as the 
primary goal and desired outcome for implementing a managed care program (transcript 
of recorded interview, 2005, March 01 , lines 48-52). He added, 
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You know the old expression necessity is the mother of invention? Well, we 
have been forced [by the introduction of TennCare Partners] to be more creative, 
to look at lower-cost alternatives, to check some of our paradigms about the way 
things are and ought to be, and ask the question . . .  or the question has been 
asked for us . . .  we have been allowed to participate in the answer if we wanted 
to. Are there not some cheaper services that can also provide some of the things 
or better outcomes for people? (lines 71-77). 
Few would dispute the need for change (at least in retrospect). Many do though 
lament the nature and extent of the change. One respondent used the analogy of a 
pendulum and cautioned about "the pendulum swinging too far'', noting, 
Any time the pendulum swings from no rationing to considerable rationing, then 
somebody's going to get lost in the shuffle. Over on this side of no rationing, 
you're going to be delivering some services that probably don't need to be 
delivered. When you get into extreme rationing, then you're going to miss some 
people getting some service that need to be. So, I would offer that as one of the 
downsides. I don't see that as something that's just inherent in TennCare or in 
managed care or in health care. That's just kind of one of those facts of life that 
pendulum swinging . . .  you're going to live at one extreme or the other, and the 
ideal is to find that happy medium. Rarely do we do that. I think its human 
[nature]. That's one of the things that I think is lost (transcript of recorded 
interview with Steve Petty, 2005, March 01, lines, 117-127). 
Information Management 
There is a whole myriad of other instances of fragmentation in the TennCare and 
TennCare Partners programs. There is no information technology (IT) or other 
significant linkages between the pharmacy and behavioral health vendors and the 
MCOs. It is not possible to use data to construct meaningful episodes of care or 
evaluate patient outcomes or provider performance. This lack of meaningful information 
hampers efforts to manage program costs and utilization and ultimately improve patient 
outcomes by minimizing variation to improve practice. According to the unidentified 
member _of the TennCare Partners Roundtable, 
There are insurance companies across this country that make lots of profit off of 
providing health care services. And they manage them using data. When they 
see prescriptions going through the roof, they have ways of dealing with it. 
(transcript of a recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 411-414) 
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Interestingly, the advocates have been pressing for a strategy that leverages IT to 
manage prescription drug costs. They see this approach as a far more viable and 
responsive strategy to manage costs than cutting beneficiaries or severely limiting 
coverages. The idea of identifying outlier beneficiaries and prescribers and managing 
variations has far more resonance than across-the-board cuts that do not address the 
root cause problem or ultimately facil itate the maturation of managed care in the state. 
There is even a lack of integration within the operations of contracted vendors. The 
same researcher explained that Magellan has a system to monitor hospital 
authorizations, but the system was not l inked to other data and it takes a long lag time to 
integrate the data into meaningful records. 
Disjointed data systems, in some respects, are also symptomatic of the lack of 
integration around care. Some of this is driven by the way care is financed and how risk 
is allocated. According to a member of the TennCare Partners Roundtable who choose 
anonymity, 
We've sti ll got this fabricated system ... . We have a pot of money over here 
for .. .  the people who are responsible for community care, [but] aren't also 
responsible for what happens when they're not in community. [Could all] of our 
Community Mental Health Centers . .. take that risk? No. Could some of them? 
Yes. Would that promote coordination of care? Well, it sure seems l ike it to me. 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, l ines 572-577) 
The current annual budgeting cycle and vicissitudes of leadership change in a 
pol itical environment are also deterrents to innovation that is needed to better integrate 
TennCare and TennCare Partners . Much of what was done to launch the two programs 
was done without precedent or careful planning and staged implementation. Although 
there are instances where the BHOs have funded innovation (e.g. , video conferencing 
for court hearings), the annual budget cycle and ineffective long-term oversight and 
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planning has thwarted innovation. One way that innovation can be tested and ideas 
improved is through demonstration projects. However the current oversight and funding 
structures do not support demonstrations. The Roundtable member further observed, 
The problem is when you've got year-to-year budgeting process that can't go in 
the red, . . .  how can you make a five-year plan, or a four-year plan? Say you're at 
the beginning of an administration, and it takes you a year to figure out what's 
going on. So can you make a three-year plan to do some of that? That. . .  is the 
whole nature of government [with] the constant change of the leaders at the top. 
How can we have a strong State agency level that keeps the ball rolling? 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2005, February 24, lines 587-593) 
Data is used by the vendors to manage the delivery of care and provider 
performance. In turn the state uses data to manage the performance of the BHO. When 
asked how the state had fulfilled their role in managing the BHOs, Charlotte Bryson 
replied, "There has never been an adequate data system .. . . There has not been the 
accountability in place overall. There have not been data to provide the information to 
do comprehensive management. So, I do not think we've been effective about it" 
(transcript of recorded interview, 2004, February 24, lines 145-149). This issue is not 
peculiar to the BHOs. The MCOs also have inadequate data systems and there is 
minimal emphasis placed on performance indicators. 
Reflections on the Theme of Fragmentation 
Although good rationale exists for the carve-out of behavioral health care 
services and the practice is relatively widespread with good results in other instances, it 
is hard to make a case for what has happened with the TennCare Partners carve-out. 
Fragmentation in the design and delivery of TennCare and the TennCare Partners 
program has caused pervasive negative effects. 
One of the reasons given for the value of carve-out programs is the specialized 
expertise and focus that the specialty vendors bring. This is an important and 
compelling reason for the use specialty vendors. In the case of TennCare Partners, 
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there have been numerous barriers to leveraging the potential expertise and focus of the 
BHOs. These barriers originate from fragmented accountabilities. 
Proper construction of carve-outs and expert and ongoing performance 
management can mediate the ill effects of fragmentation that were seen in 
accountability, management, risk, care delivery, and data integration in the TennCare 
Partners program. Strategies and tactics that segregate types of care and providers are 
incongruent with the reality and possibilities of care delivery and management. 
Concluding Remarks on Study Findings 
The themes that emerged from the analysis of transcripts of interviews and 
review of a variety of printed sources were each discussed separately in the preceding 
chapters. The distinctions between each of these themes are important, but it is also 
important to note the web of connectivity between the themes. Each of the themes had 
an influence on or was influenced by the other themes. Mismanagement was a 
significant contributor to challenges to the TennCare authoritative hierarchy and status 
quo. Likewise fragmentation of accountability hindered good program management. 
Throughout the discussion of TennCare, program design has been differentiated 
from program delivery. The pervasive and persistent issues with program delivery 
dominated the discussions with all informants. Issues of design were seldom 
mentioned. The distinction between design and delivery is congruent with the distinction 
made by proponents of theory-based program evaluation who link the quality of program 
implementation with program results. Weiss ( 1 997) has said that sufficient quality, 
intensity and fidelity to the program plan wil l  yield expected results consistently. You 
could similarly say that if delivery is consistent with design, results wil l be what were 
anticipated. The delivery or implementation of the TennCare and TennCare Partners 
209 
programs demonstrate the corresponding negative of Weiss' assumption. In this case, 
poor delivery or deviations from the program plan yielded negative results. 
This disconnect between design and delivery, or plan and implementation, can 
be used to evaluate the concept of fidelity. The TennCare and TennCare Partners 
implementations were inconsistent with plans that were described in the waiver 
applications and what was said to the various stakeholders in various venues. The fact 
that the TennCare and TennCare Partners results were not what were predicted is 
entirely consistent with theory-based evaluations, given the poor delivery. 
But there is another piece which Weiss, or the other advocates of theory-based 
evaluation, including Chen, Rossi, Bickman, Lipsey, Pollard and others, do not address 
which is germane to this analysis, and this is the adequacy of the program design. In 
most of  the writings reviewed on theory-based evaluations, good design seems to be 
assumed or established. It is uncertain whether this can be said of the design of 
TennCare and TennCare Partners. 
It seems intuitive that poor design, even with good delivery, will yield results that 
are inconsistent with expectations. This analysis though did not focus on issues of 
design. Even informants as articulate and analytical as Gordon Bonnyman were 
relatively ambivalent about design issues in their interviews. David Manning and Manny 
Martins spoke of the foundational design of TennCare, but little of what they said was 
evidence-based or very specific. Only Dr. Bruce Vladeck substantially touched on 
design issues. Issues of design, which are more conceptual, are more difficult to discern 
and they are too often over-shadowed by the perceived urgency of problems associated 
with delivery. In the next chapter, the experience with market-oriented reforms in 
Tennessee and evidence concerning managed care in Medicaid will be discussed 
further. 
210 
The concept of fidelity to design was the lens that has been used to evaluate the 
question of what TennCare and TennCare Partners were designed to do and what the 
results actually were. To understand the answers to these questions, a broad 
consideration of contextual factors have beenincluded. This analysis had led to many 
conclusions. The state did not have nor were they aggressive in acquiring the expertise 
needed to run the programs. Accountability was seriously missing in the state 
leadership, particularly after the initial implementation of TennCare. There were serious 
deficits in the state infrastructure, most notably in information technology. The 
Tennessee marketplace was too underdeveloped for rapid and extensive 
implementation of TennCare and later TennCare Partners. The state was unable to 
partner with established, stable and proven national vendors. This void was fil led by il l­
prepared, hastily assembled vendors. The initial exclusion of providers from early 
discussions and the massive problems associated with the start-up of both programs 
deeply alienated a key constituency. Ultimately the inability or unwillingness to deal with 
urgent provider and member issues led to the breakdown in the carefully crafted 
relationship and agreements with the advocates. The state never made the transition to 
being an astute purchaser of services with a commitment to embrace their new 
accountability of performance management. The state failed to be broadly inclusive in 
the program design or ongoing oversight. 
All this said, it is conceivable that even with effective delivery, the program may 
have had too many liabilities that were out of the control of the state to succeed long­
term. Fundamental considerations, many of which wil l require a national response, wil l 
eventually need to be addressed. 
A commentary on market-oriented reforms and managed care, incremental 
reform, transparency and engagement in public policy and the right to a decent minimum 
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of health care will be discussed in the next chapter. The TennCare story will be used to 
frame a discussion about health policy-making health care reform. 
Health Care Reform: Ten Years Later 
As we undertake this journey of change, we clearly must preserve what is right with our 
health care system-the close patient-doctor relationship, the best doctors and nurses, 
the best academic research, the best advanced technology in the world (President 
Clinton, as quoted in ibiblio.org, n.d.) 
Just as it would be irresponsible to change what is working in the health care system, it 
is equally irresponsible for us to not fix what we know is no longer working (Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, as quoted in ibiblio.org, n.d.) 
Introduction 
It has been just over ten years since the introduction of TennCare and the failure 
of President Clinton's Health Security Act. In the ensuing time, the number of uninsured 
in the United States has continued to grow, costs have continued to escalate, questions 
about quality have not abated and concerns about managed care remain unanswered 
(Budetti, 2004). The costs for TennCare expanded more than 13 percent in one year 
from $6.1 million in fiscal year 2002 to $6.9 million in fiscal year 2003 (Mc Kinsey & 
Company, 2003, December 11). In July of 2005, the twelfth year of the operation of 
TennCare, Governor Bredesen, in a retreat from the vision for TennCare outlined by 
Governor McWherter, began the implementation of his reform plan to manage TennCare 
program costs by disenrolling nearly 200,000 adult beneficiaries from the expansion 
population and imposing benefit limits on all adult TennCare beneficiaries. Ironically 
Governor Bredesen's plan was set in motion at the same time the Governor of 
Massachusetts was promoting a plan to insure universal access for all citizens of the 
state. 
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Governor Bredesen's TennCare Reforms 
During the conduct of this study, Governor Bredesen's reforms of the TennCare 
program were proposed and debated. Before the analysis was completed, changes in 
the program were occurring. In numerous ways, the changes reflect issues that have 
been highlighted during the study and the polarity of views surrounding how the program 
is designed and delivered. The changes that are discussed in the following paragraph 
were only implemented after contentious debate culminating in changes in the terms of 
the Grier and Rosen consent decrees. 
In 2004 Governor Bredesen set in motion a series of efforts to reform TennCare. 
In July of 2005 the final hurdle was cleared, permitting the implementation of Governor 
Bredesen's plans. Table 13 details TennCare reform efforts. Table 14 shows how 
various eligibility categories are impacted by Governor Bredesen's cuts. Table 15 shows 
the benefit changes. 
A Plan to Provide Access to All Massachusetts Citizens 
In contrast to the state of Tennessee's partial dismantling of TennCare is an 
effort initiated by Republican Governor Mitt Romney of Massachusetts. Governor 
Romney has introduced legislation to provide coverage for health care services to all 
Massachusetts citizens through a free market system. The plan is based on an 
individual mandate, whereby those that can afford it would be required to buy a relatively 
inexpensive health insurance policy and those that need assistance would receive 
subsidies to purchase coverage. In addition, a concerted effort would be made to get 
eligible persons signed-up for Medicaid. Subsidies would be funded by monies currently 
used to pay for care for uninsured individuals. The premise of the plan is similar to the 
one used for automobile insurance where it is a widely accepted civic responsibility, 
sometimes a mandate, to have coverage. Governor Romney sees health care as no 
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November 1 7, 2000 
February 1 2, 2002 
May 2002 
March 28, 2003 
August 26, 2003 
October 6, 2003 
. . · 
Event : : · 
: .· · . 
Sundquist administration 
Governor Sundquist appointed the Commission on the Future of TennCare to 
develop recommendations about what should be done when TennCare waiver 
expired December 2001 (Tennessee.gov, n.d. c). 
Sundquist hosted Summit on the Future of TennCare, seeking input from physicians, 
managed care executives and Tennessee lawmakers about the future direction of the 
program (Tennessee.gov, n.d . c). 
Commission on the Future of TennCare presented recommendations to Sundquist 
(Tennessee.gov, n.d. c). 
Sundquist administration filed new waiver request with CMS; please refer to Table 6 
for additional details (Tennessee.gov, n .d . c) . 
Proposal for TennCare II presented to the State Legislature by John Tighe, then the 
TennCare Director; plan called for a new business model for TennCare and greater 
accountability. Plan also called for active recruitment of new MCOs (Tennessee.gov, 
n .d . c). 
Bredesen administration 
Governor Bredesen announced that benefit reductions approved during the 
Sundquist administration would be implemented April 1 ,  2003. The reductions were 
not implemented though because of progress that was occurring on a Settlement 
Agreement (Tennessee.gov, n.d. c). 
State and plaintiffs entered into a joint motion; see Table 8 for more details 
(Tennessee.gov, n.d. c). 
Settlement Agreement reached with plaintiffs in the four TennCare lawsuit: Grier, 
John B., Newberry and Rosen; see Table 8 for additional details (Tennessee.gov, 
n .d. c). 
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Table 1 3: Continued 
· Date 
. · · . 
Event 
. · . ·  . . .. .  •.· : : ;  . .  · .· .· >: :::' 
December 1 1 , 2003 Part one of the McKinsey report is released (McKinsey & Company, 2003, December 
1 1  ). 
February 1 1 ,  2004 Part two of the McKinsey report is released (McKinsey & Company, 2004, February 
1 1). 
February 1 7, 2004 Bredesen announced his reform plan called "TennCare Transformation" which called 
for decreased enrollment in expansion categories (children would not be affected by 
cuts), implementation of benefit l imits for all adult enrollees, a return to managed care 
and challenges to the TennCare Consent Decrees in federal court (Long, W., 2005, 
March 29; Tennessee.gov, n .d . c) . 
November 1 0, 2004 Bredesen announces plans to scrap TennCare (Locker, 2004, November 1 0; Locker, 
2004, November 1 1 ) .  Impetus for this announcement included increasing costs, 
reduced federal spending and ongoing litigation from the Tennessee Justice Center 
November 1 1 ,  2004-early Bredesen announced a cooling-off period and talks proceed between the Governor, 
2005 Gordon Bonnyman and other interested parties (Locker, 2004, December 26). 
January 1 0, 2005 Governor Bredesen announced TennCare overhaul after attempts to forge an 
agreement with Gordon Bonnyman and others failed (Johnson, 2005, December 1 8}. 
January 28, 2005 Judge Haynes blocked Governor Bredesen's plan to cut 323,000 adults from 
TennCare (Johnson, 2005, December 1 8) .  
April 1 2, 2005 The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the state of Tennessee did not need 
approval to cut TennCare enrollment (Johnson, 2005, December 1 8}. 
April 28, 2005 Judge Haynes ruled that approximately 300,000 of the adults in Tenn Care slated for 
disenrollment can seek an appeal hearing (Johnson , 2005, December 1 8) .  
May 27, 2005 Judoe Haynes rulino is overturned (Johnson, 2005, December 1 8). 
June 2005 State began disenrollment by sending out notices requesting information (Johnson, 
2005, December 1 8) .  
July 1 ,  2005 Tennessee Legislature approved Governor Bredesen's budget proposal which 
included TennCare benefit and enrollment cuts. 
July 2005 State announced that approximately 1 91 ,000-200,000 adult beneficiaries in the 
expansion categories will lose TennCare coverage and 97,000 of the sickest in the 
expansion categories will retain coverage; state also announces all adult 
beneficiaries will have benefits curtailed. Disenrollment begins immediately and 
benefit cuts are implemented effective August 1 ,  2005 (French, 2005, July 30; 
Johnson, 2005, August 4; Wadhwani , 2005, August 4). 
August 2005 U .S. District Judge Nixon approves changes to the Grier consent decree; Governor 
Bredesen announced that this would allow him to maintain coverage for 97,000 of the 
sickest TennCare enrollees slated for disenrolment (Johnson , 2005, December 1 8). 
August-December 2005 Appeals for disenrolled individuals proceeded and state officials incrementally 
announced decisions to delay cuts in enrolment for certain groups of beneficiaries 
(Johnson, 2005, December 7; Powers, 2005, December 21}. 
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Table 14: TennCare El igibi l ity Categories Affected by Proposed 2005 Changes 
Category Detai l . · : ·. • Adult enrollment 
Medicaid categories 
Medicaid-eligible Not affected 1 million 
Medically needy Eligibility will be granted for 1 2  months; 97,000 
spend-down cateQorv closed to non-preQnant adults 
Expansion categories 
Uninsured Category previously closed to new enrollment 1 21 ,000 
Uninsurable 67,000 
Waiver dual Category previously closed to new enrollment 38,000 
eligibles 
Note: Enrollment preserved for 612,000 children, including 1 12,000 in expansion categories and medically 
needy/spend down categories. 
(Long, W., 2005, March 29) 
Table 1 5: Proposed TennCare Benefit Changes 
Service · TennCare Limits . · · • • TennCare post-2005 
· Reform Limits 
Physician None 1 2.lyear* 
Lab None 1 0/year* 
Inpatient hospital None 20 days/year* 
Outpatient services None 8/year* 
Prescriptions None 5/month (2 brand; 3 
generic) 
As of January 1 ,  2006, these changes had not been implemented. 
(Long, 2005, March 29; Tennessee.gov, n.d.c} 
different and bases the mandate on the concept of the common good (Appleby, 2005, 
July 4; Klein, 2005, December 12). 
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CHAPTER 9: REFLECTIONS 
Introduction 
The tangled story of TennCare encompasses great promise and equal ly tragic 
failures in execution. In embarking on a radical new reform plan for providing access to 
nearly all Tennesseans, the state created a new vision in a time of an ever-growing crisis 
of health care coverage and access in the United States. Unfortunately this vision 
quickly faded, overshadowed by forces that the state could control and did not, as wel l  
as forces outside the control of the state. The attempts to reform the delivery of health 
care to Medicaid beneficiaries in the state of Tennessee fared little better, and in certain 
aspects far worse, that other national or state reforms. Reflection on what happened in 
TennCare segues to a discussion about factors that have contributed to the failure of 
health care reform in this country. 
TennCare's long and hard fal l  from grace, traced from the early days of bold and 
compassionate promises to the disappointing dismantling of the program we are now 
witnessing, offers many lessons to those who remain committed to idea of broad access 
to affordable, high quality health care. In reviewing the history of TennCare, it is 
important to separate issues of design from those of delivery, and to separate initial 
start-up problems from persistent ongoing problems. Start-up problems were inevitable 
and acceptable given the speed of implementation and the lack of readiness. The 
inability to recover from these problems and build the needed infrastructure and 
competencies to be successful is unacceptable. The inability to avoid past mistakes is 
particularly alarming. Governor McWherter and his team braced themselves for the 
fallout from the implementation of the program. In the year between the program start­
up and the end of the administration key administration officials, including the Governor 
himself, demonstrated a resolve to actively manage problems and do what was need for 
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sustained success. That same effective resolve and commitment was not evident in the 
subsequent administrations. The inability or unwillingness to build an effective 
information technology infrastructure and make a continued and strong commitment to 
performance management doomed the program. 
It was not the consent decrees, as many asserted, that prevented the TennCare 
and TennCare Partners from being successful. Had there been responsive and 
efficacious management there would not have been the need for court-imposed 
authority. The breakdown in the cooperation that Governor McWherter and his team 
was able to forge with Gordon Bonnyman and the other advocates was pivotal in the 
eventual tarnishing of a vision of health care access for all Tennesseans. Many have 
decried Mr. Bonnyman's exactness and idealism, but it must be acknowledged that Mr. 
Bonnyman was pragmatic enough to join forces with Governor McWherter fully 
cognizant that the start-up of TennCare would be difficult. It was only when the 
subsequent administrations were entrenched in a pattern of mismanagement that Mr. 
Bonnyman was compelled to seek relief in the courts. 
The inclusion of the advocate community in the early discussions about 
TennCare demonstrates that when reasonable people come together for a common 
purpose, solutions can be forged . The power of the alliance of the McWherter 
administration with the advocates is undeniable, but without the other major 
stakeholders it was not powerful enough. When governmental deliberations and actions 
became insular it was evidence of how impotent the state government had become in 
the management of TennCare. 
The failures or TennCare we have so sadly witnessed through its history and 
most recently with the disenrollment of 290,000 beneficiaries and the unsound assaults 
on substantial building blocks of an effective health care delivery program, are due to 
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factors that the state clearly could have, but did not, address. In contemplating the 
TennCare story, it is tempting to think the story is peculiar to Tennessee. It is not. While 
there are certainly innumerable instances where the state did not execute well, the 
underlying crisis regarding health care coverage in the United States can not be 
dismissed as a state problem. There are fundamental national issues that must be 
addressed for meaningful and sustainable reform to progress. There are other factors 
that made fulfil lment of the promise virtually impossible. These factors relate to the very 
principles that were used to ground the program. Beneath all the turmoil of and il l­
effects of poor management are fundamental design flaws. The model of health care 
reform the state used as a vision has never lived up to expectations or produced 
continued results. For any health care reform to be successful there needs to be a new 
vision that is embraced by a broad consensus of stakeholders. 
The ensuing discussion addresses three key design issues including the failed 
promise of market-oriented reforms and managed care, the lack of transparency and 
engagement in public policy and the right to a decent minimum of health care. 
The Failed Promises of Market-Oriented Reform and Managed Care 
Americans are deeply ambivalent about the organization and financing of health 
care. We are skeptical about the role of government in matters affecting our 
medical care and profess a faith in the ability of markets to shape the health care 
system. At the same time, we are squeamish when we see financial motives an 
corporate self-interests at work controlling services that we regard as 
humanitarian. Of such muddled thinking, muddled health policy is born. 
(Bonnyman, 1999, p. 264) 
The promise of TennCare, enhanced access and management of cost 
escalation, was built on a foundation of managed care and the promised of market­
oriented reforms. This foundation, weak at the outset, col lapsed under the overly 
ambitious promises of the program. 
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An understanding of how reliance on market-oriented reform doomed TennCare 
requires a historical perspective and an exploration of Americans' values. The nature of 
health policy in the United States and how this policy is forged is essential to a 
discussion of health reform and an understanding of why reform has not succeeded to­
date. A review of health care cost trends highlights one of the failures of market-oriented 
reforms, the inability to manage costs. Other failures will also be discussed. 
Historical Health Policy Paradigms 
For most of the 1900s two major paradigms framed thinking about health care in 
the United States. The first, dominant for most of the century and actually rooted in the 
prior century, reflected the prevailing paternalistic approach to the delivery of health care 
services whereby physicians shielded patients from the complexities of health care and 
maintained an elitist and relatively insular position. Policy that arose from this view 
centered primarily in the extension of scientific knowledge for physician use and the 
training of an adequate number of physicians. After the Great Depression, a new idea of 
medical care as a "societal right" emerged. This idea was translated into policy in the 
mid-1960s with the birth of Medicare and Medicaid. In the 1970s support for another 
paradigm, market-oriented care, began to gain traction in policy debates (Schlesinger, 
2002, Starr, 1982). Market-oriented care relies on competition in the marketplace to 
manage the costs and quality of health care. 
The allure of market-oriented care had appeal across the political spectrum. The 
appeal though was rooted in very different ideologies among the constituents. 
Conservatives were drawn to the idea of bringing health care delivery more in line with 
traditional markets while liberals were attracted to the concept because of the appeal of 
patient empowerment (Schlesinger, 2002) and the opportunity to potentially increase 
access through projected cost savings. 
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By the 1 990s, Alain Enthoven, an economist and health researcher, had 
developed the idea of managed competition, a market-oriented reform model (Enthoven, 
1 993). Subsequently, Enthoven and his colleague, Paul El lwood, a physician, 
shepherded the development of a plan cal led "Responsible Health Choices" with an 
informal group of health professionals, government officials, business leaders, academic 
and other experts who became known as the "Jackson Hole Group" because their 
meetings were held in l iving room of Ellwood's home in Teton Village, Wyoming (Ellwood 
& Enthoven, 1 995; Enthoven, 1 993). 
Managed competition, a sophisticated offshoot of market-oriented health care, 
"relies on a sponsor to structure and adjust the market for competing health plans, to 
establish equitable rules, create price-elastic demand, and avoid uncompensated risk 
selection" (Enthoven, 1 993, p. 24). Sponsors were generally conceived as large 
employers or purchasing all iances of employers and consumers. Managed competition, 
as conceived of by Enthoven (it has come to mean many other things) combines 
competitive and regulatory strategies (Enthoven, 1 993). The Clinton health reform 
proposal used managed competition as its centerpiece (one criticism of the Cl inton plan 
was that the balance was tipped too far towards regulation). 
The "Responsible Choices" plan broadened the scope of managed competition to 
include Medicare, Medicaid and small employers. This expansion was designed to offer 
beneficiaries of these added groups the same choices as those of large employers and 
to extend the successes of the large corporate purchasers to governmental and small 
employer purchasers (Ellwood & Enthoven, 1 995). 
Managed competition includes the idea of separating the choice of a health plan 
on a prospective basis, usually annually, from the more immediate decision of seeking 
actual care. In this model, plan sponsors, such as employers and other purchasers have 
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the value-added role of managing the performance of plans offered, providing their 
sponsored beneficiaries with information to make informed choices and eliminating poor 
performing plans (Enthoven, 1993; Schlesinger, 2002). An understanding of recent 
efforts to reform health care requires an understanding of past reform efforts. 
Health Reform in the United States 
An understanding of the history of health reform efforts in the United States and 
how these efforts have been influenced by politics and deeply held American values 
provides good insight into how TennCare was constructed and promises perceived. An 
historical perspective also helps us to understand the factors which led to the many 
failures that have been discussed. An examination of past reform efforts and discussion 
of American values, attitudes and political structure follows. 
Federalism in health care. The federal government has had a relatively minor 
role in health care delivery and policy for most of the country's history. American views 
on health care and policy are the legacy of English traditions. The idea that public health 
is a local responsibility is an English precedent that has long shaped American thinking 
and actions. Likewise the conception of public welfare as an approach only for the 
"deserving poor'' emanates from the English example. Even in the 1930s when 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt radically expanded social welfare programs, it was 
with a clear delineation that preserved local responsibilities. Since the New Deal 
federalism that Roosevelt spearheaded and instituted, the federal government has been 
accountable for social insurance programs (e.g, Social Security) whereas the states 
have primary accountability for social welfare programs (Sparer, 1998). This division 
has resulted in the states having major accountabilities for the administration, regulation 
and, to a lesser degree, the financing of health care for poor and indigent people. 
Medicare though is a health care program for which the federal government is primarily 
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accountable. Medicare has traditionally been held in high regard. The same can not be 
said of Medicaid. 
Historical high and lows. Calls for reform of the U.S. health care system have 
converged in significant national debate in various times in recent history, including in 
1912, 1973 and 1993. At the heart of these calls is the common denominator of alarms 
about the number of uninsured and escalating costs (Oberlander, 2003). Despite the 
ability of proponents to focus and sustain national debate at these times, there have 
been repeated failures because of the inability to win politically or change deep-seated 
values. 
Barriers to Reform: lncrementalism and Vested Interests 
The healthcare system is like a fabric woven from many different threads. One 
cannot work on the fabric one strand at a time; instead one must work on the 
whole cloth. (Reforming States Group, 1998, p. 184) 
One of the most significant barriers to meaningful and sustained health care 
reform is a mentality that favors incrementalism. According to Dr. Bruce Vladeck (2001), 
"American political science is pre-occupied with incrementalism" (p. 153). In U.S. policy­
making, incrementalism is a description of the status quo and a justification for strategies 
that maintain the status quo. Vladeck has said, 
As is always a risk in social sciences, the explanatory power of incrementalism in 
characterizing the status quo can too easily migrate into a normative prescription. 
Because the world works in a certain way, the argument implicitly becomes, 
efforts to change it have to be grounded in the realities of the system, so that 
incrementalism as a descriptor is used to justify incrementalism as a strategy 
(pp.153-154). 
Oberlander (2003) echoed similar sentiments when he said, "Incremental reform may 
not be sustainable in the long run, for the very same reason that makes it politically 
popular now: It does not change the status quo of the health system" (p. W3-391). 
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Vladeck asserts that American public opinion supports incremental, meliorist policy 
change rather than substantial change. lncrementalism though is a fundamentally 
flawed approach that has failed. " I t  has become increasingly clear that neither the 
government (at any level), nor the private sector, acting alone, can be expected to make 
significant progress in addressing problems of quality, access and costs" (Reforming 
States Group, 1998, p. 184). 
Incremental reform fails because it fails to address the complexity and 
interconnectedness of health care delivery and financing. Relationships must be 
understood and managed and unneeded variations that contribute to needless variation 
must be eliminated. Coordinated strategies are essential for success. A graphic 
analogy comes to mind: health care is like a giant balloon. If you push on one side, the 
other side pops out. That is the problem with incrementalism. When you try to "fix" one 
sector, problems arise in another. Efforts by the federal or state governments to 
increase coverage can (and have in the case of TennCare) lead to decreased private 
coverage. Likewise as cost rise in the private sector and employers and other plan 
sponsors decrease coverages or increase employee premiums and deductibles, 
copayments and coinsurance, cost are shifted to individuals thereby reducing access 
and maybe increasing public burden. 
Dr. Vladeck (2001) has also noted a lack of congruence in the public's view of 
health policy. He observed, 
Since the early 1950s public opinion polls have repeatedly shown support for 
expansion of public health insurance programs, although not always at the same 
level . . . . Such broad consensus tends to fracture when translated into specific, 
concrete proposals. Antigovernment instincts in American political culture remain 
as powerful as ever. (p. 159) 
224 
Vested interests have blocked reform efforts. Special interest groups and other 
power players (remember Harry and Louise who were created by the health insurance 
industry in opposition to health systems reform?) have fragmented and thwarted efforts 
to produce significant, balanced and coordinated change. 
Fundamental reform poses a threat to interests invested in maintaining the 
medical status quo, including physicians, hospitals, insurers, pharmaceutical 
companies and suppliers of medical technology-the entire medical-industrial 
complex. National health spending represents these parties' income, and they 
are opposed to any reform that will slow down the resources society is 
transferring to them. These groups are well-organized, well-funded, and willing 
to take advantage of fragmented institutions that provide multiple institutions that 
provide multiple opportunities to block legislation deemed as hostile to their 
interests. (Oberlander, 2003, August 23, pp. W3-394-W3-395) 
To understand the impact of the ability of parties with vested interests to block 
substantial health reform efforts, one only needs to recall the "Harry and Louise" ads that 
the health insurance industry effectively deployed to create a negative backlash against 
the Clinton health reform efforts in the mid-1 990s. 
Added to these barriers are peculiarities of the American political system. In the 
United States, it is not uncommon for the President and the majority of members of the 
Congress to be of different political parties. Nor does party affiliation necessarily predict 
voting preferences. The American legislative process also makes it difficult to achieve 
legislative consensus. Despite this, Medicare, which represents a rare example of 
substantial health reform in the United States, passed as a single payer system. This 
was because President Lyndon Johnson, a federal activist, was strongly supported by a 
large Congressional majority, a unique set of circumstances. 
Competition in Health Care: Market-Oriented Reforms 
Competition is the center piece of market-oriented reforms. The focus of 
competition can be price, non-price factors (e.g., quality or amenities), market 
segmentation or some complement of these factors. The differentiation of these factors 
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is blurred in health care for several reasons. End-consumers of care, patients, are 
shielded from pure price issues because the consumer is generally is not the payer. 
Health care is unusual in that it is disproportionately supply-driven, not needs-based. 
America has excess capacity, most notably in bricks and mortar and technology, and 
perceptions, not evidence, drive the use and allocation of services. Price comparisons 
are virtually impossible in health care because of unneeded complexity and variation in 
benefit plan designs and plan administration, as well as a "black box" persona and a 
cloak of secrecy the health care industry has assumed. 
The propensity to make managed care plans more attractive by minimizing 
patient deductibles, co-payments and coinsurance has only exacerbated the problem by 
insulating people even more, at the time they seek care, from a financial stake in the 
consequences of their choices. Several informants in this study bemoaned the lack of 
patient co-payments in the TennCare. 
Understanding market forces in health care. Health care is notoriously unique in 
that the supplier of services has significant impact on the definition of need. Most 
consumers of health care services do not have access to information that would facilitate 
making informed choices. In many cases the information is not informative and in other 
cases it is not user-friendly or relevant. 
It is also a perverse incentive that the prevailing mindset in health care is to 
expend significant resources in mounting heroic responses to the effects of chronic and 
often preventable conditions while not supporting prevention or early treatment (in this 
regard the single-mindedness of the advocates concerning EPSDT should be 
commended). The inclination to rely on expensive, relatively low yield high-tech tertiary 
care is evidence of supply driving need. 
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There is little evidence of competition based on quality in health care. Quality 
measures are relatively immature and the complexity of health care super-imposed over 
naturally occurring human variations in response to disease and treatment make 
measurement challenging and beyond the understanding of most consumers (some 
would say providers also). Also little has been done in the U.S. to reward quality 
performance. Competition based on market segmentation is more evident. Efforts to 
compete based on market segmentation is evidenced in TennCare by the health plans 
that specializes in Medicaid and specialty services, such as the management of 
behavioral health care and pharmacy benefits management. 
Managed care: The name is a dream. To be competitive in market-oriented 
approaches, most health plans rely on varying degrees of managed care. The name 
managed care says it all. It is through the management of care that success will be 
achieved and not through a series of administrative constraints and overlays. 
Unfortunately managed care, more often than not, refers simply to managed costs and 
sometimes utilization management which is more cost-focused than outcomes-focused 
rather than the full complement of managed costs, utilization and quality. This is very 
true of TennCare which is first and foremost a funding strategy. 
Managed care (in its conceptual from, not the bungled variants so frequently 
seen) is built upon the rational allocation of resources. The objective of managed care is 
to move to a needs orientation where evidence about the cost of care are weighed 
against the benefits expected of the care and less expensive or intensive alternatives 
are considered. The rational allocation of resources relies on evidence to drive 
decisions, which is a move away from the status quo of a predominant supply-driven 
allocation of resources and unmanaged demand. 
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Health care quality management. The management of care quality has the two 
primary components that were described in regards to the concept of "in control and 
capable". Capable refers to setting a high performance goal and in control refers to 
minimal variation. The goal of quality management in health care then is to cluster 
provider performance around a standard and minimize non-value-added variation that 
does not contribute to the objective of maximal patient outcomes. This definition leads 
us to a discussion of the evidence that should be used to set standards of care and the 
issue of variation in health care. First, the evidence that quality is a problem will be 
presented. 
Health care in the United States was issued an indictment in the Institute of 
Medicine report entitled "Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health Care System for 
the 21st Century". Simply stated, the report charges that "the U.S. health care delivery 
system does not provide consistent, high quality medical care to all people" (Institute of 
Medicine, n.d. b, p. 1 ). The report authors contend that the difference between our 
current health care and what is currently possible is not just a gap, but rather a chasm 
(Institute of Medicine, n.d. b, p. 1 ). One quote aptly summarizes the concern, "At its best, 
health care in the United States is superb. Unfortunately, it is often not at its best." 
(Chassin and Galvin, 1998, p. 1001 ). Care frequently does not meet needs and the 
care delivered is often not based on the best scientific knowledge. Too frequently 
patients do not receive the full benefits of care available and too often care harms 
patients. How can this be possible in such a technologically advanced and prosperous 
country? 
There are numerous reasons, none of which justify ignoring quality management. 
Most studies provide only a limited perspective on quality. Studies tend to focus on 
single conditions, a small slice of the appropriate quality indicators, small geographic 
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areas or persons with a single payment mechanism (McGlynn et al., 2003). Because of 
this, we do not have a comprehensive view of the quality of care given to the average 
person in the United States. Paradoxically, most patients are satisfied with their own 
care and providers, but express dissatisfaction with the general health care delivery 
system. Care is very fragmented. There is not a single provider that is fully accountable 
or knowledgeable about the patient. Often care is not coordinated across providers and 
settings. Generally providers have difficulty moving from an individual patient focus to a 
group or system focus (Berwick et al., 1999). 
To keep perspective, much of what is done in health care in the United States is 
very good. Immature or otherwise critically ill infants and older adults afflicted with acute 
coronary heart disease are living longer than ever (Blumenthal, 1996). There are many 
other success stories. Quality improvement should preserve our many advances while 
focusing on the specific areas that need improvement (Agency for Health Care Research 
and Quality, 2002; Blumenthal, 1996). The need for quality management is driven by 
the wide and unnecessary variations that exist in health care and the fact that evidence 
is not widely used in the process of delivering health care services. 
Variations in health care delivery. In  the early 1970s respected researchers at 
Dartmouth published their findings about the routine treatment of health care problems in 
different geographic areas and health care settings. The wide variation seen in the 
processes of care delivery and patient outcomes were startling and not easily explained 
(Wennberg and Gittleson, 1973). Thirty years later the real indictment is not that the 
variations existed when the work was first published. Some variation is expected in a 
process as complex as the delivery of health care, but not to the degree discussed in the 
1970s and still apparent today. The real indictment is that the variations are not yet 
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adequately explained, justified or remedied, and that there is not widespread 
understanding and acceptance about which health care processes produce the best 
patient outcomes (Blumenthal, 1996). This variation indicates that practice is not 
consistent with the available scientific evidence. 
A more recent study (Fisher, Wennberg, Stukel, Gottlieb, Lucan and Pinder, 
2003a & 2003b) showed 60 percent variation in the care received by Medicare 
recipients, as well as the cost of care. This variation was not attributable to some 
patients being sicker that others. There is no evidence that the quality of care was better 
for those that received more care. In some cases, the care was actually worse. 
An Institute of Medicine report on unequal treatment in health care in the United 
States (Smedley, Stith and Nelson, 2002) begins with the following statement: "Racial 
and ethnic minorities tend to receive a lower quality of health care than non-minorities, 
even when access-related factors, such as patient's insurance status and income, are 
controlled. "  (p. 1 ). The fact that the quality of health care varies according to skin color, 
gender and economic status is perhaps the most significant health care quality issue and 
a social outrage. 
Ignoring the evidence. The science of health care is good. We are deficient in 
disseminating and using the evidence that science has produced. It takes an average of 
17 years for new knowledge generated by random trials to be incorporated into practice. 
The use of clinical evidence to drive clinical decision-making is uneven at best (Institute 
of medicine, n.d., b). We must assure that we are providing services based on our best 
scientific knowledge. This means doing the right thing for the right patients and avoiding 
doing the wrong things for any patient. 
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Is managed care more cost-efficient? Despite many claims to the contrary, the 
evidence that managed cares saves money is inconclusive. 
The issue . . .  is not whether HMOs reduce utilization rates below FFS levels, nor 
whether HMOs and preferred provider organizations extract discounts from 
providers and drug companies that FFS cannot get. I t  is well established that 
HMOs reduce utilization rates and that managed care companies can compel 
their suppliers to offer larger discounts. The issue is, rather, whether medical 
cots equal total costs. They clearly do not. Total costs are the sum of medical 
costs plus profit or surplus . . . . Evidence indicates that managed care has driven 
up administrative costs. (Sullivan, 2000, p. 140) 
The administrative burden (and cost) of managed care. 
The exceeding complexity of the health care system in the United States is 
evident to every decisionmaker in the public and private sectors. The financing 
system alone contains thousand of different payers or plans, each with its own 
incentives, operating in an extremely competitive environment facing increasingly 
sophisticated and demanding purchasers. (Reforming States Group, 1998, p.82) 
It is interesting to note that those that fear a role for the federal government in the 
delivery of health care services in a national plan seemingly accept the choking 
bureaucracy that exists today of private and public insurers and payers, providers of all 
types, specialty vendors, auditors, consultants and numerous other players. Those that 
decry the value of coordinated management seem to willing accept the unneeded costs, 
tremendous administrative burden, unnecessary variation and complexity of a system of 
silos. This defies reason. If the United States continues to resist a universal health plan, 
it is imperative that the country at least better coordinate the efforts and roles of 
government and the private sector. Interests of both should be more closely aligned and 
coordinated. If nothing else standardized claims forms, data protocols, reporting 
requirements and mandatory health reporting would help to eliminate would help to 
unnecessary variation and added costs. 
In an important 1992 analysis, Dr. Kenneth E. Thorpe, who holds a doctorate in 
public policy, explained that health care administrative expenses in the United States 
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were 24 percent of total spending, whereas the same number in Canada (with a single 
payer system) was 11 percent. Even in the U.S. ,  private plan expenses were three 
times higher than Medicare or Medicaid. There are several components of 
administrative expenses, including "transaction-related costs, benefits management, 
selling and marketing costs (to allow consumers specific choices regarding the level of 
risk they bear) and regulatory/compliance costs" (p.43). 
After an examination of each of these expenses, Thorpe (1992) concluded that 
"many transaction-related expenses could be streamlined if a universal health insurance 
program were adopted. A single payer could produce the single largest reduction is 
system-wide administration. Continued growth in prepaid practices and standardized 
electronic billing and claims filing in the fee-for-service sector would yield additional 
reductions" (p. 54). 
Some of the administrative burden of managed care is due to low yield 
management processes. This was clearly demonstrated in late 1999 when United 
Healthcare, a managed care behemoth, made the decision to discontinue prospective 
utilization review because the cost of the process was three times the savings 
generated. 
Consumer cost-sharing. Health care costs are the product of several factors. 
Most simply cost equals price per unit of service multiplied by the number of services. 
Cost is also a factor of acuity, which relates to how sick patients are and the intensity of 
services they receive. Basic strategies that are used by managed care plans to manage 
costs focus on both of these factors. Price per unit of service is managed by the 
negotiation (some would say imposition) of discounted fee schedules with providers and 
facilities. The number of services is controlled by various utilization management 
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strategies. We know that with TennCare strategies to manage costs and utilization were 
employed. 
Another way that costs are managed is through plan design and the 
administration of that plan design. Plan design encompasses what services the plan 
sponsor will pay for and at what level payments will be made. The TennCare plan 
design, like most managed care plan design, is very comprehensive. TennCare 
recipients pay virtually no copayments or coinsurance. There are few limits on benefits, 
such as annual maximum benefits. 
In 1971 the Rand Corporation, the first organization to be called a "think tank", 
created an insurance company (with funding from the federal government) and 
conducted an 15-year comparative study on health care costs, utilization and outcomes. 
The Rand researchers found that the experimental groups with higher copayments had 
reduced overall spending. The implication was that people consume unnecessary care 
when the charge per service is free or low. This was further supported by the finding 
that there were minimal health status differences across the various experimental groups 
(Keeler, 1992). 
The problem with the Rand Health insurance experiment is the emphasis on 
routine, low-cost services and the exclusion of elderly participants from the study and the 
protection of a $1000 cap on annual out-of-pocket expenses per patient (Bodenheimer, 
2005d; Robinson, 2002, March 20). According to Bodenheimer, 10 percent of the 
population incurs 70 percent of annual health care expenditures. It is unrealistic (and 
unwise) to think that cost-shifting to higher cost, sicker beneficiaries will yield the same 
change in utilization of health care services such as were seen with less sick 
beneficiaries seeking more discretionary care. 
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The Broad-Based Appeal of Market-Oriented Reforms 
Managed competition and other market-oriented reforms appeal to a broad 
spectrum of policy and decision-maskers and have figured prominently in recent reform 
efforts. Liberals laud the potential benefit of competition making the health care 
marketplace more responsive to consumers. Conservatives are attracted to the strategy 
as a means to control escalating health care costs. 
The broad ideological appeal of managed competition had particular resonance 
with the New Democrats and their leader, Bill Clinton. Managed competition seemed to 
be the vehicle which would allow expanded coverages through market forces without 
increasing funding. The demise of Clinton's Health Security Act did not damper 
enthusiasm for managed competition. Instead the idea spread to public health 
programs, most notably Medicare and Medicaid. 
In a fascinating discussion of the results of two surveys, Schlesinger (2002) 
dissected the underlying values of policy-makers (what the author calls "policy elites" 
who are actually Congressional staffers with primary accountability for health care) who 
support market-based reforms. Schlesinger also compared policy-makers with the 
general public. Schlesinger found wide divergence in the underlying values of policy­
makers and interesting differences in the acceptance of market-oriented reforms 
between policy-makers and the general public. 
Support for the concept of individual choice, a cornerstone of market-oriented 
reforms, links conservative and liberal policy-makers who favor market-oriented reforms. 
Beneath this fa�ade of consensus are wide variations in the underlying values of 
conservatives and liberals. 
Value differences. On measures of equity and fairness in health care, 
conservative policy-makers strongly favor individual responsibility and the allocation of 
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medical care based on choice and productivity. In contrast, liberals reject the notion that 
health care should be an individual responsibility. Although liberals, like conservatives, 
support choice-based allocations, they reject an emphasis on productivity. Instead 
liberals are bound together in their commitment to the concepts of need and equity 
(Schlesinger, 2002). 
The attitudes of policy-makers are sharply divided from those of the general 
public. While 58 percent of policy-makers endorse market-oriented reforms, only 41 
percent of the general public embraces this approach. Those from the general public 
that support market-oriented care are less likely to support individual choice than their 
policy-maker counterparts. Another difference is that the general public is substantially 
more supportive of equality as a norm for health care and slightly more supportive of 
need criteria. The preference for individual choice seen in policy-makers is also seen in 
the general public (Schlesinger, 2002). 
The difference in attitudes about equality and need between pro-market policy­
makers and citizens is interesting. Schlesinger showed, through a series of 
comparisons, that the differences emanate from different perceptions about the nature of 
health care and health policy. Policy-makers, compared to the general public, "see 
health care as less essential for equal opportunity and are more likely to fear that 
government programs will be unduly burdened by fraud and abuse" (Schlesinger, 2002, 
p. 911). 
Schlesinger (2002) also showed differences between how power is viewed by 
market advocates and those who do not espouse the approach. Market advocates 
support a shift in the locus of decision-making power from the medical profession to 
employers (in the private sector) who monitor performance in market-based systems. 
The general public viewed professional authority more favorably (Schlesinger, 2002).] 
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Realities have not met expectations. Policy-makers' readiness to embrace 
managed competition was never matched by the end-users of health care services, 
patients. Despite an intrigue that has never been proven through a sustained 
demonstration of success, policy-makers of varying ideologies continue to support 
managed competition. 
The Lack of Transparency and Engagement in Public Policy 
The heart of American democracy---and of any democracy---is meaningful , active 
participation by its people in government decisions that touch their lives. The 
soul of [democracy] is the ability of its citizens to hold government accountable 
for their actions. Known as "transparency", this essential democratic process 
takes many forms, but all allow concerned citizens to see openly into the 
activities of their government rather than permitting these processes to be 
cloaked in secrecy. (USINFO. STATE. GOV, n.d.) 
Transparency refers to the state of being frank, open, honest, candid, sincere, 
genuine and direct (Merriam & Webster's, 2000). In the public arena, access to 
information is the cornerstone of transparency (Carter Center, n.d.). "Transparency 
implies openness, communication and accountability. It is a metaphorical extension of 
the meaning used in physical sciences; a "transparent" object is one that can be seen 
through" (Wikipedia, n.d.). 
In the recollection of TennCare's creation, operation and recent changes, there 
have been many and significant demonstrations of a lack of transparency. The limited 
public debate that characterized the start of TennCare, as well as recent the processes 
used to develop a "reform" strategy has limited public discourse and involvement. The 
unreliability of public oversight of the operation of TennCare, limited inter-governmental 
involvement and inaccessibility of current administration officials are further 
demonstrations of a policy of secrecy. 
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By creating a shroud of secrecy and isolation relative to the management of 
TennCare, most notably in the Bredesen administration, government officials have 
ignored the voices of the general public, blocked stakeholder participation and stifled the 
diverse voices of the legislature. There have been few opportunities for Tennessee 
citizens and other interested individuals and groups to have an impact on policy-making, 
regulations and the administration of the TennCare program. Without transparency, 
there is no accountability. 
Transparency as a Cause and a Symptom 
The lack of transparency in public policy-making is symptomatic of deep-seated 
problems that have contributed to the inability to implement successful health care 
reform. The inability of our federal government to address the issues of health 
disparities, uneven quality, ever increasing health care costs and the growing number of 
uninsured reflects a lack of leadership, a corruption of our political processes by special 
interest groups and legislators's self-interests, as well as a lack of meaningful 
engagement. Recent reform efforts have only broadened the gaps between the various 
constituencies. Patients are marginalized by the very system that is supposed to help 
them. Elected officials and industry leaders are unwilling or unable to break the 
impasse. Special interest groups and other power players have fragmented and 
thwarted efforts to produce significant, balanced and coordinated change (sadly, nurses 
have generally not participated in the policy-making process in a role commensurate 
with their professional experience and expertise). The lack of transparency also inhibits 
engagement in public policy. 
Defining Collaboration 
Leadership and new ways of addressing problems are clearly needed to develop, 
implement and evaluate policies that promote health and general social well-being. 
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Collaboration is a means to engage the citizenry in the resolution of urgent problems. 
Collaboration profoundly changes how we effect change and our views of leadership 
(Chrislip & Larson, 1994). "Collaborations have the power to deal with difficult issues 
while embodying fairness because they include voices otherwise excluded (American 
Assemblies, 2002). Chrislip and Larson (1994) see collaboration as "not simply another 
strategy or tactic for achieving an end. It is something broader, more encompassing, 
and more powerful" (p. 11 ). Americans have a history of building communities by 
accident and out of crisis. The efforts following September 11, 2001 certainly 
demonstrate the latter (American Assemblies, 2002). This paper is about building 
community by design. 
To Greenwald and Beery (2002), "collaboration signifies association of 
individuals or organizations with divergent histories, interests, and perspectives working 
together on projects of common purpose" (p. 3 ). Individuals or groups who collaborate 
seek to set aside their differences to focus on their common interests (Greenwald and 
Beery, 2002). 
Inners and Booher (1999) elaborate by describing collaborations as a strategy for 
dealing with conflict when others have failed (others have defined collaborations as an 
extension of more traditional negotiating strategies that deal with differences or conflict). 
They also see collaboration as a societal response to an increasingly networked society 
where power and information are widely distributed and the gaps in knowledge and 
values among individuals and communities are growing. 
The American Assemblies convened a group of American thought leaders in 
1999 under the auspices of their Uniting America series to look specifically at 
collaborations and its linkage to democracy. Included in the report released by the 
group were the characteristics of successful collaborations. These include 
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demonstrated needs and concrete problems; clear visions and tangible goals; well­
defined roles; participants having shared values relative to the problem; a process that 
supports respect and trust; strong champions; the opportunity for all participants to 
derive clear benefits; adequate funding; participants who are close to the problem; 
genuine involvement; and broad-based participation (American Assemblies, 2002). 
Chrislip and Larson (1994) identified keys to successful collaborations through a 
study of six exemplary cases to create preliminary conclusions and the subsequent 
testing of these conclusions with an 46 additional cases. The selection criteria for the 
exemplary cases were production of concrete, tangible results; a sufficiently complex 
cross-sectoral problem; significant barriers and obstacles to overcoming the problem; 
many and diverse stakeholders; and widespread acknowledgement and recognition of 
the collaboration's success. The keys to successful collaboration identified were good 
timing and clear need, strong stakeholder groups, broad-based involvement, credibility 
and openness of the process, commitment and/or visibility of high-level and visible 
leaders, support or acquiescence of established authorities or powers, successful 
handling of mistrust and skepticism, strong process leadership, interim successes and a 
shift to broader concerns (from narrow, parochial interests). 
Collaboration that involves players from the public sector, business and non­
profit organizations has been termed cross-sectoral collaboration (Logsdon, 19091 ). 
Cross-sectoral collaboration is particularly applicable to complex social problem-solving 
(American Assemblies, 2002; Austin, 2000; Drucker, 1999; Logsdon, 1991). Cross­
sectoral collaboration has been used for a variety of societal problems, including 
workforce development, environmental stewardship and preservation, improving 
education, homelessness and community and cultural development (American 
Assemblies, 2002. ;  Logsdon, 1991). 
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The primary research available on cross-sectoral collaboration is case studies. 
Case studies and related work in the field of inter-organizational relations have 
contributed to the development of conceptual models and other descriptors. Gray 
(1985) has identified six issues which must be addressed during an early collaboration. 
These are common definition of the problem, commitment to participate, identification of 
stakeholders, acceptance of the legitimacy of the other stakeholders, presence of a 
convener and identification of resources. 
Logsdon (1991) proposes that six issues identified by Gray (1985) must be 
addressed in initial collaborations, but more important are two essential pre-conditions 
for any collaborative effort. These two factors are "the interests or stakes of the 
organization in the outcome" and "the perceived interdependence with the groups" 
(Logsdon, 1991, p. 25) dealing with the problem. Using these two essential factors, 
Logsdon (1991) developed a matrix for assessing the potential for cross-sectoral 
collaboration and to track the dynamic evolutions of cross-sectoral collaborations. The 
matrix has four categories, including low stakes/low interdependence, low stake/high 
interdependence, high stakes/low interdependence and high stakes/high 
interdependence. Collaborative potential is highest with high stakes/high 
interdependence and lowest with low stakes/low interdependence. 
Two predominant patterns of the evolution of collaborative efforts can be 
explained by the matrix. One pattern involves the movement form low stakes/low 
interdependence to low stakes/high interdependence to high stakes/high 
interdependence. The other pattern is the movement from low stakes/low 
interdependence to high stakes/ low interdependence and on to high stakes/high 
interdependence (Logsdon, 1991 ). I was not able to find any research that tested the 
model for the essential features of collaboration presented in the matrix. Such research 
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is needed to enhance the utility of the model for predicting the potential success of 
collaborations and to analyze failures or difficulties with collaboration. 
Linking Deliberative Democracy and Collaboration 
Collaboration and consensus are closely aligned with deliberative democratic 
theory. In deliberative democratic theory, legitimacy is defined as the ability or 
opportunity to participate (or not participate) in effective deliberation. Essential to this 
definition is the concept that decisions resulting from deliberation are justified on 
reflection, where reflection embodies the idea that preferences are transformed through 
deliberations. Deliberation is a social process where participants are open to changes in 
preferences or judgments during the course of interaction. It is essential in deliberation 
that these changes result from persuasion, not coercion, manipulation or deception 
(Dryzek, 2002). Many see deliberation as the true essence of democracy, rather than 
voting, rights or even self-government. 
The defining characteristics of what Chrislip and Larson (1994) call the 
collaborative premise parallel characteristics of deliberative democracy. The 
collaborative premise is that "if you bring appropriate people together in constructive 
ways with good information, they will create authentic visions and strategies for 
addressing shared concerns of the organization or community" (Chrislip and Larson, 
1 994, p . 1 4) .  
The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care 
Freedom . . .  requires that basic human needs . . .  must be met if freedom itself is to 
endure. Life is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of all things and it is, 
therefore, the necessary condition if freedom is to exist. Life, in a sense, enables 
freedom. The ability to live depends on a decent minimum of basic necessities. 
Freedom to starve or die of a remediable condition is a mockery. Individual 
freedom requires life and the health to enjoy that life. (Loewy, 1987, p. 790) 
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There are many worthy ethical and moral arguments that can (and have been) 
set forth to support a call for a decent minimum of health care for all U.S. citizens. Some 
of the arguments include the assertion that all citizens have a right to a decent minimum 
of health care. Rather than pursue these arguments and explore the merits of the 
rationale of each, more pragmatic and accessible points will be made to argue for a 
decent minimum of health care. I assert that it is imperative that arguments be 
developed that resonate with policymakers, politicians and the public to break the 
impasses about health care reform at the national level and ground the public debate 
which is essential for success. 
A Decent Minimum of Health Care 
What is meant by a decent minimum? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(n.d.) defines a social minimum (of which a decent minimum is a corollary) as "that 
bundle of resources which suffices in the circumstances of a given society to enable 
someone to lead a minimally decent life" (para 2). Dr. Lawrence Schneiderman, a 
Professor with the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine at the University of 
California San Diego, is a prominent advocate of a decent minimum of health care for all 
Americans. He defines a decent minimum of health care as that which "enables [a 
person] to hold a job, obtain an education, raise a family, in other words, participate 
successfully in society" (University of California San Diego, 2004, p. 4). 
The Personal and Economic Costs of Uninsurance 
The pragmatic arguments that support providing a decent minimum of health 
care for all Americans are economic. The societal burden of a large number of 
uninsured has become untenable. It is untenable from a strictly financial perspective, 
and it is incompatible for a country with a legacy of compassion to ignore the human toll. 
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Despite the innovation the Medicaid waivers permitted, the number of uninsured 
continues to grow in the United States. One in eight Americans, 43 million, does not 
have any health insurance (Quadango, 2005). To lend some perspective, the number of 
uninsured was approximately 37 million when President Bill Clinton was elected. In any 
given year millions more Americans lack coverage for shorter periods of time (Institute of 
Medicine, 2004). The majority of American without health coverage are part of working 
families (Quadango, 2005). The United States stands alone as the only advanced 
country without national health insurance of some sort (Krugman, 2005, June 13). 
The individual health consequences of being uninsured are profound. Uninsured 
people are more likely to receive too little health care & receive it too late; as a result, 
they are sicker & die sooner. Consider these sad findings: Uninsured adults have a 25 
percent greater mortality risk than adults with coverage; uninsured women with breast 
cancer have a risk of dying that is 30-50 percent higher than insured women; uninsured 
car crash victims were found to receive less care in the hospital & had a 37 percent 
higher mortality rate than privately insured patients; uninsured individuals with diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, end-stage renal disease, HIV infection & mental illness have 
consistently less access to preventive care & have worse clinical outcomes than do 
insured patients; if common childhood conditions such as asthma, anemia and middle 
ear infections are left untreated or improperly controlled (which is common if the family 
lacks insurance), they can affect mental & language development, school performance & 
hearing; women with no insurance are more likely to receive no prenatal care than their 
insured counterparts (15 percent versus 4 percent); and the uninsured receive far less 
preventive & screening services, as well as medicines & treatments that meet 
professional standards (Institute of Medicine, n.d.a). 
Societal costs are also high. According to the Institute of Medicine (2003, June), 
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Communities are at risk of losing health care capacity because high rates of 
uninsurance result in hospitals reducing services, health providers moving out of 
the community, and cuts in programs like communicable disease surveillance. 
These consequences affect everyone, not just those that are uninsured. 
The economic viability of the country is diminished by productivity lost as a result 
of poorer health and premature death or disability of uninsured workers. 
Medicare, Social Security Disability, and the criminal justice system probably cost 
more than they would if everyone had health insurance up to age 65. For 
example, when an uninsured woman with diabetes turns 65 years old and gains 
Medicare, her condition is likely worse and requires more intensive treatment 
than had she been previously insured. Similarly, uninsured persons who are 
mentally ill often do not get appropriate treatment and may end up in the criminal 
justice system at significant but potentially avoidable costs. (p. 1-2} 
Dr. Schniederman says his support of a decent minimum is grounded in 
pragmatism. He explains, 
It's in everyone's self-interest. It's in my self-interest that you are healthy enough 
to hold a job, that you contribute your work and taxes to society, that you have 
time to raise a family that isn't going to be a problem for me; it's in my self­
interest that you had diabetes, you don't wait until you need hospitalization to get 
your treatment, that somebody's educated about your diabetes so you can take 
most of your treatments on an outpatient basis. (University of California San 
Diego, (2004, August, p. 5} 
An IOM analysis (2003, June} showed that the care delivered to individuals 
without health insurance in 2001 was valued at $99 billion. It is estimated that this same 
group would incur $34-69 billion more in health care if they were insured. Adding health 
care insurance to all who lack it would return $65-130 billion annually. Because of this, 
the IOM study committee concluded that, "the estimated benefits across society of 
providing health insurance coverage are likely greater than the additional social costs of 
providing coverages to those who lack it" (p. 4). 
A Changing Paradigm 
A changing paradigm about the public's health may facilitate a willingness to let 
concerns about the common good become more prominent in the health care reform 
' 
debate. Gostin, Boufford and Martinez (2004} said, 
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Public health has a long history of designing the bui lt environment to reduce 
injury (workplace safety, traffic calming, and fire codes), infectious diseases 
(sanitation, zoning, and housing codes), and environmental ly associated harms 
(lead paint, asbestos, and toxic emissions). The United States is facing an 
epidemiological transition from infectious to chronic diseases such as 
cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, asthma, and depression. The 
challenge is to enable communities to facil itate physical and mental well-being. 
(p. 102) 
Essential ly the authors are saying that we need to reconceptualize what we view as our 
pressing health challenges. The epidemic of l ifestyle-related chronic diseases mandates 
that we mount a response just as we did in earlier times to defeat the devastation of 
infectious diseases. The IOM has shown that for five chronic conditions, diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, end-stage renal disease, HIV and mental i l lness, "uninsured 
patients have worse cl inical outcomes than insured patients" ( Institute of Medicine, 2002, 
May, p. 3). Additionally, the uninsured do not receive care recommended for the 
management of their chronic disease and they lack regular access to medications which 
are essential for the management of their diseases. Part of this response must include 
adequate health insurance, a decent minimum. 
Putting It All Together: A Vision 
National health care insurance that provides a decent minimum of health care for 
all Americans should become a pol icy priority. A national, coordinated strategy must be 
adopted. Whether a single payer system or a complement of payers is used should be 
determined through broad-based public discourse, discourse that is transparent and not 
dominated by special-interests. If an affinity for some of the principles of market­
oriented reforms is an agreed-to priority, it is important that there be a commitment to 
their implementation in a meaningful way. Any reform strategy must be predicated on 
"the need for state-of-the-art evidence-based medicine and technology assessment 
information, as well as data comparing quality among providers" (Nichols et al . ,  2004). 
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The IOM has adopted five principles regarding health insurance. These should 
be considered in the debate. They include: health care coverage should be universal; 
health care coverage should be continuous; health care coverage should be affordable 
to individuals and families; health insurance should be affordable and sustainable to 
society; and health insurance should enhance health and well-being by promoting 
access to high-quality care that is effective, efficient, safe, timely, patient-centered and 
equitable (Institute of Medicine, 2004, January). 
The American Nurses Association (ANA) released a pioneering plan for health 
care reform in 1991 which embraced the concepts of universal access and a decent 
minimum of health care benefits. The ANA's Health Care Agenda 2005 continues this 
advocacy and is more specific on one point that is worth noting. The ANA proposes 
that, 
The system must be reshaped and redirected away from the overuse of 
expensive, technology-driven, acute, hospital-based services in the model we 
now have, to one in which a balance is struck between high-tech treatment and 
community-based and preventive services, with the emphasis on the latter. The 
solution is to invert the pyramid and focus more on primary care, thus ultimately 
requiring less secondary and tertiary care. (p. 2). 
The keys to success are broad-based engagement and meaningful deliberation. 
"If you bring appropriate people together in constructive ways with good information, 
they will create authentic visions and strategies for addressing shared concerns" 
(Chrislip & Larson, 1994, p. 14). 
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CHAPTER 10: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TENNCARE 
Introduction 
We are continually faced with a series of great opportunities brilliantly disguised as 
insoluble problems (Gardner, n. d.) 
There are numerous lessons that have been illustrated by this analysis of 
TennCare. From these lessons, specific recommendations have been developed. 
These recommendations stem from problems associated with authority, management 
and fragmentation seen in TennCare. Although there are recommendations that are 
implied in the preceding chapter which apply to federal initiatives and accountabilities, 
the purpose of this chapter is to outline specific recommendations for the TennCare 
program. 
Authority 
It is essential that a framework for effective TennCare oversight be created. The 
entity given the accountability for TennCare oversight must be given the authority to 
oversee the program's operations in a meaningful way. The body that is conferred with 
this authority must be responsive to the public served and should operate with full 
disclosure. A collaborative model of oversight is recommended because it is more 
sustainable and responsive to the citizens of the state. The benefit of including 
advocates in the development of TennCare was clearly demonstrated. This approach 
should be replicated and expanded to include providers and other key stakeholders in 
the ongoing oversight of TennCare. It is imperative that the oversight entity have access 
to TennCare data and be supported by Medicaid and managed care experts. 
There needs to be agreement on basic principles of TennCare's operation to 
guide the oversight of the program. Changes as significant as the ones on which 
TennCare are based require sustained nurturing over time. It is imperative that 
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TennCare oversight be both guided by long-term goals and balanced with 
responsiveness to immediate and short-term priorities. 
Management 
A program as complex and far-reaching as TennCare requires adequate 
planning time for effective implementation of changes. Adequate lead time and 
preparation for changes are critical in managing the impact of change fostering 
acceptance. The state needs to minimize patient and provider hassles to the greatest 
degree possible. Many of the problems seen in the operation of TennCare could have 
been avoided by better planning to assure implementation readiness and inclusion of 
key parties. Involving a broad base of interested parties will facilitate the implementation 
and acceptance of change. 
One of the most critical shortcomings of TennCare program management is 
inadequate and disconnected information management systems. For responsible 
stewardship, the state needs integrated management systems to assess needs, 
establish program priorities and manage and improve performance. Data concerning 
TennCare utilization, costs, patient outcomes, quality of care and vendor performance 
must be readily accessible to stakeholders in a timely manner. 
The MCOs and BHOs should be held accountable for performance and be at risk 
financially; poor performing vendors should be replaced if performance does not improve 
after a reasonable time through a competitive bid process. Efforts to attract nationally 
known and proven vendors should be assumed. 
The state needs to develop core competencies in vendor performance 
management. Achieving this objective will require attracting new staff and empowering 
them to be effective in clearly delineated roles with very specific objectives and 
accountabilities. Reorganization of state departments and accountabilities within state 
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government may be necessary to facilitate coordination and integration of functions, 
avoid redundancies and eliminate gaps in state employees and departments' 
accountabilities. 
Principles of managed care, most notably financial risk and risk for performance 
and competition for state contracts and member enrollment, must be established. The 
retreat from the basic tenets of managed care, and the state's failure to effectively 
manage the utilization of care and progress to the management of patient outcomes and 
the quality of care has prevented the state from improving results and evolving the 
program. 
Fragmentation 
Although there is significant justification for the need for specialized vendors and 
the expertise they bring to the management of a program as complicated as TennCare, 
there is no justification for the lack of integration that has plagued TennCare. The state 
needs to establish single points of accountability and integration across vendors, 
departments and processes. A holistic view of health requires a more integrated view of 
the management of health care services. 
Table 16 provides a summary of recommendations. 
Conclusion 
The recommendations outlined are necessary for the long-term viabil ity and 
progress of TennCare. These recommendations transcend the many changes and 
iterations of TennCare that have been seen since the original inception of the program. 
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Table 1 6: Summary of Recommendations for TennCare 
.. Theme ' ·  : Recommendation : : ' ' '  
Authority It is essential that a framework for effective TennCare oversight be created and 
maintained effectively. 
Management A program as complex and far-reaching as TennCare requires adequate plann ing 
time for effective implementation of changes. 
For responsible stewardship, the state needs integrated management systems to 
assess needs, establish program priorities and manage and improve performance. 
The MCOs and BHOs should be held accountable for performance and be at risk 
financially; poor performing vendors should be replaced if performance does not 
improve after a reasonable time through a competitive bid process. 
The state needs to develop core competencies in vendor performance 
management. 
Principles of managed care, most notably financial risk and risk for performance 
and competition for state contracts and member enrollment, must be established. 
Fragmentation The state needs to establish single points of accountability and integration across 
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Glossary of Terms 
Aid to Famil ies and Dependent Chi ldren (AFDC)-A program that "provides 
transitional financial assistance to needy families. Federal and state 
governments share in its cost. The federal government provides broad 
guidelines and program requirements, & sates are responsible for program 
formulation, benefit determinations, & administration. Eligibility for benefits is 
based on the state's standard of need as well as the income and resources 
available to the recipient". (Administration for Children & Family, n.d.). 
Behavioral health care (BHC) - includes both mental health and substance 
abuse care, which are often categorized together because of a relationship 
between the two. 
Health plans-the names health plans and MCOs are used interchangeably to 
reflect organizations used to manage the cost and delivery of health care 
services. 
Managed behavioral health care organization (MBHCO) - MCOs that 
specialize in the management of mental health and substance abuse care. In 
this document, the more generic MCO term is often used to refer to MBHCOs. 
Managed care-"a system designed to maintain the quality of health care in a 
cost-effective manner. It encompasses both the delivery of health care and the 
payment for those services. Instead of simply paying claims submitted by 
independent physicians and hospitals, organizations enter into formal 
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Glossary of Terms continued 
agreements with providers, set guidelines for health care providers and monitor 
their effectiveness" (Managed Care Terms & Definitions). 
Managed care organization (MCO)-"may be a physician group, health plan, 
hospital or health system-Le.,  any organization that is accountable for the health 
of an enrolled group of people. In contrast to organizations that provide services 
at a discount but do not attempt to coordinate care, managed care organizations 
actually have responsibility for the health of enrollees, and, as a consequence, 
seek improvements in both results and cost-effectiveness of the services 
provided. Most managed care organizations still care for those with traditional 
indemnity insurance" (Managed Care-A Brief Glossary, n.d.). 
Managed care plan-"any health plan that requires or creates incentives for an 
enrollee to use providers that are owned, managed, or under contract" (Managed 
Care Health Plan Definitions, n.d.). 
Medicaid-"Federal program (Title XIX of the Social Security Act) that pays for 
health services for certain categories of people who are poor, elderly, blind, 
disabled, or who are enrolled in certain programs, including Medicaid waivers. 
Joint Federal/State funds are used to support the Medicaid program" (Health 
Care Definitions, n.d.) . 
Medicare-federal health insurance program for older Americans and the 
disabled. 
Supplemental Security Income (SSl)-A federal income supplement program 
funded by general tax revenues which is designed to help aged, disabled and 
blind people who have little or no income (Social Security Online, n.d.) .  
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Glossary of Terms continued 
Types of Managed Care Plans 
Carve-out-"an arrangement whereby the health plan or an employer eliminate 
coverage for a specific category of service and contracts with a separate set of 
providers for those services according to a predetermined fee schedule" (Health 
Care Definitions, n.d.). A diagram of behavioral health care carve-out 
arrangements is shown in Appendix B. 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)-"a health care financing and delivery 
system that provides comprehensive health care for enrollees in a particular 
geographic area" (Managed Care Health Plans Definitions, n.d.). 
Financing Mechanisms 
Capitation-fixed monthly or annual rate paid to a health plan or provider, 
regardless of how few or many services are used. 
Fee-for-Service-traditional payment mechanism where a provider is paid a fee 
for each service performed. 
Risk-sharing-a financial arrangement where the MCO and the purchaser share 




List of Acronyms 
ADHD-Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
AFDC-Aid to Family and Dependent Children 
ANA-American Nurse Association 
BHO-Behavioral Health Organization 
CMHC-Community Mental Health Center 
CMS-Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
ETHRA-East Tennessee Human Resources Agency 
FFS-F ee-for-service 
FY -Fiscal year 
GAO-Government Accounting Office 
GNP-Gross National Product 
HCFA-Health Care Financing Organization 
HMO-Health maintenance organization 
ICM-Institute of Medicine 
MBHC-Managed behavioral health care 
MCO-Managed care organization 
PBM-Pharmacy benefits manager 
POL-Preferred drug list 
PCS-Point of service 
PPO-Preferred provider organization 
RFP-Request for proposal 
RMHI-Regional Mental Health Institute 
SEO-Serious emotional disorders 
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List of Acronyms continued 
SFY-State fiscal year 
SMHA 
SPMI-Seriously and persistently mentally ill 
TAADAS 
TAMI-Tennessee Alliance for the Mentally Ill 
TAMHO-Tennessee Association of Mental health Organizations 
TDMHMR-Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation 
TDMHDD-Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities 
TMA-Tennessee Medical Association 
TNA-Tennessee Nurses Association 
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Continuum of Types of Managed Care Plans 
Group : .  . . .  ·




Sample Consent Form for Providers 
I am Carole R. Myers, a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee at Knoxvil le, 
College of Nursing. I am conducting a case study about the TennCare Partners program 
and access to care for chi ldren with serious emotional disorders (SEO) as research for a 
dissertation. 
You are invited to participate in a study that will explore your perspective about the 
TennCare Partners program and/or access to care for chi ldren with SEO. A goal of this 
study is to understand the strategic objectives of the TennCare Partners program and 
the experiences of children with SEO enrolled in the program. Another goal of this study 
is to obtain information that may help state policymakers and administrators, providers 
and managed care organizations better del iver care to children with SEO enrol led in the 
TennCare program. 
You wil l be asked to participate _in a 60 to 90 minute audio-taped interview in a place and 
time of your choice. You wil l be asked to share your perspective, insight, experiences, 
thoughts and feelings about the TennCare Partners program. Other questions wil l follow 
based on what you share with me. The interview will be audio-taped in order for me to 
use you exact words. There wil l be approximately 15-20 other pol icymakers, 
administrators, advocates and providers involved with this study. 
All interviews wi l l  be typed into written form to allow for analysis of perspectives and 
experiences. Audio-tapes wil l be destroyed after transcription and verification. Your 
name wil l  not appear on the tape or the typed copy and wil l  be known only to me. You 
may select a pseudonym to be used during the interview. Information on the typed 
copies wil l  be kept confidential. All copies, with no identifying information, wil l be kept in 
a locked file in my home. Your recorded interview will be transcribed verbatim. The 
investigator may contact you after the interview to make sure she understood your 
comments and thoughts. Information obtained in this study may be combined with other 
information for future projects related to TennCare and Medicaid managed behavioral 
health care. 
As a volunteer in this study, you wil l  not be paid for your time and effort in participating in 
this study. There is l ittle risk to participating in this study. Information obtained from this 
study may help lend understanding to the experiences of children with SEO enrolled in 
TennCare. This understanding may help state policymakers and administrators, 
providers and managed care organizations better deliver care to chi ldren enrolled in the 
TennCare program. 
Participant's initials: ________ _ 
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Sample Consent Form for Providers continued 
You are free to answer or not answer any questions. You may choose not to participate 
or withdraw at any time during the study without any penalty or loss of present or future 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your audiotape will be destroyed if you 
withdraw from the study. 
Contact Information : 
Investigator: 
Carole R. Myers, RN, MSN-Doctoral Candidate 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 97 4-7626 
email: cmyers9@utk.edu 
Home: 
8161 Cedar Creek Road 
Townsend, TN 37882 
(865) 448-2310 
(865) 414-7218 (cell) 
Faculty Advisor: 
Dr. Sandra Thomas, RN, PhD, FAAN 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 97 4-7581 
email: SThomas@utk.edu 
If at any time you have any questions about the study or the procedures, you may 
contact the Principle Investigator. Contact information appears below. If you have 
questions about your rights as a participant, contact The University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville, Compliance Section of the Office of Research at (865) 974-3466, or write 
them at 404 Andy Holt Tower, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 37996. 
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Sample Consent Form for Providers continued 
Consent 
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study. I have had 
the study explained to me and I have been given an opportunity to ask questions. I 
understand that I may ask further questions at any time. I have received a copy of this 
consent form. 
Participant's name (print): ___________________ _ 
Participant's signature: __________________ Date: __ _ 
Investigator's signature: _______________ Date: _____ _ 
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Sample Transciptionist's Confidentiality Agreement 
I am Carole R. Myers, a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville, College of Nursing. I am conducting interviews with a variety of stakeholders 
about their perspectives and experiences with the TennCare program as part of my 
doctoral dissertation. 
As Principal Investigator (Pl) in this study, I have contracted with you to transcribe 
the digitally taped interviews. At no time will any of the information obtained as part of 
this study be revealed to anyone not directly involved in the research. All files will be 
destroyed after transcription and verification. All interview transcriptions will be given to 
the Pl. You will retain no information or documents from this study. 
If at any time you have any questions about the study or the procedures, you may 
contact the Pl . Contact information appears below. If you have questions about your 
rights, contact The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Compliance Section of the Office 
of Research at (865) 974-3466, or write them at 404 Andy Holt Tower, The University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville, 37996. 
Contact Information 
Carole R. Myers, RN , MSN 
Doctoral Cand idate 
The University of Tennessee­
Knoxvil le 
College of Nursing 
1 200 Volunteer Blvd . 
Knoxvil le, TN 37996-4 1 80 
Cel I phone: 865-41 4-721 8 
8 1 61 Cedar Creek Road 
Townsend , TN 37882 
Home phone: (865) 448-23 1 0  
I have read the above information and agree to provide transcription services in 
this study. I have had the study explained to me and I have been given an 
opportunity to ask questions. I understand that I may ask further questions at any 
time. I agree to keep in confidence any and all information disclosed to me during 
any portion of this study. I have received a copy of this confidentiality agreement. 
Name (print): _______________________ _ 
Signature: _____________________ Date: __ _ 
Investigator's signature: ________________ Date: __ _ 
298 
APPENDIX G 
Sample Consent Form for Non-Providers 
I am Carole R. Myers, a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 
College of Nursing. I am conducting a case study about the TennCare Partners program 
and access to care for children with serious emotional disorders (SEO) as research for a 
dissertation. 
You are invited to participate in a study that will explore your perspective about the 
TennCare Partners program and/or access to care for children with SEO. A goal of this 
study is to understand the strategic objectives of the TennCare Partners program and 
the experiences of children with SEO enrolled in the program. Another goal of this study 
is to obtain information that may help state policymakers and administrators, providers 
and managed care organizations better deliver care to children with SEO enrolled in the 
TennCare program. 
You will be asked to participate in a 60 to 90 minute audio-taped interview in a place and 
time of your choice. You will be asked to share your perspective, insight, experiences, 
thoughts and feelings about the TennCare Partners program. Other questions will follow 
based on what you share with me. The interview will be audio-taped in order for me to 
use you exact words. There will be approximately 15-20 other policymakers, 
administrators, advocates and providers involved with this study. 
Unless you specify below, you and your comments wil l  not be anonymous. 
However, you do have the option to be anonymous. In this case, all information about 
your identity will be protected. 
I consent to being identified. __________ Participant's signature 
I do not consent to being identified. I want my identity to remain confidential to all 
individuals except Carole Myers, the Principal Investigator (researcher). 
_________ Participant's signature 
All interviews will be typed into written form to allow for analysis of perspectives and 
experiences. Audio-tapes will be destroyed after transcription and verification. 
• If indicated that you wish your identity to remain confidential, your name will not 
appear on the tape or the typed copy and will be known only to me. You may select a 
pseudonym to be used during the interview. Information on the typed copies will be kept 
confidential. All copies, with no identifying information, will be kept in a locked file in my 
home. Your recorded interview will be transcribed verbatim. The investigator may 
contact you after the interview to make sure she understood your comments and 
thoughts. Information obtained in this study may be combined with other information for 
future projects related to TennCare and Medicaid managed behavioral health care. 
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Sample Consent Form for Non-Providers continued 
• If you indicated that you consent to being identified, you will be given the 
opportunity to review a transcript of the interview and to make changes. The investigator 
may contact you after the interview to make sure she understood your comments and 
thoughts. Information obtained in this study may be combined with other information for 
future projects related to TennCare and Medicaid managed behavioral health care. 
As a volunteer in this study, you will not be paid for your time and effort in participating in 
this study. There is little risk to participating in this study. Information obtained from this 
study may help lend understanding to the experiences of children with SEO enrolled in 
TennCare. This understanding may help state policymakers and administrators, 
providers and managed care organizations better deliver care to children enrolled in the 
TennCare program. 
Participant's initials: ________ _ 
You are free to answer or not answer any questions. You may choose not to participate 
or withdraw at any time during the study without any penalty or loss of present or future 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your audiotape will be destroyed if you 
withdraw from the study. 
Contact Information :  
Investigator: 
Carole R. Myers, RN, MSN-Doctoral Candidate 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 97 4-7626 
email: cmyers9@utk.edu 
Home: 
8161 Cedar Creek Road 
Townsend, TN 37882 
(865) 448-2310 
(865) 414-7218 (cell) 
Faculty Advisor: 
Dr. Sandra Thomas, RN, PhD, FAAN 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 974-7581 
email: SThomas@utk.edu 
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Sample Consent Form for Non-Providers continued 
If at any time you have any questions about the study or the procedures, you may 
contact the Principle Investigator. Contact information appears below. If you have 
questions about your rights as a participant, contact The University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville, Compliance Section of the Office of Research at (865) 97  4-3466, or write 
them at 404 Andy Holt Tower, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 37996. 
Consent 
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study. I have had 
the study explained to me and I have been given an opportunity to ask questions. I 
understand that I may ask further questions at any time. I have received a copy of this 
consent form. 
Participant's name (print): ___________________ _ 
Participant's signature: __________________ Date: __ _ 
Investigator's signature: _______________ Date: _____ _ 
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Sample Introduction to Study Information 
I am Carole R. Myers, a doctoral student at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing. I am conducting a case study about the TennCare Partners program 
and access to care for children with serious emotional disorders (SEO) as research for a 
dissertation. 
You are invited to participate in a study that will explore your perspective about the 
TennCare Partners program and/or access to care for children with SEO. A goal of this 
study is to understand the strategic objectives of the TennCare Partners program and 
the experiences of children with SEO enrolled in the program. Another goal of this study 
is to obtain information that may help state policymakers and administrators, providers 
and managed care organizations better deliver care to children with SEO enrolled in the 
TennCare program. 
You will be asked to participate in a 60 to 90 minute audio-taped interview in a place and 
time of your choice. You will be asked to share your perspective, insight, experiences, 
thoughts and feelings about the TennCare Partners program. The investigator may 
contact you after the interview to make sure she understood your comments and 
thoughts. 
Your recorded interview will be transcribed verbatim. You will be afforded all the 
protections mandated by the federal government and . the University of Tennessee 
Institutional Review Board, as specified in the Consent Form which will be presented to 
you before I do your interview. 
I appreciate you taking the time to consider participating in this study. 
Investigator: 
Carole R. Myers, RN, MSN-Ooctoral Candidate 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 97 4-7626 
email: cmyers9@utk.edu 
Home: 
8161 Cedar Creek Road 
Townsend, TN 37882 
(865) 448-2310 
(865) 414-7218 (cell) 
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Sample Introduction to Study Information continued 
Faculty Advisor: 
Dr. Sandra Thomas, RN, PhD, FAAN 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 974-7581 
email: SThomas@utk.edu 
If you have questions about your rights as a participant, contact The University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville, Compliance Section of the Office of Research at (865) 97 4-3466, 
or write them at 404 Andy Holt Tower, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 37996. 
I will follow-up with you in the next ten days. If you agree to being interviewed, we will 
schedule an appointment at a time convenient to you. 
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Sample Transcript Cover Letter 
Dear 
----
As I have completed the interviews for my dissertation and now transition to integrating 
each person's perspective in my telling of the TennCare story, focusing on the care for 
children with Serious Emotional Disorders, I am pausing to reflect on my good fortune of 
having the privilege of being able to do this work and benefit from your knowledge and 
experience. I am appreciative of being able to interview you and impressed with your 
understanding and generosity. 
As we discussed before we did the interview, I want to give you the opportunity to review 
a copy of the transcript of your interview and to make any modifications you feel are 
necessary. I have enclosed a self-addressed, stamped envelope for you to return your 
transcript with any changes. If I do not receive a corrected transcript from you within ten 
working days of the postmark date of this letter, I will assume that you agree your 
transcript is accurate. 
My contact information is listed below should you have any questions. 
Carole R. Myers, RN, MSN-Doctoral Candidate 
The University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
College of Nursing 
1200 Volunteer Boulevard 
Knoxville, TN 37996-4180 
Phone: (865) 97 4-7626 
email: cmyers9@utk.edu 
Home: 
8161 Cedar Creek Road 
Townsend, TN 37882 
(865) 448-2310 
(865) 414-7218 (cell) 
Sincerely, 
Carole R. Myers 
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VITA 
Carole Lynn Myers is a family Nurse Practitioner who founded and operated a 
rural primary care clinic in the early 1980s. Following this, she established herself as a 
managed care expert developing, implementing and continually improving a variety of 
managed care initiatives throughout the United States working as a business consultant 
to a Fortune 50 company, the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), and as a 
founder and principal of a benefits consulting company, Risk and Performance 
Management. 
Carole has a long-standing interest and involvement with outcomes 
management, quality improvement in health care and benefits delivery, and organized 
systems of care. This interest has been cultivated through a variety of experiences 
including serving as a member of the Board of Directors of the Managed Health Care 
Association (MHCA) from 1994-1997, as Chairman of the MHCA's Outcomes 
Management Committee (1995-1997), member of the Accreditation Committee of the 
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